114. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Hilsman) to
the Secretary of State1
Washington, September 16,
1963.
SUBJECT
Attached are two cables—one on the “Reconciliation Track” and one on the
“Pressures and Persuasion Track.”
I think it is important to note that these are true alternatives—i.e.,
the “Reconciliation Track” is not the same as Phase I of the “Pressures
and Persuasion Track.” The difference is in public posture. Phase I of
the “Pressures and Persuasion Track” continues to maintain a public
posture of disapproval of the GVN’s
policies of repression. The “Reconciliation Track” requires a public
posture of acquiescence in what the GVN
has recently done, and even some effort by the US to put these recent
actions in as good a light as we possibly can.
If this distinction, which is a real one, is preserved, then it seems to
me clear that it will not be possible to switch from the “Reconciliation
Track” to a “Pressures and Persuasion Track” if the former does not
work—except in the event that Diem and Nhu
provide us with another dramatic act of repression as an excuse. On the
other hand, it will be possible to switch from a “Pressures and
Persuasion Track” to a “Reconciliation Track” at any time during Phases
I and II of the “Pressures and Persuasion Track,” although probably not
after we had entered Phases III and IV.
My own judgment is that the “Reconciliation Track” will not work. I think
that Nhu has already decided on
an adventure. I think he feels that the progress already made in the war
and the US materiel on hand gives him freedom to launch on a course that
has a minimum and a maximum goal. The minimum goal would be sharply to
reduce the American presence in those key positions which have political
significance in the provinces and the strategic hamlet program and to
avoid any meaningful concessions that would go against his Mandarin,
“personalist” vision of the future of Viet-Nam. The maximum goal I would
think, would be a deal with North Viet-Nam for a truce in the war, a
complete removal of the US presence, and a “neutralist” or “Titoist” but
still separate South Viet-Nam.
[Page 222]
At the same time, I would give Phases I and II of the “Pressures and
Persuasion Track” only a fair chance of success, and I think that Phases
III and IV will create a situation over which we would have little if
any control, at least if they were launched in the immediate future.
Thus, I would recommend adopting as our initial course Phases I and II of
the “Pressures and Persuasion Track” testing and probing as we go along
and being ready to switch to “Reconciliation” at any moment that it
becomes necessary, using the decision to switch as a means of getting at
least nominal concessions in order to save as much of our face as
possible.
I make this recommendation with the caveat that we do not have sufficient
information to make a final and complete judgment on either of the two
key issues—where Nhu will lead
Viet-Nam if he remains in power and whether or not enough people will
continue to fight the Viet Cong to bring victory.
The trouble is the necessary information for a final judgment on these
two key issues is simply not available. Nor is anyone likely to acquire
it before we make a fundamental decision. This is not an unfamiliar
dilemma in the making of foreign policy. At such a time governments
perforce operate on informed hunch, hoping only that the hunch they use
is the best one available.
But I also think that at such a time governments must not even attempt to
make final judgments or to take irreversible actions, but to proceed by
incremental steps. It is for this reason that I would reject both
“Reconciliation” and Phases III and IV—at least at this time.
[Attachment 1]
Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Vietnam2
Eyes only Lodge. Approved
Action Plan for Viet-Nam is outlined below. You should proceed to
implement at once.
Our analysis of the situation is as follows: Diem and Nhu are well entrenched and will
resist changes stubbornly. Ultimate sanction of cutting aid thus
runs risk of forcing them into a corner where their choices will be
between capitulation and departure of whole family, and showdown and
either Gotterdammerung or a deal with the DRV, with latter more likely.
[Page 223]
We are therefore faced with problem not only of reconciliation with
GVN but of obtaining sufficient
popular support for the Diem-Nhu
government to enable it to win the war. The central problem will
still be Nhu—his position as
political symbol to the disaffected, his philosophy and concept of
the State, his conviction that Americans in positions we deem
essential are an obstacle to achieving his goal, and his possible
machinations with the DRV.
Within Viet-Nam the major target of rehabilitation effort must be the
urban elite. Ensuring their support will require credible reforms,
which will in turn help to improve the GVN image abroad.
Approach
You should institute dialogue with Diem against background of current internal US and
external world pressure for reform in GVN. Basis of conversation is Presidential letter
forwarded via immediately following cable. Tone should be persuasion
combined with sympathy and understanding. Major inducement will be
U.S. official statements designed to restore Diem and GVN image at home and abroad (see Public Posture
below). Probably wise to have someone like Lansdale assist you
through long-standing personal friendship with Diem.
You should say that the programs thus far followed to win the war
have been sound and generally successful but have lagged in that
they did not take sufficient account of the aspirations of the
leading elements primarily in the main urban centers but also in
cities at the provincial and district levels. Their support vital to
arrest present deterioration.
Political opposition as expressed in the Buddhist movement was not
caused by Communist subversion but by the absence of a feeling of
stake and participation in the Government and its programs on the
part of these leading elements.
Program
Following are major topics you should plan to cover with Diem: a) Family—Diem should
think deeply and sincerely about the role of members of his family,
not only Nhu and Madame Nhu but also Thuc and Can. He should consider
making their role more open and less susceptible to charges they are
conspiratorial and therefore nefarious in their activities.
b) Party—Can Lao party should not be covert or
semi-covert but a broad association of supporters engaged in a
common, winning cause. This could perhaps be best accomplished by
disbanding the party and starting afresh.
[Page 224]
c) Elections—These should be held, should be
free, and should be widely observed. Candidate lists should be
reopened and members of the opposition should be allowed full and
free participation. They should and can be defeated in a free
battle.
d) Assembly—Assembly should be convoked, if
necessary in extraordinary session. The Government should submit its
policies to it and should receive its confidence. An Assembly
resolution would be most useful for external image purposes.
e) Normalcy—Diem should get everyone back to work and get them
to focus on winning the war. He should be broadminded and
compassionate in his attitude toward those who have, for
understandable reasons, found it difficult under recent
circumstances fully to support him.
A real spirit of reconciliation could work wonders on the people he
heads; a punitive, harsh or autocratic attitude could only lead to
further resistance.
f) Press—The press should be allowed full
latitude of expression. Diem
will be criticized, but leniency and cooperation with the domestic
and foreign press at this time would bring praise for his leadership
in due course.
g) Buddhists and Students—Let them out and
leave them unmolested. This more than anything else would
demonstrate the return of a better day and the refocussing on the
main job at hand, the war.
h) Secret and Combat Police—Keep its role to a
minimum and as circumspect as possible, thereby indicating clearly
that a period of reconciliation and political stability has
returned.
Following are additional specific remedial actions you should bring
up with Diem as appropriate:
- a.
- A repeal or suitable amendment Decree 10.
- b.
- Rehabilitation by ARVN of
pagodas.
- c.
- General Association of Buddhists to publish history of
Buddhist agitation, naming those who subverted it into
political vehicle to overthrow Diem.
- d.
- Establishment of Ministry of Religious Affairs.
- e.
- Liberation of passport issuances and currency restrictions
enabling all to leave who wish to.
- f.
- Offer of 1000 student scholarships in US permitting
departure of inimical elements.
- g.
- Cabinet changes to inject new untainted blood, remove
targets of popular discontent.
- h.
- Acceptance of Buddhist Inquiry Mission from World
Federation to report true facts of situation to
world.
Public Posture
Concurrently, the Department will undertake
to:
[Page 225]
- a.
- Work in the UN to blunt the
debate in the UN on the
resolution condemning GVN
for human rights violation.
- b.
- Prepare White Paper placing recent events in perspective,
noting essential political character of Buddhist agitation,
that only small numbers of pagodas occupied by force and
violence, and that Buddhist religion never really seriously
interfered with as far as majority Vietnamese
concerned.
- c.
- Present this privately before publication to key members
of Congress.
- d.
- Announce lifting of travel ban to SVN in view of “reestablishment of
situation”.
- e.
- Publicize with appropriate indications of approval each
step taken by GVN towards
better image.
[Attachment 2]
Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Vietnam3
Eyes only for Ambassador Lodge. Exclusive for Admiral Felt. Saigon’s
478.4 Action Plan for Viet-Nam is outlined below.
Phases 1 and 2 approved at highest level, and you should proceed to
progressive implementation. Washington decision will not be taken on
further phases which add increasing pressures, until we see results
of actions under Phases 1 and 2.
Part I, Objective and
Concept.
Objective. Our overall objective in South Viet-Nam is to win war
against Viet Cong. Recent repressive actions of GVN have created disaffection which
will inevitably affect war effort unless GVN undertakes changes in both policies and personnel
that are effective and credible.
While withdrawal by US would be immediately disastrous to war effort,
acquiescence by US in recent GVN
actions would be equally disastrous, although less immediately so.
We therefore propose follow policy of persuasion coupled with
pressure on GVN aimed at inducing it
to take actions which will insure sufficient popular support to win
war against Viet Cong. This policy should be implemented in such a
way as to avoid triggering either civil violence or radical move by
GVN to make deal with DRV and remove US presence.
[Page 226]
Actions by GVN. Check list of desired
GVN actions to ensure popular
support necessary to win war are divided into two categories: (A)
actions designed to reverse recent policies of repression, and (B)
actions essential to set psychological tone and image which will
make category A actions effective and credible.
Category A Actions:
- 1.
- Release and freedom from pursuit of all those recently
arrested, except only those who have indubitably engaged in
subversive action.
- 2.
- Announcement that Vice President Tho is designated to
negotiate with a legitimate reconstituted Intersect
Committee of Buddhists, these negotiations to lead to joint
statement of reconciliation.
- 3.
- Effective revocation of martial law.
- 4.
- Removal of all censorship.
- 5.
- Scheduling of a definite date for holding of new National
Assembly elections; reopening of list of candidates and
guarantee that elections will be free.
- 6.
- Convocation of extraordinary session of National Assembly
to announce actions above.
Category B Actions:
- 1.
- Diem’s government
should be reorganized and broadened to include respected
individuals such as Tran Quoc Buu and Pham Huy Quat, with
one or two posts given to senior generals such as Big Minh and Kim and with a recall to
public service of one or two individuals who have left
Vietnam, such as Vu Van Maul
- 2.
- Since Nhu and
Madame Nhu
symbolize to world and to important Vietnamese opinion
GVN policies of
repression, Nhus’
power must be terminated in order to lend credibility to
statements of policy changes and assure a fresh start. This
requires their departure from Vietnam, at least for extended
vacation.
Need to set psychological tone and image is paramount. Diem has taken positive actions in
past of greater or less scope than those contemplated in Category A
but which have had little practical political effect. Diem has already taken many of
steps in Category A but in such a way as to make them hollow or,
even if real, unbelievable (e.g., martial law already nominally
lifted, assembly elections scheduled, and puppet bonzes
established).
Thus specific “reforms” are apt to have little impact without
dramatic, symbolic move which convinces Vietnamese that reforms are
real. As practical matter this can only be achieved by some visible
reduction in influence of Nhus, who are—justifiably or not—symbol to disaffected
of all that they detest in GVN.
Even though it not our intention remove Diem, Ngo family may so resist reversal of policies
and removal of Nhus as to
make Diem’s removal
inevitable. If so, our goal should be so to structure situation that
Diem has option of
staying without his brother or retiring of his own free will.
[Page 227]
We recognize possibility this campaign may also result in resumed
coup plotting. We propose to give no encouragement to such
activities at this time, although we remain ready to listen to
serious approaches.
Part II, Phase 1.
- 1.
- Phase 1 concentrates on suasion by a continuation of your
conversations with Diem
on problem of US-GVN relations
in all its ramifications. Although past experience does not lead
us to be hopeful that suasion alone will accomplish desired
results, it seems essential to make attempt if only to establish
a record and lay groundwork for Phase 2.
- 2.
- You should present to President Diem Presidential letter5 forwarded via immediately
following cable.
- 3.
- In presenting Presidential letter it is suggested that you
review situation along following lines:
Since your last meeting with Diem USG has been faced with crisis of
confidence in Vietnamese Government on part of American
public and more particularly Congress. Diem is undoubtedly
aware of increasing tempo of criticism of his government
appearing in all sectors of US press without regard to
geographic location. In addition, he is aware of
movement in US Congress, exemplified by Church
resolution, which if unchecked could result in
Congressional action to cut off all aid to Vietnam.
Another factor must be borne in mind, and that is world
opinion. This too has been universally condemnatory of
regime and its recent policies of repression. This will
inevitably be manifested dramatically in General
Assembly when present resolution on Buddhist question is
debated. US and other friendly nations who are aiding
Vietnam will find it politically difficult support
GVN in UN under present
circumstances. US cannot control world opinion, but as
leader of free world its attitudes carry great deal of
influence. If US, major support of South Vietnam, has
its confidence in GVN
restored, this will have favorable effect on attitudes
shown by other nations.
In order to preserve aid program to South Vietnam, which
President sincerely desires to do, he has written
President Diem
personal letter urging him to take steps necessary to
permit USG to meet criticisms of its people and Congress
and continue assisting Vietnamese war effort.
- 4.
- We believe you should also reiterate to Diem actions (see checklist
above) which US considers desirable for him to take to counter
US and world criticisms and enable us to continue cooperate with
him.
- 5.
- In this phase we hereby authorize limited, voluntary
evacuation of American dependents. Separate cable being
forwarded on implementing instructions.
[Page 228]
Part III, Phase 2.
- 1.
-
Concept.
In this phase we add selective cuts in aid which will have
least effect on war effort as pressures in your continuing
conversations with Diem.
Tone of your conversations should continue be that US purpose
is to preserve aid program to SVN, which President desires to do.
Regretfully, however, has become politically necessary take
certain actions convince US public and Congress we
supporting only those GVN
efforts with which we agree, i.e., fight against Viet Cong.
Otherwise, Congress may cut off all aid.
We notify Diem of
these actions with great reluctance and wish assure him we
will attempt continue or redirect aid for programs essential
to war effort as this can be worked out. If Diem can take dramatic
actions we requesting promptly, we feel we can quickly
restore conditions but we may have make further cuts, again
in order avoid total cut of aid.
- 2.
-
Actions.
Your Approach to Diem.
In context of above, you should inform Diem that in light of unsatisfactory response to
your (Phase 1) effort at persuasion, USG has now instructed you
review for him actions relating our programs Viet-Nam which have
now, or recently, been taken.
- A.
- We are not moving ahead with decisions on major AID actions, such as negotiation of
$33 million additional new PL-480
sales agreement, $5 million in September allotments for the
Commercial Import Program (CIP),
$5.5 million in releases for licenses of July-August CIP allotments, and the approval of
certain new contracts.
- B.
- We will withhold our support from organs of GVN which have been supporting
policies of repression, and will specifically withhold
additional supplies and equipment from certain operations and
elements of the combat police and DGI and ARVN
PsyWar.
- C.
- We will require written guarantees that AID provided equipment will not be
used in acts against non-Communist political or religious groups
from any GVN agency likely to be
involved in such acts.
- D.
- We have given instructions to Mr. John Richardson to suspend immediately payments
to all projects serving the current politically repressive
activities. Projects not serving those activities may continue
to be supported by payments directly to project officers,
provided the projects are in our mutual best interest.
- E.
- The Executive Branch considers any effort to contest moves in
Congress to restrict or terminate U.S. aid programs in Viet-Nam
bound to be ineffective under present circumstances.
- F.
- The US did not oppose the inscription of an item proposed in
the United Nations General Assembly censoring the violation of
human rights in Viet-Nam, and will not be in a position, due to
the
[Page 229]
state of domestic
opinion in the US, to oppose its adoption by the General
Assembly unless a radical improvement in the situation in
Viet-Nam occurs.
- G.
- Reluctantly the United States has decided that the unsettled
conditions in South Viet-Nam require us to evacuate all American
dependents.
- H.
- USOM and USIS/Saigon will withhold
additional supplies and equipment now being delivered in Saigon
from those operations and elements of the Combat Police and
ARVN
PsyWar and Director General
of Information which have been used in support of policies of
repression.
Background on AID
Actions Above.
Following is provided for your background information on AID aspect of your approach to
Diem above, and may at
your discretion be communicated to Diem during your conversations.
In recent weeks AID has already been
delaying:
- A.
- Issuance of Procurement Authorization on $5.5 million in
Supporting Assistance/Commercial Import Program (CIP) funds allotted to Mission
in July-August but not yet obligated to GVN.
- B.
- Allotment of approximately $5 million to Mission for
September issuance of Procurement Authorizations for
Commercial Import Program.
- C.
- Amendment of current PL-480
agreement adding $2.9 million in sweetened condensed
milk.
- D.
- Negotiation of new PL-480
agreement covering roughly CY
1964 for about $33 million in cotton, flour, condensed milk
and tobacco.
- E.
- Approval of major contracts expected to be presented
shortly under loan projects including Saigon-Cholon
waterworks (treatment plant $9 million) and Saigon Electric
Power ($4 million).
Disclosure of Your Approach.
You should not immediately announce publicly the content of your
approach to Diem and the
actions taken. You should obtain Diem’s reaction on later visits. During your
approach, however, you should inform Diem that at some stage White House must announce
general nature of actions taken by USG. You should tell Diem that you have authority to
recommend to Washington timing of this announcement.
Should we move into this phase (Phase 2), you have discretionary
authority to inform certain key Vietnamese, to be selected by you,
in confidence about your approach to Diem immediately after it has been made.
Undisclosed Actions.
Begin FYI. In this phase we would
immediately institute following other actions which should not be
revealed to Diem himself but
which would rapidly become apparent.
[Page 230]
- A.
- Acquisition of substantial cash resources in plasters, in
preparation for direct support by-passing Saigon.
- B.
- On same day or about same time as your approach to Diem, Richardson and certain his
officers would indicate to Colonel
Tung and selected Vietnamese officers and
officials suspension of payments to those projects serving
current repressive activities. Burden of CAS statements would be along following lines:
“Ambassador has instructed Richardson and staff cease certain payments on
instruction received from highest levels in Washington. Reason
for suspension of aid to certain programs is that USG cannot
condone actions of repression on part GVN and cannot for one moment support such
activities.”
- C.
- At your discretion, Chief of Station might talk directly to
Ngo Dinh Nhu with
view persuade him to depart. End FYI.
Additional Actions.
Additional measures which may be taken in Phase 2 at your discretion:
- A.
- Demand by USOM Director
for return, or refund, of trucks and other equipment used by
police in raids on pagodas and schools.
- B.
- Withholding of participation in hamlet militia leaders
training program so long as it is directed by Colonel Tung.
- C.
-
Withhold quarterly release 25 million plasters due
shortly to Department Defense PsyWar for their publications pending
positive indication these funds will not be used to
support policy of repression against Buddhists and
students or other non-Communist groups or to publicize
Nhus
favorably.6
