Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

122. Memorandum From the Deputy Regional Planning Adviser of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (Mendenhall) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)¹

Washington, September 17, 1963.

REPORT OF VISIT TO VIET-NAM, SEPTEMBER 6-10, 1963

Purpose and Itinerary

On September 6, 1963, I departed Washington, D.C., at your instruction and pursuant to a decision reached that day at the White House, to visit Viet-Nam and report back promptly on the situation in that country. This report supplements and completes the telegrams I sent (Saigon’s 453, September 9, 1963² and Department’s telegram 375 to Saigon, September 10, 1963³), and the oral reports I made on my return on September 10, 1963.

I arrived in Saigon at 6:00 a.m., September 8, and spent a few hours in consultation with Mr. Trueheart (the DCM) and other Embassy officers and attended a meeting with Ambassador Lodge, Trueheart, General Harkins (CG, MACV), General Meede (Chief of Staff, MACV), General Krulak (who had a similar mission on behalf of DOD as mine) and Colonel Dunn (Assistant to Ambassador Lodge).

At 10:30 a.m. I departed for Hue, and proceeded from there to Da Nang and Nha Trang. I talked with as many knowledgeable people as I could at these points, and returned to Saigon shortly after noon on September 9. I spent the remainder of that day consulting with American and Vietnamese officials, talked again with Ambassador Lodge, and left Saigon at 8:30 p.m. September 9.

Situation in Viet-Nam

1. Saigon. I found a virtually complete breakdown of the civil government in Saigon following the events of August 20, 1963. The Embassy has reported that Thuan, Secretary of State for the Presidency and Assistant Secretary of State for National Defense, felt useless, and that he stated he found Thanh, Secretary of State for National Economy, reading a detective story during office hours since the Ministry was not functioning. At a USOM meeting I attended, it was indicated that the Ministry of Rural Affairs was likewise not functioning. The USOM Director stated that Vietnamese officials in general did not want him to visit their offices because of their fear of the consequences of being seen with Americans. He added that in one case when he did visit a Vietnamese official in his office, that official looked under all the objects in his office for hidden microphones before he began to talk. Dean Vu Quoc Thuc also told me he had offered his resignation as Dean of the Saigon University Law School.

Saigon was heavy with an atmosphere of fear and hate. Fear is more prevalent than it was in October, 1961, when General Taylor and Mr. Rostow visited Viet-Nam on a special Presidential mission. Then the fear had been created by Viet Cong advances; this time, however, it arises from the reign of terror conducted by the Government itself. Many high officials are not sleeping at home because of their fear of arrest. I was warned immediately on arrival that I must be extremely careful about contacting Vietnamese friends because this might compromise them with the regime. My actual contacts were arranged circumspectly, and my friends’ first remarks when I saw them were to the effect how greatly the situation had worsened since my departure from Viet-Nam a year ago.

The arrest of hundreds of students has had enormous effect on many officials, both civilian and military, because these are their children or nephews or nieces. Not only is this reflected in the attitude of bitter dislike displayed by officials toward the Government, but the Government’s repression has also absorbed the attention of many officials in attempting to protect their children or negotiate with the police for their release.

The war against the Viet Cong has clearly receded to a secondary status for the people of Saigon. As my Vietnamese contact indicated, their first concern is now their “war” with the regime itself.

Dean Thuc brought up with me the explosive danger of a religious war between Buddhists and Catholics which could be sparked by continued GVN repression of the Buddhists. As an example of GVN “conciliatory” measures toward the Buddhists, I was told that provincial bonzes had been released from prison and told to return to their provinces, but their identification papers were retained by the Government. Then on departure from Saigon they were arrested as Viet Cong because of their lack of identity papers. Word of this quickly spread through Saigon, with the result that a number of provincial bonzes have taken refuge in various homes in Saigon, including those of army officers.

Nhu is held clearly responsible by the people of Saigon for repression by the Government—he is the focal point of their bitterness and hate. Diem has become increasingly identified with Nhu as responsible for these measures, but this probably does not represent a majority view except among the students.

Increasing reports are being received that students are talking of moving over to the Viet Cong because of oppression by the Government. Also significant in this connection was Dean Thuc’s equating of the dangers from the Government and the Viet Cong.

2. Mekong Delta Provinces (South of Saigon). Because of lack of time I did not visit this area. In any case, the Buddhist problem has had no impact there, apparently because of the easy-going attitude of the Southerners on all matters, including religion.

I discussed the security situation in this area with the DCM who said that while there has been some improvement in road security, the incident rate continues to be very high. He also said that the number of armed Viet Cong is about 25,000 in the country as a whole. He described the strategic hamlet program in the Delta as a mess, largely because of lack of coordination between the military and civilian authorities.

I had also intended to call on Colonel Hoang Van Lac, Special Commissioner for Strategic Hamlets, to get his assessment of the situation since his detached, experienced judgment is valuable. I found, however, that his views had just been obtained by Rufus Phillips of USOM. Lac confirmed the disorganized state of the strategic hamlet program in most of the Delta provinces, and expressed the view that the war would be lost by 1965 if the GVN is not changed.

3. Provinces Just North of Saigon. I was informed by the Embassy Political Officer in charge of internal affairs that security has much improved in the Zone D area where Viet Cong installations have been broken up and the area is now being cries-crossed by roads. However, the Viet Cong have largely moved over from Zone D to the Duong Minh Chu region in northern Tay Ninh province.

4. Central Plateau Provinces. Bad weather for flying, plus lack of time, prevented a visit to this area. Since there are so few Vietnamese in this region, there has, in any case, been no particular impact of the Buddhist problem here.

In this area there has been substantial improvement in security over the past year which is in important measure attributable to the programs carried out with the Montagnards. Recent deterioration (presumably only temporary) has occurred in Darlac Province where a new province chief, in a literal application of strategic hamlet orders from Saigon, has tried to recover part of the arms issued to certain Montagnard villagers, and thus stirred up resentments. (This is a typical provincial application, without judgment or discrimination, of orders emanating from Nhu and/or Diem, and is prompted by the provincial official’s fear of the consequences if he fails to obey orders completely.)

I was also informed [less than 1 1ine not declassified] that the Special Forces border guards recently installed in areas close to the Laos border have found many more Viet Cong in those areas than was previously thought to be the case. It is impossible to state, however, whether this represents an increase in Viet Cong in these areas since there is no real previous base for comparison.

5. Central Coastal Provinces. I concentrated most of my brief stay in Viet-Nam in this area, visiting Hue, Da Nang and Nha Trang. This is the region (together with Saigon) where the Buddhist problem has been most acute and has had the greatest impact.

I got a very good feel for the four northern provinces of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam and Quang Tin. I found Hue and Da Nang cities of fear and hate, just like Saigon. The civil bureaucracy in those cities, as well as the regional civil service with its headquarters in Hue, is riddled with bitter discontent over the Government’s repression. Students, civil servants and young officers in the Hue area are reported to feel increasingly that they may as well move over to the Viet Cong since the only reign of terror they know has been that of the GVN.

Province chiefs in these four provinces, on the other hand, are loyal to the Government-not surprisingly since that appears to be the first criterion for selection. District chiefs, to the extent their views were known, are also considered loyal with one exception.

The armed forces in these four provinces presented a mixed picture. [less than 1 1ine not declassified] appears by his conduct completely loyal. (One report I received was that he has been bought by the Government for 2 million plasters. This could not be confirmed, but my source stated Tri had plenty of cash, including dollars.) The Corps G-2 and G-3 were described as strongly condemnatory of the GVN’s repression of the Buddhists. Their future was uncertain following the removal of General Nghiem as Corps Commander because of his Buddhist sympathies.

I was told that considerable dissatisfaction exists among lower-ranking officers for political reasons, but the extent of this discontent is not clear (partly because of limitations under which U.S. military officers appear to operate in their relations with Vietnamese officers on political and civilian matters). In any case, it is evident that the armed forces continue to function as a disciplined force under current circumstances.

The political dissatisfaction of both civilian and military officials is vented almost completely on Nhu. Diem appears largely to escape the same opprobrium.

Security in Quang Tin is deteriorating—August, 1963, was the worst month since November, 1962. This province was described as generally poor from a security standpoint. (This incidentally is a province where the province chief was unanimously described to me as incompetent, but as one who owed his job to his loyalty to the Government.) In Quang Nam, where the Viet Cong had been gradually pushed back from coastal areas over the past months, there is recent evidence of a reversal of this trend (e.g., the nightly appearance of Viet Cong about 1000 meters from the Special Forces training camp located about 10 kilometers from the city of Da Nang). It is not clear whether the Buddhist issue has caused or contributed to this worsening of security, but it is known that the Buddhist agitation has extended to rural villages in Quang Nam and Thua Thien. Reports from Hue have stated that in the latter province villagers are beginning to opt for the Viet Cong.

Aside from the four northern coastal provinces, time did not permit me to get the same feel for the other coastal provinces. During my stop in Nha Trang, I was only able to talk to U.S. military officers who, from their limited vantage point, believed there was no Buddhist problem now in the Nha Trang area, although that very morning a report had been received (and was being checked) that a statue of Buddha had “miraculously” sprung up about 20 kilometers out of Nha Trang. I had hoped to talk to the [less than 1 1ine not declassified] but found he was absent. Reports of this which I was later shown in Saigon stated that strong feelings and an atmosphere of terror exist in the Nha Trang area in connection with the Buddhist problem. I also got indications that this problem was felt in varying degrees in Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Ninh Thuan, and Binh Thuan provinces.

Conclusions

1. If Nhu remains in Viet-Nam, thus retaining his power, the choice for the Vietnamese people will be between Diem-Nhu and the Viet Cong. The evidence indicates that, with this choice, the people will move in gradually growing numbers toward the Viet Cong. I had thought on the basis of my earlier tour of duty in Viet-Nam that the Vietnamese people might, under such circumstances, begin to shift from anti-Communism to neutralism. While these are small indications that neutralist thinking is indeed developing, I came away from this visit convinced that the bitterness of the Vietnamese over the recent oppression of the GVN will move them increasingly all the way over to the Viet Cong unless rapid steps are taken to remove Nhu. Both our DCM in Saigon and our Consul in Hue also believe this will be the case.

2. Thus, no matter how good our military measures are, it will not be possible to win the guerrilla war if Nhu remains in power. One need only recall Mao Tse-Tung’s dictum of the guerrillas as fish and the people as water. With the people increasingly hostile to the Government, its armed forces cannot defeat the guerrillas. To cite one way in which security is likely to deteriorate: There have been cases in Central Viet-Nam (not specifically associated with recent political events) of strategic hamlets betrayed from within, e.g., by leaving gates open or furnishing Viet Cong with defense plans. This type of betrayal can be expected to grow unless GVN policies and personnel are changed.

Recommendation

That Nhu be removed from Viet-Nam, and that the U.S. take whatever action is necessary for this purpose.

The U.S. responsibility vis-a-vis the Viet-Nam problem is inescapable: Vietnamese pursue a constant refrain of asking what we Americans are going to do about the situation in their country. When we reply that it is up to them to act, they retort that the U.S. put the Ngo family into power and gave it all the arms it possesses, which are now being used against the people, not the Communists. The U.S. can thus not escape responsibility whether it acts or fails to act. A refusal to act would be just as much interference in Viet-Nam’s affairs as acting.

1. Source: Department of State, Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 67 D 54, POL 25 Buddhist Dispute. Secret.
2. Document 78.
3. In telegram 375, September 10, Mendenhall, who had returned to Washington, sent the Embassy an additional report on his visit to Vietnam. Mendenhall’s report covered a conversation he had with the Dean of the Saigon University Law School, Va Quoc Thuc, who predicted that Vietnam was on the verge of an explosive religious war between Catholics and Buddhists. This pessimistic view, Mendenhall stated in his telegram, “emphasized the gravity of the political crisis in Viet-Nam.” (Department of State, Central Files, POL S VIET)