Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

318. Summary Record of the 515th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

Washington, July 9, 1963, 6:25–6:55 p.m.

Harriman Instructions for Mission to Moscow

Secretary Rusk initiated the discussion of the draft instructions for the Harriman mission¹ by calling attention to a sentence in the test ban section of the draft which authorized Governor Harriman, if the Soviets propose a moratorium on underground tests, to explore the usefulness of responding by suggesting a limited quota of underground tests. The Secretary said that he did not think the mission should mention specific numbers unless so authorized by further instructions from Washington. The mission should be authorized to do no more than to explore the idea of a quota for underground tests.

In response to the President’s question, Mr. Foster said he believed we could accept a quota of twelve underground tests without inspection. However, he pointed out that if the treaty provided for a fixed number of underground tests, other States would feel free to conduct tests and we would thereby lose the benefit of restricting proliferation of nuclear weapons. He agreed that we should accept a treaty with a quota of underground tests if that was all we could get from the Russians. He believed the Soviets could gain an advantage out of an arrangement permitting them a number of underground tests because the Russians stand to gain more from testing than we do.

Secretary Rusk said our objective is to continue to try for a comprehensive test ban treaty, accepting a three-environment treaty only as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive treaty. He repeated his concern about proposing any quota of underground tests to the Russians prior to consultation with our allies and appropriate Congressional leaders.

Mr. Harriman said his understanding of the instructions was that he was limited to exploring the idea of a quota of underground tests.

General Taylor asked whether the Government as a whole had considered a proposal to accept a limited quota of underground tests. He acknowledged that such a proposal had some good and some bad points, but he urged that, before approving any offer, the entire idea of a quota should be examined in detail.

The President responded by acknowledging that there might not be much for us in a quota of underground tests. He asked whether within the next week we could give detailed consideration to this idea.

In response to a question, Mr. Foster said our present test program involved twenty-five to thirty underground tests.

Secretary Rusk mentioned a second point, i.e. how we define underground tests and atmospheric tests in such a way as to make clear when an underground test becomes an atmospheric test. He said we must define precisely the cut-off point between the two types of tests.

Mr. Foster said definitions of these tests are contained in the draft treaty,² and he read the following:

Article I, Section 1—Each of the parties to this treaty undertakes to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion at any place under its jurisdiction and control … in any other environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted.

Chairman Seaborg replied that our present underground tests would be legal under this definition. Little radioactive debris from our underground tests falls outside the test area and none outside the State in which the test site is located. He said it would be feasible for us to continue our underground test program under such a limitation.

Secretary Rusk said the acceptance of this definition would mean that we were prepared to limit ourselves to weapons tests which produce no fallout outside the U.S.

Secretary Rusk mentioned the third point which he suggested should be incorporated in the revision of the instructions, i.e. in a discussion of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the Harriman mission should maintain our position that our multilateral force (MLF) proposal is not inconsistent with the goal of a non-dissemination agreement. If we did not maintain this position, we would cause great confusion among our allies and wreck NATO. He said the mission should point out that our MLF proposal actually means greater control of nuclear weapons and therefore is consistent with our effort to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons.

The President suggested that the pertinent sentence in the non-dissemination section of the instructions be revised to reflect Secretary Rusk’s point. He asked what our position would be on a proposal to ban dissemination of nuclear weapons to powers which are now nuclear powers. He wished to avoid any clause which would prohibit us from giving weapons to France if we so desired.

Secretary Rusk responded by saying that the draft treaty covered this point and that the Russians had accepted our definition of the nuclear powers as being the U.S., U.K., France and the USSR. In discussion with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin, Secretary Rusk had obtained Soviet acknowledgment that the four named States were nuclear powers. Mr. Bundy added that in our discussions with the Russians we should continue to take for granted that we are agreed on the four nations as being the only nuclear powers.

Secretary Rusk raised the fourth point. He asked that the instructions be revised so that there was no link between discussion of a non-aggression pact and progress in other disarmament missions. He believed that we should not now limit our discussion as to a non-aggression pact. At a later time, we may wish to tie it to Soviet acceptance of other proposals such as a settlement of the Berlin question.

Mr. Harriman asked that the phrase in his instructions be changed from “non-aggression pact” to “non-aggression arrangements.” The President suggested that the present wording of the sentence on non-aggression arrangements should be revised to clarify its meaning. Mr. Bundy pointed out that Governor Harriman should make clear that all discussions about non-aggression arrangements would be ad referendum to our allies.

The President suggested that the sentence referring to the desirability of an agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit should be strengthened. He thought that such an agreement would be useful to us. Secretary McNamara agreed with the President’s observation.

In response to Secretary Dillon’s question as to what areas we were referring to in the sentence mentioning nuclear-free zones, Secretary Rusk said we were thinking of Latin America and Africa—not the Far East.

The President raised the question as to our dealings with the British on matters arising from the Harriman mission. Mr. Bundy acknowledged that there was considerable suspicion of British motivation. He said many believed that Macmillan wanted a tripartite summit conference, even if there was very little substance for the three principals to discuss and agree upon. He said we should discuss with the British and reach a procedural agreement with them in an effort to hold to an absolute minimum the amount of information made available to the press about the Moscow negotiations. He suggested a procedure whereby each day a joint statement would be made about the developments in Moscow.

The President recalled a conversation with Lord Hailsham who took the position that the British could sign what the Russians proposed and they could sign what the Americans proposed.³ The President concluded that Hailsham clearly envisages himself as a mediator between us and the Russians. Mr. Bundy mentioned Ambassador Bruce’s nervousness about the personal attitude of Hailsham.⁴

The President said the reports of the negotiations should be held to a minimum distribution. He agreed that we should limit ourselves to press guidance once a day. He suggested that a personal letter be drafted for him to send to Prime Minister Macmillan calling attention to the importance of keeping the negotiations out of the press. (Copy of the letter is attached.)⁵

Secretary Rusk agreed that Harriman’s reports should be held very closely. He suggested that a special category of “Eyes Only” messages be established which would result in his receiving reports in a single copy. Further distribution in the State Department would be his decision.

The President raised the question as to whether a test ban agreement would be signed in Moscow or at a summit meeting. He expressed the view that the Russians might make a summit a condition to signing the test ban agreement.

Secretary Rusk said we should conclude an atmospheric test ban treaty if the Soviets agreed and sign it in Moscow if they wished. He shared the President’s view that the Soviets would not sign at any meeting other than a summit conference.

Mr. Bundy raised the question of how we deal with the French in connection with an atmospheric test ban. Secretary Rusk said we would keep the French informed. Mr. Bundy felt that de Gaulle would find it almost impossible to sign any agreement which had been reached by the U.S., U.K. and the USSR at a summit conference.

Secretary Rusk stated he believed that it might be necessary to hold a general conference at which other States would sign the test ban treaty. The President agreed that it might be necessary to hold such a conference in order to get other States to sign. Secretary Rusk said we should not permit the French to have a procedural veto on such arrangements.

The President asked how we thought the Russians would discuss a test ban treaty with the Chinese.⁶ Mr. Harriman replied that he would try to raise this subject with the Russians but he was personally doubtful that they would discuss this subject with us.⁷

In response to the President’s question, Secretary McNamara said he accepted the Harriman instructions and had no comment to make. He added that he felt General Taylor had some views which he wished to express as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

General Taylor said that the Chiefs individually had taken the position that a limited test ban treaty, as well as a limited test ban treaty with a quota of underground tests, was not in the national interest.⁸ Two of the Chiefs, General LeMay and Admiral Anderson, had already expressed their personal views to the Stennis Committee.⁹ General Taylor asked that a governmental review be made of the atmospheric test ban treaty to determine now whether it was in the national interest. He asked that the Committee of Principals review the entire proposal again in the light of developments during the past year. Such a review would include a review by the Chiefs as well as by other agencies of the Government.

Secretary McNamara said that each Chief will express his opinion on the treaty to the Stennis Committee.

This testimony will be the personal views of the individual Chiefs of Staff. He opposed a formal review by the Chiefs or by the Government as a whole because it would record again a difference of view. He hoped we could avoid a formal statement by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a body of its view of a test ban treaty.

The President agreed that we should not ask the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their formal position because we wished to avoid a statement of their collective judgment becoming public and resulting in press speculation as to differences within the government. He felt that if the Russians accept our treaty, we will have to fight for it in the Senate, win, lose or draw.

General Taylor repeated his request for a review of the test ban treaty in order to take into account developments during the past year.

Secretary McNamara again stated his opposition to such a review on the grounds that there was wider diversity as to the advisability of a treaty this year than there was last year. He feared that any such review would leak to the press while Harriman was en route to Moscow.

Secretary Rusk said we must now take the position that an atmospheric test ban is in the national interest. He said the time to review such a decision is behind us and that we have not [sic] based all our actions on the decision that we wanted to have an atmospheric test ban treaty. If we are not ready to try our best to get an atmospheric test ban treaty, then we should turn Harriman around.

The President suggested that following the meeting Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara and General Taylor discuss this point further with him in his office.¹⁰

The President then asked what we would do if China exploded a nuclear bomb a year after the treaty came into effect. He acknowledged that the Soviets could be properly concerned if France explodes a nuclear bomb following signature of a test ban treaty.

Mr. Foster read from the draft treaty the provisions covering the explosion of a nuclear weapon by a non-treaty power. (Article III states that if a nuclear explosion has been conducted by a State not a party to the treaty under circumstances which might jeopardize the determining parties’ national security or if a nuclear explosion has occurred under circumstances in which it is not possible to identify the State conducting the explosions, a State may request a conference of the treaty parties. At the conclusion of this conference, or after sixty days after the request for a conference, a treaty power can withdraw from the treaty by giving notice. The withdrawal takes place sixty days after notification of intent to withdraw.) Mr. Foster added that one advantage of the treaty was to advance toward our goal of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He said our signature to a proposed draft treaty created no threat to the existing military balance. He believed that opinion within the Government was heavily in favor of going ahead with the effort to get a test ban treaty.

In response to the President’s request to Mr. McCone for comment, Mr. McCone said he had none.¹¹

Bromley Smith¹²

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSC Meetings, Nos. 515-517. Top Secret. Drafted by Bromley Smith. The time of the meeting is from the President’s Appointment Book (Kennedy Library); the source text indicates it began at 6 p.m. Taylor and McCone also prepared memoranda of this meeting, and Seaborg wrote a journal entry. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, CJCS Memos for Record, T-236-69; Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President; and Seaborg, Journal, vol. 6, pp. 33-34, respectively)
1. Apparent reference to a version dated July 9, drafter not indicated. (Johnson Library, Vice President’s National Security File, NSC 62-63) The next previous draft, dated July 8, was prepared by Kaysen. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Disarmament, Harriman Instructions) The July 9 draft differs from that of July 8 in omitting some subjects from the list of disarmament measures to be explored in Moscow and contains new language stating that a non-aggression pact could reduce the possibility of another Berlin crisis. A July 5 draft is printed as Document 313.
2. Reference is to the U.S.-U.K. draft limited test ban treaty tabled at Geneva on August 27, 1962. For text, see Documents on Disarmament, 1962, vol. II, pp. 804-819.
3. This conversation has not been identified.
4. In telegram 5148 from London, June 19, Bruce described Hailsham as a “brilliant, honorable, somewhat impatient man. For considerable time to come, as a potential Prime Minister, he will, I suspect be fully occupied with domestic politics, until a successor to Macmillan is selected.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL 7 US/Harriman)
5. Dated July 10, not found attached. The text was transmitted in telegram 273 to London, July 11. (Ibid.)
6. In a conversation with Australian Prime Minister Menzies on July 8, Kennedy noted that the Sino-Soviet dispute was “the key and the negotiations in Moscow very much depended upon developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute.” (Memorandum by Roger Hilsman; ibid., DEF 18-3 USSR(MO))
7. During a telephone conversation with syndicated columnist Marquis Childs on July 4, Harriman stated that “he felt the big thing on Khrushchev’s mind [is] relations with the Chinese.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, June-July Telephone Conversations 1963)
8. See footnote 13, Document 294.
9. See footnote 11, Document 294.
10. In his record of this meeting, Taylor wrote that at the meeting in his office the President expressed dissatisfaction with the Stennis Committee for having the JCS testify on a “test ban proposal which might never be seriously considered by the government,” expressed “understanding” of the JCS position on both the comprehensive and atmospheric test ban proposals, and said that the JCS would have their “full day in court before the Senate if and when a formal treaty proposal” got that far. Meanwhile, Kennedy hoped that the JCS “would express their personal views as required by Congress but avoid doing anything capable of affecting adversely the Harriman discussions.”
11. Wiesner called Harriman at 11:30 a.m. on July 10 and said that while he did not wish to raise the issue at the NSC meeting, he thought Harriman’s instructions “on the comprehensive test ban” were “unduly restrictive.” Harriman “said to talk it over with Carl. He was the drafter. Harriman said he was never inhibited by instructions.” (Memorandum of telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, June-July Telephone Conversations 1963)
12. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.