Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament

329. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State⁰

Moscow, July 17, 1963, midnight.

182. From Harriman. This message contains more detailed summary of day’s transactions promised Embtel 180.¹ Further details on test ban negotiations with texts of articles agreed so far follows septel,² as does much more detail [garble—plenary?] session in another septel.³

1. Only business at dinner was Harriman’s suggestion to Gromyko he wished see Khrushchev privately as soon as convenient. Was not pressing, since he knew Kadar⁴ was here and Khrushchev busy.

2. Progress on test ban was good. Article I was agreed by working party. After much fencing, and with reference at close of discussion to Harriman argument on importance withdrawal clause to assist President in winning consent of Senate to treaty, Gromyko appeared to accept withdrawal clause in trade for our abandoning peaceful uses clause. Had already tried tactic suggested Deptel 207⁵ para (2) and failed. Deal was not consummated, but tone in which Gromyko said he would consider matter further left little doubt in our minds. Further details except for disputed articles referred drafting committee, including preambulatory language. On this was considerable wrangling in plenary on merits of Soviet draft and language drawn from McCloy/Zorin statement of agreed principles on disarmament.

3. Gromyko then raised non-aggression question, using Harriman proposal language of today’s communiqué as springboard. Gromyko pointed out “in passing” that extent to which this and future communiqués could reflect progress will depend on progress made in discussion non-aggression pact.⁶

4. US and UK agreed that useful move to discuss non-aggression arrangements and other matters that Chairman Khrushchev and they had raised Monday. Both made point these matters involve Allies, require their agreement. We could only explore and not commit them.

5. Harriman then commented on Soviet document⁷ as follows: accepted Khrushchev’s statement that form could be such as to avoid issue of recognition of GDR, and recognizing that this was matter for consultation with allies, now considered substance. Preamble and paras (1) and (2) of Soviet draft appear constructive and acceptable, except that language reflecting form of arrangement must be changed suitably. Consider it appropriate to add article after para (2) on fixed control points, along lines discussed by Khrushchev Monday.⁸ This could give substance and concreteness to non-aggression arrangements, by providing against surprise attack. Further, another additional article needed to refer to West Berlin. Make clear interference with access would be covered by agreement. Suggested something along lines of following might be useful:

“In order to create conditions favorable to achievement of purpose this declaration, parties agree there will be no interference with access to West Berlin and no change in present situation West Berlin without prior agreement.” (Note: This read, not given to Sovs as text.)

6. Hailsham, without commitment to language, accepted principle involved.

7. Gromyko responded in strong negative fashion, beginning with statement he was greatly disappointed. Clear US/UK remarks did not promote progress in discussion of non-aggression pact, to which USSR attaches great importance. He repeated Khrushchev’s remarks on form of treaty, but attacked US/UK attempts to broaden its content. To add items on control posts and Berlin would go beyond boundaries of non-aggression pact, lead to danger of losing concept by moving to different subjects, even though important in themselves. Characterized raising these additional questions as inappropriate; reminded us that our non-dissemination proposals did not refer to great many extraneous subjects. Discussion free access to West Berlin leads to extending discussion to free city of West Berlin, GDR sovereignty, and German peace treaty. Also failed to understand so much discussion of consultation allies. This obvious, could be done, and representatives were competent to speak for own governments. [garble] his first response by remarking signing of test ban and simultaneous signing of non-aggression pact would produce great changes in world and be in interest of three powers represented.

8. Response by US and UK repeated essential nature of dealing with West Berlin situation. Soviet draft did not define aggression as covering interference with Berlin access; therefore clause bringing such possibility within agreement necessary. While other items added because Khrushchev had suggested them, this item had different and vital status. Harriman pointed out that while stoppage of access might not be defined as aggression, US and NATO would consider it so and would react violently. Accordingly we must have clause dealing with this problem. However, we desired no one-way arrangement, the interests of all are involved, and we came prepared also to include language on boundary lines and demarcation lines which would be of interest to USSR allies, if USSR so desired. Harriman then suggested adjournment and further consideration.

9. After discussion of communiqué, already reported, meeting adjourned, to reconvene 3 PM tomorrow July 18, drafting session on test ban 12 noon tomorrow.

10. Comment: Tomorrow, when Gromyko’s attitude reveals Khrushchev’s reactions, we will know where we stand. As of tonight, it looks as if we are in for some long arguments. Soviets may hold up agreement test ban as pressure on us for non-aggression pact.

Kohler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Eyes Only; Ban, Received at 10:29 p.m.
1. Telegram 180, July 17, contained a text of the daily joint tripartite press statement on the test ban talks and gave an extremely brief statement of developments in the negotiations. (Ibid.)
2. Telegram 183 from Moscow, July 18, (Ibid.)
3. Telegram 184 from Moscow, July 17. (Ibid.) Telegrams 183 and 184 are in the Supplement.
4. Janos Kadar, Prime Minister of Hungary.
5. Telegram 207, July 17, referred to telegram 206 to Moscow, July 16, which had concurred with Harriman’s intention to “seek a deal in which peaceful uses clause might be traded against adequate withdrawal provision with understanding that peaceful uses might be restored via amendment either on ad hoc or general basis.” If Article II were dropped entirely, Harriman was to make it understood that “Article I language on nuclear weapon test explosions included peaceful uses explosions in prohibited environments or with prohibited effects.” Telegram 207 amended this instruction by suggesting Harriman try to get Soviet approval of clause (1) of Article II, in order to get additional Congressional support. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO)) Regarding Article II, see footnote 3, Document 328.
6. According to telegram 184, Harriman “expressed desire to get communiqué to President in time for Wednesday press conference,” whereupon Gromyko noted “in passing” that “degree of optimism which could be expressed in this communiqué and future ones depended on progress which could be made on NAP.” For text of Kennedy’s statement on the test ban negotiations made at his press conference held on Wednesday, July 17, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, p. 566.
7. See footnote 2, Document 325.
8. July 15; see Document 325.