Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

313. Draft Instructions for the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman)⁰

Washington, July 5, 1963.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR HONORABLE W. AVERELL HARRIMAN SPECIAL AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW

The purposes of your mission are three:

1. To negotiate the most comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty possible in accordance with existing guidelines.

2. To explore what other acceptable measures of disarmament the Soviets are interested in undertaking.

3. To probe Soviet intentions in related areas, including those mentioned in Khrushchev’s speech of July 2.

I. Test Ban

1. Our judgment that a test ban treaty is in the national interest rests on two grounds. First, it may be a significant first step toward the halting of the arms race and thus reduce international tensions. Second, and more important, it is an indispensable first step toward the limitation of the further diffusion of nuclear weapons. The prospects of a further increase in the number of powers possessing nuclear weapons poses a potentially serious threat to our security and to world stability and peace. Therefore, a test ban treaty must be viewed in relation to the problem of checking the further diffusion of nuclear weapons.

2. Accordingly, the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty outlawing testing in all environments remains our objective. However, Chairman Khrushchev’s speech makes it unlikely that we can reach agreement with the Soviets on a comprehensive treaty at this time. Therefore, we should seek an agreement banning testing in three environments along the lines of the August 27, 1962, draft treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in atmosphere, outer space and underwater, presented to the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.¹

3. The achievement of such an agreement should be viewed as a first step toward the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty. You should therefore initiate technical discussions with the Soviet Union which may resolve the present disagreements between the Soviet Union and ourselves and the United Kingdom on the need for inspections in any comprehensive test ban treaty. You may also explore other possible means of extending the scope of the treaty such as limiting the number of underground tests to an agreed quota.²

4. You should continue to emphasize the relation between the nuclear test ban treaty and control of the diffusion of nuclear weapons. In pursuing this subject, you should be guided by the talks on non-dissemination of nuclear weapons between Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Dobrynin.³

II. Other Measures of Disarmament

1. Our talks on general and complete disarmament in the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva have made little progress. Recently Foreign Minister Gromyko made a proposal⁴ which at least raises the question of whether or not the Soviets are willing to consider serious first stage disarmament measures not tied to an agreement to proceed rapidly to complete and general disarmament on terms which we have always found unacceptable. You should accordingly explore the possibility that the Gromyko proposal is intended to open a serious discussion of separable first stages.

2. In addition, you should attempt to discover Soviet interest in other measures not necessarily part of a general disarmament treaty. These include:

a. An agreement not to put weapons of mass destruction in orbit.

b. A halt to the production of fissionable materials, under appropriate safeguards.

c. In combination with (b.), the transfer from military stockpiles of agreed quantities of fissionable materials to peaceful uses. In this connection, you should be prepared to discuss an arrangement in which we transfer more fissionable materials than the Soviets.

d. The scrapping on a one-for-one basis of B-47’s and Badgers at a rate to be agreed.

In exploring these and other possibilities, you will be guided by the paper, __________, recommended by the Committee of Principals and approved by the President.

III. Other Measures

1. Chairman Khrushchev, in his speech, stated a connection between the test ban treaty and a non-aggression pact between the NATO and Warsaw Pacts. Neither the degree of this connection nor the nature of the proposals to which Chairman Khrushchev referred are clear. In exploring Soviet intentions in this respect, you should be guided by the following objectives:

a. If possible, we should separate the non-aggression pact from the test ban treaty and other disarmament matters. We should press the discussions on these, and defer to a later date the further discussions of the non-aggression pact. We would prefer to conclude the three environment test ban treaty first, get the discussion on other measures of disarmament under way, and discuss the Soviet proposals for a non-aggression pact in the context of our discussions of further disarmament measures.

b. Even if it proves impossible to agree on this procedure it is useful to explore Soviet purposes. The phrase, “non-aggression pact,” has been loosely used to cover a wide variety of possible arrangements about the way in which relations between Eastern European Communist states and Soviet Russia on the one hand, and the NATO allies, on the other, are conducted. In discussing these arrangements, we must continue to make clear that we can accept no arrangement which formally recognizes the East German regime or which renounces the ultimate reunification of Germany as a policy goal. Within these constraints, you should explore Soviet purposes in advancing this suggestion, and the possible modes which, in the Soviet view, would meet these purposes.⁵

2. You should also be prepared to explore any other matters which the Soviets wish to raise under the general heading of reducing tensions between the Soviet Bloc and NATO; or between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁶

0. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban I, Background. Secret. Drafted by Kaysen. Attached to a July 5 letter from Kaysen to Harriman.
1. Harriman wrote a marginal note next to this paragraph: “Should we sign if possible or wait for Secretary’s meeting?”
2. Beside this sentence Harriman wrote: “I don’t want to do this particularly as it would be more difficult to sell Congress.”
3. At the end of this sentence Harriman wrote: “Read this.” Regarding the Rusk-Dobrynin talks, see Document 287.
4. Not further identified.
5. At the end of this paragraph Harriman wrote: “Also safeguards our position in West Berlin.”
6. Harriman wrote below this paragraph: “Discuss Laos in depth.”