330. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State0
Moscow, July 18, 1963,
3 p.m.
193. From Harriman and Kaysen.
- 1.
- Question arises how hard to play continuing discussion of comprehensive treaty. Should we make best efforts to highlight it or have it at low key. Sov disposition appears to be along latter lines.
- 2.
- Something to be said on both sides. On one hand, President has repeatedly stated our goal is comprehensive treaty. Prime Minister has echoed this. Further, it is clear comprehensive ban more effective in relation to non-diffusion problem.
- 3.
- On other side, emphasis on comprehensive at this moment appears to diminish value of three environment treaty. This undesirable both internationally and at home. Further, at least theoretical problem arises that undue emphasis on continuing effort toward comprehensive might lead to argument in Senate that ratification should be postponed to await comprehensive.
- 4.
- Our own instincts go in direction of low key treatment. This issue will become operational problem when we get to discussion communiqué language. Also may arise earlier, especially with you in relation to press.
Await your reaction.1
Kohler
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 18-3 USSR (MO). Secret; Operational Immediate. Received at 10:55 a.m.↩
- In telegram 221 to Moscow, July 18, midnight, the Department agreed that “low key treatment comprehensive treaty desirable at this time” but stated that it was important that “ultimate desirability of comprehensive ban be supported in negotiations and in public discussion even though in low key.” (Ibid., DEF 18-4)↩