Office of the Historian

121. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (Krulak) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(Taylor)1

SACSA-M 525-63
Washington, September 17, 1963.

SUBJECT

  • Reconciliation versus Pressures and Persuasion
1.
The two draft messages2 do not differ significantly from the longer papers which you saw yesterday.3 The truly important document is in the covering memorandum.4
2.
Taking the covering memorandum, paragraph by paragraph, these observations are pertinent:
a.
Paragraph 1. Unless it is desired to set up circumstances where Reconciliation must be rejected as a barren course of action, it need not be accepted that Reconciliation and Pressures and Persuasion must be incompatible.
b.
Paragraph 2. As long as the concept is retained that Reconciliation is nothing more than total acquiescence on our part, the content of this paragraph is correct. Under those circumstances Reconciliation would have to be rejected. It would be preferable, however, to see Phase I and Reconciliation both altered, to make them the very same. The revised Phase I would embody expressions of dissatisfaction and sincere warning on our part, coupled with hope, confidence, and a willingness to go halfway with Diem in any genuine action which he undertakes. As it stands now, neither Reconciliation nor Pressures embodies this total philosophy. Reconciliation, as expressed, has too little candor and too little bite. Pressures, as expressed, dwells too much on the limitations of Nhu and gives no evidence of US determination to help Diem wherever he exhibits good faith.
c.
Paragraph 3. This is speculation and, along with Governor Harriman, I find no basis for real benefit for Nhu or South Vietnam in such a sequence.
d.
Paragraph 4. This suggests that Hilsman himself is not content with the program which he has established.
e.
Paragraph 5. If Phase I of the Pressures and Persuasion track were designed to give Diem hope, while still presenting a picture of the unfavorable future which he must expect if he does not re-establish himself in the world opinion arena; if; in addition, Phase I did not pivot on the elimination of Nhu but only made plain to Diem the great benefits of reduction of Nhu’s authority; if Phase I made clear our willingness to participate in rehabilitating the GVN in the world’s eye, [Page 243] then there would be no problem of switching from one policy to another as Hilsman describes it, because under this arrangement there would only be one policy.
f.
Paragraph 6. The long range plans of Nhu and the adequacy of GVN national resolve to achieve victory are facts that we cannot expect to have until matters are essentially concluded.
g.
Paragraph 7. To proceed, as Hilsman proposes, with initial steps aimed at the elimination of Nhu, without offering hope to Diem regarding our own intentions, is indeed placing our confidence in an informed hunch. However, to proceed along the lines which I have described earlier, where Phase I has both strength and conciliatory characteristics, changes this significantly.
3.
To exemplify the shift which would make the idea of reconciliation compatible with the idea of escalating pressure, I have made some marginal notes and interlineations on a copy of the Pressures and Persuasion approach.5 With those changes, I believe that the sequence of events is more logical, and far more promising, than either of the cables in their present form.
V.H. Krulak
Major General, USMC
  1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-186-69. Top Secret; Sensitive.↩
  2. Attachments 1 and 2 to Document 114.↩
  3. See footnote 5, Document 113.↩
  4. Document 114.↩
  5. Not printed.↩