164. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Yugoslavia0
901. For Ambassador Kennan. Re your 1164.1 Although we found Ambassador Yepishevʼs remarks to you on February 21 of interest, implications of what he was saying are not clear and in our estimation are not persuasive of any particular conclusions.
As regards his emphasis on improvement of commercial relations between US andUSSR, since Mikoyanʼs visit in 1959 and subsequent trips of Kozlov and Khrushchev to US, this has been frequent Soviet theme by which they are in reality talking about credits (long-term as well as short-term) to make possible kind of trade they are interested in. Lend-Lease negotiations in early 1960 made this all too clear. It is true that Soviet leaders have been and are now perhaps prone to look upon better economic relations as step toward an improvement of political atmosphere. Most notable precedent, preliminaries to Nazi-Soviet pact 1939, was example Soviet method using economic relations as beginning to political objectives. However principal political issues today, i.e., Berlin, Laos, disarmament, have already been subject of prolonged debate and negotiations between parties at interest. Moreover, we find it difficult to believe after visits of Soviet leaders here in 1959 when our position on economic relations was explained at length to them by then Under Secretary Dillon, that Soviet Government could genuinely consider it possible for legislative obstacles to improved commercial relations to be [Page 383] removed before an improvement in political relations had occurred by a muting of some of the sharpest international differences of today, notably Berlin.
Of course, if a settlement of major issues were reached and thereby tensions in the world lessened, there would be created a better atmosphere for increased trade. American traders would themselves be more confident in dealing with Soviet organizations and would not fear public criticism. Sustained improvement in the international climate might in due course enable us to secure modification or removal of existing legislative obstacles. But even then Soviets should recognize more than they have given indication to date inherent limitations on trade between two countries whose economies are so different and whose methods of trading so divergent. The plain fact is that the Soviets, who tend to bilateral trading relationships have relatively little to sell which is of interest to American importers.
As regards possible internal changes in Russia, you were completely correct in telling Ambassador he was wrong in suspecting us of any such attempts as he asserted. We have no reason to doubt that Khrushchev is effectively in charge of Soviet Government andCPSU and our policies are based on these realities and not on any wishful thinking or in anticipation of “advantage from our standpoint” as result of possible future Soviet internal changes.
We leave entirely in your discretion your next contact with Ambassador Yepishev. After your return to Belgrade you may wish take opportunity when you next happen to see him to comment along above lines but we see no necessity for you taking initiative to seek interview with him before March 5.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 601.6168/2-2262. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Davis, cleared in draft with Bohlen and Kohler, in substance with Rusk, and approved by Kohler.↩
- Document 161.↩