Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

286. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology (Wiesner) to President Kennedy⁰

Washington, May 16, 1963.

We appear to have reached a complete impasse on the size of the quota for on-site inspections in the nuclear test ban negotiations. The Soviet Union has taken an adamant position that there can be no more than 3 annual inspections, and we are insisting that there be at least 7 annual inspections. While we have considered a fall-back position of 5 or 6 annual on-site inspections, there is no evidence that this compromise would be acceptable to the Soviet Union.

I do not believe that the Soviet objective in the test ban negotiations is clear at this point. On the one hand, the Soviet Union may not want a test ban now. On the other hand, Khrushchev may be pursuing his present line either simply to drive a hard bargain or because he is actually unable to go above 3 inspections for internal political reasons.

If the Soviets do desire a test ban, I believe that, by properly exploiting the fact that there is an unusual concentration of seismicity in the Soviet Union, we can find a formula for the number of on-site inspections that will resolve our present differences.

As you will recall, we have on several occasions indicated to the Soviets our willingness to take this factor into consideration in the allocation of inspections. So far, however, neither the Soviet Union nor ourselves have followed up this offer with specific proposals.

The most recent statistics on Soviet seismicity, which have been submitted to both the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee are summarized on the attached map.¹ You will note that on the average 38 per cent of Soviet earthquakes occur in the Kurile Islands and 35 per cent in Kamchatka. These two small, remote areas therefore account for about three quarters of all Soviet earthquakes. Since internal security is presumably a major Soviet concern in the on-site inspection problem, these areas have the special advantage of apparently containing very little of real security interest to the Soviet Union. There are no important military installations on the Kurile Islands. It is true that the Soviet ICBM impact area is off Klyuchi on northern Kamchatka; however, practically all of the earthquakes on Kamchatka take place south of Klyuchi. Therefore, it would be possible, for example, to define the Kamchatka seismic area as lying south of latitude 55°, which is some 100 miles south of Klyuchi and still include most of the earthquakes in this area. The only remaining important military facility in the area is the Petropavlovski-Kamchatskiy Naval Base. This base could even be specifically excluded from the seismic zone if desired.

Taking advantage of the fortuitously concentrated Soviet seismicity, one could accept Khrushchev’s annual quota of 3 for the entire Soviet Union and couple to it a separate annual quota of 2 for use only in the Kurile Islands or alternatively 3 for use only in the Kurile Islands and Kamchatka south of latitude 55°. The first alternative would provide essentially the same deterrent to clandestine testing as a single quota of 5 and the second alternative would provide essentially the same deterrent as a single annual quota of 6. The effectiveness of these quotas could be further improved by taking advantage of the concept of cumulative quotas over a period of years. For example, one could have a cumulative five-year quota of 15 on-site inspections for all of the Soviet Union and a separate five-year quota of 10 for the Kurile Islands or alternatively 15 for the Kurile Islands and Kamchatka. Recognizing the Soviet argument that this would permit us to use all of our inspections in one year and then break the treaty, one could also place a separate ceiling of 4 on the maximum number of inspections in any one year in the Soviet Union and a separate ceiling of 3 for the Kurile Islands (or 4 for the Kurile Islands and Kamchatka if this alternative were chosen). This procedure would, therefore, permit us to have up to 7 annual inspections in the case of the five-year cumulative quota of 15 for the entire Soviet Union and 10 for the Kurile Islands area (or up to 8 annual inspections under the other alternative).

Considering the above alternatives, I recommend that you consider a new proposal to the Soviet Union based on the concept of a five-year cumulative quota of 15 for the entire Soviet Union with a separate five-year quota of 10 for the Kurile Islands area with the proviso that no more than 4 of the quota of 15 or 3 of the quota of 10 could be used in any single year.

The so-called “black boxes” or automatic seismic stations in our present proposals offer another possible area of compromise. The Soviets have indicated that they would accept 3 of these stations and we have asked for 7. As I have indicated previously, these stations will add relatively little to the capability of our system and will considerably complicate its operation. We could, therefore, either accept the Soviet offer of 3 or even eliminate these facilities entirely without significantly reducing the deterrent value of our national detection system on which the treaty is now based.²

Jerry

0. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Kaysen Series, Nuclear Energy, Test Ban Negotiations 7/62-7/63. Secret.
1. Not found attached.
2. On June 19, Wiesner submitted to Harriman a longer version of this proposal in which the position regarding the automatic stations was set forth at greater length. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Test Ban Treaty, 8)