Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

287. Memorandum of Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)⁰

Washington, May 18, 1963, 3:30 p.m.

During a two hour visit with Ambassador Dobrynin on board the “Patrick J” the following points emerged. They are not recorded in exact sequence but topically, since the conversation ranged back and forth.

Reappraisal in Moscow

I started by asking Dobrynin what he thought the principal questions are which would be asked of him when he reaches Moscow. He said that the overriding question was whether it is possible to reach any agreement with the United States on any subject. He said there was a dispute on this point going on among the leadership in Moscow and that they were indeed in the middle of a reappraisal. He said he thought it was of great importance that some point be found on which agreement could be reached. He emphasized the psychology of an agreement on something rather than the importance of the subject of agreement itself. For example, although he said he was not speaking on instructions and that the matter was one in which Khrushchev had no interest, he personally thought that even a Civil Air Transport Agreement would be advantageous. The remainder of our conversation was taken up with further exploration of points on which some agreement might be possible.

Nuclear testing

I told Dobrynin that, contrary to what some in Moscow might think, the President is very serious indeed about pursuing the possibilities of a nuclear test ban. We believe that a nuclear test ban is in the basic interest of both countries and that it could be an important step in turning down an arms race which will inevitably become more burdensome and dangerous to both. I noted that Mr. Khrushchev’s recent reply to the Prime Minister and the President¹ seemed to rest upon two points of fact which it ought to be possible to clarify. First, there is the assertion as a fact that national detection means are adequate to do the job and that inspections are therefore unnecessary. I said that we could not be certain that Mr. Khrushchev was not speaking the truth about his own capabilities. They may have instruments which we do not have; that technical problems of looking at the United States might be simpler than those of looking at the Soviet Union. But what we can say is that we do not have a national detection system capable of detecting and verifying underground tests in the Soviet Union without inspections. As far as we are concerned, this is a scientific and technical problem. I pointed out that we were prepared to adjust policy to technical and scientific developments as exemplified by the fact that we are now prepared to enter into an atmospheric test ban without inspection. But this factual question as to the capability of existing detection systems is one which we ought to explore further on both sides. Their scientists and ours ought to be able to sit down and look at existing instruments and capabilities and come to joint conclusions as to what the facts are.

A second “fact” underlying Mr. Khrushchev’s reply was his repetition of the view that inspections mean espionage. I said that we did not expect the Soviet Union to accept and trust our determination in good faith not to mix up espionage and international inspections of seismic events. I said that we could, however, recognize that the Soviet general staff looks upon secrecy as an important strategic asset in their closed society and could work out inspection techniques which could not possibly involve espionage.

I cited the President’s reference to our willingness to make some arrangement to cover a situation where instrumentation pointed to the need for an inspection at a point which happened to contain a highly sensitive Soviet military installation. When Dobrynin referred to an area of 500 square miles to be inspected, I pointed out that the area to be inspected could be reduced by a larger number of automatic seismic stations, but that this was a technical problem of accurately locating the event itself through triangulation and other well known means.

In the course of our discussion I said that it ought to be possible for us to have a continuing negotiation on nuclear testing, that a first result of such a negotiation might be to report back to governments an atmospheric test ban which could be promptly ratified and put into effect while negotiations proceeded on underground testing. He asked if that could be accompanied by a moratorium on underground tests. I said that it would be difficult for us to agree to a moratorium because the underlying difficulty is whether in fact tests are occurring. On the other hand, I said that it would not be our purpose to engage in any massive program of underground testing during such negotiations. We would not attempt to keep secret any underground tests conducted during such a period, but I saw no reason why the situation could not be one with which both sides could live pending a serious effort to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

He asked whether it was not possible for President Kennedy to obtain consent to a treaty based upon two or three inspections if the President were to throw his full personal prestige behind the matter and present it forcefully to the Congress and to the country. I said that this was a question which was not merely “political” in the terms in which he had presented it but was also involved with the merits of the arrangements and their consistency with the national security interests of the United States. The President himself could not in good conscience urge upon the country a test ban treaty with two or three inspections because he is convinced that such a treaty could not meet our essential requirements for reasonable assurance. I added that I myself, on the basis of what I now know about the capabilities of instrumentation and other available means, would be forced to oppose a treaty involving only two or three inspections.

In concluding this subject I emphasized again the seriousness of our interest in a nuclear test ban, our desire to clarify our differences about the factual aspects, and our hope that we could find a means for moving ahead at least with an atmospheric test ban while the underground problem was under serious and urgent discussion. I told him that he should know that there is some question in our minds about whether interest in a test ban on the Soviet side has not diminished since December possibly because of the Soviet decision to step up its nuclear effort and engage in further testing and possibly because it is their view that it is untimely to move ahead on a nuclear test ban during their discussions with the Chinese since every indication is that the Chinese would not take part in a test ban treaty. He offered no comment on the latter points.

Non-Transfer of Nuclear Weapons

I told Dobrynin that I thought the Soviet Union ought not to let the MLF discussion in NATO get in the way of a prompt agreement along the lines of the paper we submitted on the non-transfer of nuclear weapons.² I said I could understand why the Soviets might be nervous about arrangements which have not yet been concluded and the details of which cannot therefore be known. I told him that I thought that when such arrangements were known that the Soviets would be much more relaxed about them because it would be clear that they would reflect our own fundamental policy against the proliferation of national nuclear forces. I said that it would help the atmosphere of our discussions if the Soviets were to bear in mind that they themselves have gone much further in contribution to the proliferation of nuclear weapons than we have done or intend to do—namely, in furnishing China with a plutonium plant. I said this put the Chinese in a position to produce nuclear weapons regardless of the attitude of the Soviet Union itself. I said to Dobrynin that “you have already lost your virginity on this point and we are still trying to preserve ours”. He laughed and said that I should say that to Mr. Khrushchev, who would greatly appreciate it.

When he emphasized that their concern is that the MLF is only a first step toward full proliferation, I said that nothing could better insure that any such first step would be the last step than a solemn international agreement of just the sort we had proposed. Indeed looking ahead for the next ten or twenty years, I said that the possibilities of proliferation are in no sense limited to NATO countries but exist in the Near East and among unaligned countries who would not take guidance from this matter from either the Soviet Union or the United States.³ We ourselves believe, therefore, that we need the help of the Soviet Union in halting proliferation, help which could be provided by the kind of agreement we have proposed. He commented that he thought it would be helpful if we were in a position, say by late July, to offer somewhat more detail about the MLF arrangements which would prevent their resulting in additional national nuclear capabilities.⁴

[Here follows discussion of Berlin, a NATO-Warsaw Pact non-aggression pact, NATO, Cuba, and Laos.]

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL US-USSR. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Rusk. The conversation was held on board the Patrick J. This memorandum of conversation is printed in full in vol. V, Document 195.
1. Document 285.
2. This paper is attached to the April 12 memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Dobrynin; see footnote 5, Document 275. The Soviet reply of May 11 is summarized in Topol 1712 to Paris, May 14. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18)
3. In a conversation on May 11, Dobrynin asked Rusk “if we wanted the Chinese to be a member of a multilateral force. The Secretary said that if it were on the same basis as we had in mind, we would be quite relaxed about it.” (Memorandum by Thompson; ibid., Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330)
4. In a postscript to this memorandum, Rusk stated that in response to Dobrynin’s question regarding a Latin American nuclear free zone, he had said that the United States had encouraged Brazil to pursue it and that while the United States would not include Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands in such a zone, it would include Guantanamo.