Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

288. Memorandum for the Record⁰

Washington, May 21, 1963.

SUBJECT

• Discussion on the Development of a High-Yield Nuclear Weapon, attended by The President, Gilpatric, Taylor, Ball, Johnson, Fisher, Haworth, and Betts (from AEC), Bundy, and McCone
• 21 May, 11:00 a.m.¹

1. Gilpatric and Taylor explained that the JCS had developed a need for a high-yield weapon for use against particular targets and for availability in about four years or more. They explained that the weapon was to be delivered by a B-52, would be a lay-down bomb, and would be more effective against certain Soviet targets than existing weapons.

2. Commissioner Haworth explained that the AEC would develop a lay-down bomb of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] that would weigh 35,000 pounds, could be carried in a B-52, would utilize known technology, no testing would be necessary, the cost would be $20 million, the development period about four years.²

3. The President immediately asked McCone’s views.

4. I opposed the development, said that I would not proceed with it because we would end up with an obsolete weapon far inferior to the Soviets, it could only be delivered in a B-52, and with the rise in Soviet defense which we had observed and reported on, I questioned very much whether a B-52 could be depended upon for penetration four to six years from now. I therefore said that if we were to go forward we should develop the most sophisticated and lightest high-yield weapon giving a yield of maximum value from a military point of view. This would require testing, and we should be prepared to test such a weapon both during its developmental and in its final version. I pointed out that if they went to a 100 megaton weapon it would require, among other things, the development of a new weapons system and this should be looked at in addition to the question of developing the bomb itself. I again questioned the ability of the B-52 to penetrate with reasonable dependability into the Soviet heartland in the late ‘60s at which time this large bomb would become available.

5. Mr. Fisher questioned the development because we had deplored Soviet development of 100 megaton “horror” weapon which had no military application. I took issue, pointing out to Mr. Fisher that a large yield weapon did, indeed, have significant military value.

6. The President, supported by Mr. Bundy and others, agreed with the position I advanced and instructed AEC to give consideration to the development of a sophisticated high-yield bomb, rather than one based on present technology, and also instructed Defense to look into the question of a delivery system.³

Action: There is no action required on the part of CIA. However, I would like our technical staff to further refine figures presented to me today.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Meetings with President, 4/1/63-6/30/63. Secret. Drafted by McCone.
1. According to the President’s Appointment Book, the meeting began at 11:15 and lasted until 11:55 a.m. Gerald Johnson, U. Alexis Johnson, Harold Brown, and Carl Kaysen also attended. (Kennedy Library)
2. Prior to the meeting, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense had prepared a joint briefing paper for the President. (Undated paper attached to a note from Kaysen to Kennedy, May 20; ibid., National Security Files, Kaysen Series, High Yield)
3. On May 21, McGeorge Bundy issued NSAM No. 245, which stated that the President had reviewed the problem of developing a high-yield nuclear weapon and had requested that the problem be re-examined, with attention to be “directed also to the question of developing a high-yield warhead to be delivered by presently programmed missile systems.” (Ibid., Meetings and Memoranda Series, NSAM 245)