Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

328. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, July 16, 1963, 10 p.m.

166. From Harriman.

1) At meeting¹ in friendly atmosphere with Gromyko, Zorin, Tsarapkin, main points three element test ban treaty including each point in Article I² and much of US-UK language accepted by Gromyko. Although NAP raised briefly, not pressed at this point, and further discussion NAP postponed until next or later meetings.

2) Two significant points of difference arose, on peaceful uses (Art. II) and withdrawal (Art. III).

3) Soviets objected to peaceful uses clause on two arguments: (a) as further exception to comprehensiveness of treaty, in addition to exception of underground tests, would detract from political value, worldwide appeal of treaty, and (b) underground testing already provides for possibility peaceful uses and experiments directed thereto.

Harriman urged need for peaceful uses provision, suggested US would find it easier to give up II(2) if Soviets could take II(1) seriously.³

4) Soviets objected to withdrawal clause on grounds casts doubt on seriousness of intentions contracting parties, and unnecessary. Gromyko repeated remarks on France Khrushchev made yesterday.⁴ Harriman and Hailsham argued importance withdrawal clause as protection to parties, and Harriman underlined importance China to US.⁵ Gromyko remained unmoved. Harriman made clear US would not dispense with adequate withdrawal clause.

5) Our present thought is to sacrifice peaceful uses clause for trade against withdrawal clause. Since Soviets have accepted US-UK amendment clause (IV)⁶ in principle, possibility of peaceful uses via amendment still open. In our judgment, satisfactory withdrawal method clearly necessary, peaceful uses not essential.

6) Alternative language of achieving effect present withdrawal clause under consideration. Soviets suggest each side make desired reservation instead of withdrawal clause. Soviets will make reservation which would by inference cover France.

7) Three-party drafting session tomorrow morning covering as much as has been agreed and whatever else seems useful.

Plenary session with Gromyko again tomorrow afternoon. It is likely we cannot then avoid discussion NAP. If it arises we plan to bring up non-dissemination and other matters raised at yesterday’s meeting.

8) Need your reactions peaceful uses and withdrawal problems, welcome other advice.

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret. No time of receipt is indicated.
1. Apparently held the afternoon of July 16. A full account of this meeting, at which the principals were accompanied by their advisers, is in telegram 186 from Moscow, July 17. (Ibid.) See the Supplement.
2. Of the U.S.-U.K. draft limited test ban treaty that Harriman had presented the previous day; see Document 325.
3. Article II reads: “The explosion of any nuclear device for peaceful purposes which would take place in any of the environments described, or would have the effect prescribed, in paragraph 1 of Article I may be conducted only: (1) if unanimously agreed to by the original parties; or (2) if carried out in accordance with an Annex hereto, which Annex shall constitute an integral part of this Treaty.” Concerning Article I, see Document 318.
4. Telegram 186 states that Gromyko “wished point out that in agreeing, for reasons indicated by Khrushchev, to having no specific reference to France USSR proceeded from premise that if France should continue testing after agreement signed Sov Govt would have to examine situation resulting therefrom.”
5. According to telegram 186, Harriman commented that the United States would “feel differently re withdrawal provision if Sovs could assure us that CPR would adhere in some reasonable time or that it would not become danger to mankind, which might necessitate” a resumption of U.S. testing.
6. This article provided that any party to the treaty could propose amendments to the treaty and that the amendments would enter into force upon ratification by two-thirds of the parties.