Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume V, Soviet Union

165. Current Intelligence Weekly Review⁰

Washington, March 2, 1962.

Soviet Affairs

Khrushchevʼs return to Moscow may mark the end of a period in which the Soviet Union has appeared to be searching for the means to move ahead with difficult issues on both the domestic and foreign fronts. During his six-week vacation at Sochi, on the Black Sea, Khrushchev apparently readied the report he is scheduled to deliver to the central committee plenum opening on 5 March,¹ at which a new program for tackling the critical agricultural problem is expected to be unveiled. There is some evidence that he also consulted at Sochi with many of his colleagues on foreign and intrabloc questions. They may also have reached a decision on the fate of Molotov and the other members of the antiparty group.

Ambassador Thompson reports that an unusual number of Soviet ambassadors have remained in Moscow, although some of them were scheduled to return to their posts some time ago. While they may be waiting for a routine briefing after Khrushchevʼs return, it is more likely that their presence is connected with a review of foreign policy questions. Among them are the ambassadors to London, Washington, Paris, and Rome; some of the ambassadors to the satellite countries are also believed to have returned to Moscow during the past several weeks. The Soviet ambassador to Laos returned unexpectedly to Moscow on 20 February, and Deputy Foreign Minister Pushkin failed to return to the Geneva conference on Laos as expected on 19 February. These developments suggest that a whole range of topics has been up for reconsideration.

Ambassador Thompson comments that Soviet foreign policy appears to be approaching a crossroads. Moscowʼs position on Vietnam, for example, will be very much influenced by the outcome of talks in Laos as well as by developments in other major East-West problems such as disarmament and Berlin. Developments in any one of these questions could affect policy toward the West as well as toward Communist China.

East-West Questions

In its relations with the Western powers, Moscow has continued to speak with an indecisive voice. On the one hand, there are signs that Soviet policies could shift to a more militant line. Khrushchev dropped his cordial tone and employed pointed criticism of US policy toward disarmament in his letter of 21 February to President Kennedy.² He claimed the US was “not yet determined to reach agreement on questions of disarmament,” and that it had already concluded that the 18-nation disarmament committee would fail in its task. Khrushchev directly charged the US with an ulterior motive in proposing a meeting of foreign ministers at Geneva in order to “neutralize” world opinionʼs “adverse reaction to the resumption of nuclear tests by the US and UK.” The harsher Soviet tone also was contained in key speeches by Soviet military leaders on the occasion of Red Army Day.

While Khrushchev apparently is determined to gain a definite commitment from the West for a future heads of government meeting, this approach does not rule out the achievement of propaganda advantages from alleged Western disinterest in an immediate top-level meeting on disarmament. The extensive Soviet propaganda campaign, government statements and Khrushchevʼs pronouncements are designed to provide the Soviet Union with a justification for resuming its own test series at any time. As Khrushchev said in his letter: “It is clear that the Soviet Union … will not want to be left behind and will do everything to maintain its nuclear arsenal at the necessary level.”

This strident campaign for a summit has nevertheless been offset by the wide publicity given Khrushchevʼs prompt congratulations on Colonel Glennʼs successful flight and the Soviet leaderʼs offer to cooperate with the US in outer space.³ In addition, Khrushchev has left the door open for a foreign ministersʼ conference as proposed by the US and has stopped short of announcing his intention of going to Geneva regardless of Western participation—a move which would foreshadow an unabashed propaganda assault on the US. Press reports from Moscow suggest that Khrushchev will soon make his position clear in a number of speeches and pronouncements containing new versions of proposals on disarmament and European security. The scheduled World Conference on Peace and Disarmament, to be held in Moscow in July, suggests that the “peaceful coexistence” and disarmament themes will dominate the Soviet line this spring, with its predictable effect on Sino-Soviet relations.

Berlin

The summit campaign has tended to overshadow the Berlin question, but theUSSR may have reached new decisions in this area. Almost immediately after his return to Moscow, Khrushchev met for two days with an East German delegation headed by party First Secretary Walter Ulbricht. The short communiqué issued on 28 February dealt mainly with economic questions and indicated further Soviet support for the East German regime.⁴

On the political side, the communiqué stated only that “an exchange of opinions” occurred on the conclusion of “the German peace treaty and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on its basis.” While this formula contains no sense of urgency and avoids any question of timing, it is likely that the Soviets and East Germans have used the meeting to coordinate a tactical line on these questions for the coming months. This meeting, in the wake of more aggressive actions affecting access to Berlin, also suggests that the bloc will begin to press forward on Berlin.

While Moscow has backed away from any showdown over Allied access, it has not abandoned its maneuvering to undermine the four-power basis for air access to Berlin. After a four-day respite, coinciding with a Soviet holiday, theUSSR resumed flights in the air corridors and continued filing specific flight plans. Employment of this tactic, rather than a return to the blanket reservations used earlier, suggests that for the present Moscow is mainly interested in keeping its position intact by periodically asserting a right to use the corridors at times and places of its own choosing.

Coincident with Bonnʼs reply to the Soviet memorandum of 27 December,⁵ the Soviets dispatched new notes to the three Western powers on 26 February⁶ protesting that the West German customs law of 1 January provided for inclusion of West Berlin in the Federal Republic customs system. This was labeled a “provocation” designed to create new difficulties in “normalizing the situation in West Berlin on the basis of conclusion of a German peace treaty.” The note included the standard claim that the extension of West German legislation to West Berlin was “absolutely illegal and beyond the competence of the Federal Republic.” The timing of these protests, after almost two monthsʼ delay, suggests that it is a further step toward driving a wedge between Bonn and its allies by raising the issue of the incompatibility of the occupation status with West German ties to Berlin.

Simultaneously, Soviet diplomats in Vienna have inspired reports in the Western press that Khrushchev is prepared to make far-reaching concessions to Adenauer if bilateral talks are arranged. The Soviet concessions would include incorporating West Berlin into the Federal Republic, establishing a corridor for access, removing Ulbricht, and eliminating the wall; in return, Bonn would sign a peace treaty, recognize East Germany, and accept the division of Berlin. Such rumors are doubtless intended to provide an incentive for Bonn to explore Soviet intentions in private talks. In the meantime, the Soviets apparently will allow the talks with Ambassador Thompson to stagnate.

Sino-Soviet Relations

The Soviet leaders may also have decided to launch a new attack against the Albanian leaders and by implication their Chinese Communist defenders. Pravda on 21 February devoted two full pages to articles and statements made several months earlier by leaders of other Communist parties “supporting” the new Soviet party program and the course established at the 22nd party congress. One of Pravdaʼs two editorials tried, by citing Engels, to rebut Chou En-laiʼs complaint that it was “un-Marxist” to attack another Communist party—the Albanians. Pravda warned that “only with open and uncompromising criticism” of Albanian leaders Hoxha and Shehu can unity of the Communist movement be preserved. This appeal, which apparently is directed at the Asian parties, directly contradicts the Chinese view that attacks on the Albanians disrupt unity. It probably is intended to prepare the way for stepped-up criticism of Tirana.

Khrushchev apparently is moving to offset Chinese influence among other parties where it is strong, and the first new step in this effort is toward Hanoi. A Soviet Communist party delegation headed by party secretary Boris Ponomarev—and including Andrey Andropov, head of the central committeeʼs department for liaison with foreign Communist parties—arrived in Hanoi on 21 February “at the invitation” of the Vietnamese. Ponomarev was active during Khrushchevʼs behind-the-scenes assault on the Rumanian party congress in June 1960 and will probably try to persuade the Vietnamese leaders to reject Maoʼs challenge to Soviet leadership of the international Communist movement and join the Soviet bloc in criticizing Albania.

The Russians are reopening the issue of factions in the international Communist movement—an issue presumably decided in favor of the Chinese at the Moscow conference of Communist parties in late 1960. A Soviet commentator on 24 February cited the British Communist partyʼs criticism of the idea of “freedom to form factions,” and Pravda on 21 February reprinted part of Leninʼs letter to the Austrian party stressing the need to accept the “international discipline of the revolutionary movement.” Khrushchev may be preparing to use the issues of factions and dogmatism, possibly in his report to the central committee plenum, as pretexts for criticizing Peiping more openly.

0. Source: Central Intelligence Agency: Job 79-S01060A. Secret; Noforn. Prepared by CIAʼs Office of Current Intelligence. The source text comprises pp. 1-3 of the Weekly Review section of the issue.
1. For text of Khrushchevʼs report, see Pravda, March 6, 1962. For a condensed text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XIV, No. 8, March 21, 1962, pp. 3-17 and March 28, No. 9, pp. 3-13.
2. For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, pp. 98–106.
3. For text of Khrushchevʼ;s message, February 21, see ibid., p. 96.
4. For reports of Khrushchevʼs meeting with Ulbricht, see Pravda, March 1-3, 1962, and Izvestia, March 1-2, 1962.
5. See Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, p. 709.
6. The February 26 Soviet note was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 2285 from Moscow, February 26. (Department of State, Central Files, 762A.34/2-2662)