327. Editorial Note

In his memorandum of the White House staff meeting held July 16, 1963, Bromley Smith stated that the “latest version” of JCS views on a limited test ban was “probably the most comprehensive” paper on the subject in the government. He noted that it “would be useful” to show the paper to Bundy. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Chairman’s Staff Group, July 1963, T-203-69) Smith’s reference may be to the undated draft paper JCSM-543-63, a proposed memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, which stated that while a limited test ban treaty had fewer disadvantages than a comprehensive one, “it could continue the USSR lead in high-yield technology,” and allow significant opportunities for Soviet cheating. A limited test ban treaty would also deny the United States the opportunity to conduct important atmospheric effects tests; to eliminate “some uncertainties” in the survival of a hardened, fixed-base second-strike force; and to conduct training exercises with tactical weapons. The paper concluded that a three-element test ban “would be militarily disadvantageous” and that “there must be overriding nonmilitary considerations favoring such a treaty for it to be in the national interest.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, ACDA, Disarmament, Test Ban, U.S. Military Views) See the Supplement.

The language “overriding non-military considerations” was suggested by the Joint Staff on July 10. Taylor favored instead the phrase “there must be compensating non-military considerations.” Generals Wheeler and LeMay both wanted the original language, which was approved at a JCS meeting held July 16. The JCS did not, however, forward the draft to McNamara. (Walker S. Poole, The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, volume VIII: 1961-1964, Part 1, The Structure of National Defense (Washington, 1983), pages 399-400)