Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963

113. Memorandum for the Record of a Meeting¹

Washington, September 16, 1963, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam

PRESENT

• Secretary Rusk
• Secretary McNamara
• Secretary Dillon
• Mr. Ball
• Mr Gilpatric
• General Taylor
• Mr. Bundy
• Mr. McCone
• Governor Harriman
• Mr. Bell
• Mr. Forrestal
• Mr. Hilsman
• Mr. Colby
• Mr. Janow
• Mr. Manning
• Mr. Sheldon
• Mr. Smith
• General Krulak

1. The meeting was preceded by distribution of an up-to-date intelligence roundup by Mr. McCone.²

2. Secretary Rusk opened the meeting by asking if we had any details of what military units had moved out of the capital and what the real significance was. General Taylor replied that we had no definitive information but that we would send an inquiry to General Harkins.

3. Mr. Rusk then asked if there had been any thought given to discussing with the GVN the prospect of getting Tri Quang out of the country rather than releasing him to be a continuing annoyance in Vietnam. Mr. Hilsman said that, to his knowledge, nothing of this sort had been contemplated but that he would suggest it to the Ambassador.

4. Mr. Rusk then asked if there was any basis for real apprehension that students might be going over to the Viet Cong. To this Mr. McCone suggested that the Group might wish to question Mr. Sheldon (from CIA Headquarters) and Mr. Smith (from the CIA Station in Saigon) who had just returned from Saigon this morning. These two individuals were then brought in and the Group questioned them as follows:

a. From Mr. McCone. Do you believe that the dissident students are going over to the Viet Cong?

Reply. Three schools in Saigon have probably been infiltrated by the Viet Cong. This is something that has been known for some time. The general impression is that some Saigon students have defected to the Viet Cong; the number is not large-not exceeding 30.

b. From Mr. McCone. How many students remain in custody?

Reply. Less than 200 students remain in custody-100 of these are in jail, 100 in the armed services. The arrest of students was widespread and extended to almost anyone involved with the Lycee or the university. Release, in most cases, was prompt.

c. From Mr. Rusk. Is there, in fact, a difference in view among our various officials in Saigon?

Reply. Yes, there is, except in the U.S. military.

d. From General Taylor. What are your views on the Sheehan and Halberstam articles in the Sunday papers?³

Reply. There is some truth in the allegations. This sort of thing finds its way into the paper because everything in Saigon gets leaked by our own people.

e. From Mr. Rusk. How does Nhu go about creating the atmosphere that he enjoys full U.S. support?

Reply. He gives lectures; and he conveys the idea of the Special Forces, the Can Lao, the Republican Youth, and the Women’s Solidarity Movement.

f. From Mr. Rusk. Is there still coup talk on the Vietnamese side?

Reply. Yes. Various Vietnamese officials and employees come to CIA with coup ideas all the time. It is mostly talk because the key is the loyalty of the military units, and there is little assurance in this area. Some of the coup talkers speak of having acquired loyalty from junior officers and some units in the Saigon area, but there are no specifics.

g. From Mr. Hilsman. Do you have any views as to the reports that Nhu is an opium smoker?

Reply. The rumor has been current for some years, but it is not believed.

h. From Mr. Rusk. Does any of the U.S. representation believe that we can make a success of the present endeavor with the Diem government totally unchanged?

Reply. No one is known to hold this view in the Embassy, at CIA, USIS or USOM.

i. From Mr. McCone (referring to a cable which had come in from Sheldon).⁴ What are the general ideas which underlie current coup planning?

Reply. They generally pivot around the thought of a quick, violent attack on the Palace, assassination and then hope for subsequent substantive action by the generals. The substance which they all lack is a comprehensive follow-on plan.

j. From Mr. Rusk. Do you agree that the coup planners are hopeful that, if they can cause the initial crisis, the U.S. will do the rest? The question was not answered.

k. From Mr. Rusk. What are your views regarding the rumors concerning possible gestures in the direction of the DRV?

Mr. Sheldon offered, as a hypothesis, that Nhu is extremely wise; that if we corner him and he has no hope of maintaining his influence in any other way he will go to Moscow—probably via Yugoslavia—to propose that the Soviets and French take over our commitments. The compensation would be in terms of U.S. withdrawal and the possibility of a Soviet presence. To this Governor Harriman commented that the Russians would really be getting little out of the arrangement, since we would remove ourselves in any case, as soon as the Viet Cong stopped attacking the GVN.

5. The meeting then turned to the papers which had been distributed over the week-end.⁵ Mr. Hilsman made a brief distribution of two general lines of action, one involving conciliation; one involving pressures. He was emphatic in his statement that we should be prepared to reverse our course at any time in the event that we achieved some degree of success. The papers were not discussed in detail.

6. Secretary Rusk stated that a cable of instructions would have to be drafted quickly for the Ambassador in order for him to get an accurate view of Washington level reactions.

7. Mr. McNamara proposed that the paper embodying a conciliatory program be taken as a basis;⁶ that an appraisal of the situation at large, as seen here, be developed; that it be followed by the elements of the conciliatory approach; that we include the Presidential letter; that we realize that a conciliatory approach may not succeed, in which case further steps may have to be taken; and finally that the Ambassador’s views on all the above be solicited.

8. The general meeting was then terminated, followed by a brief session including the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Mr. Bundy. General Taylor described the session as the occasion for Mr. Rusk to say that he preferred the conciliatory rather than the pressure approach, and that a cable embodying these thoughts would be drafted for consideration by the President.

9. Subsequently, I discussed events with Mr. Hilsman, who advised me that he had been directed by Secretary Rusk to prepare two cables;⁷ one conveying a conciliatory approach, and one conveying the suasion and pressure approach, stating that these would be taken up with the President in a meeting, probably tomorrow.

V.H. Krulak
Major General, USMC

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-647-71. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krulak. The meeting was held at the Department of State.
2. Not found.
3. Reference is to Neil Sheehan’s front-page article in The Washington Post, September 15, entitled “U.S. Acts To End Dispute Among Its Viet Missions,” and David Halberstam’s The New York Times article of the same date; see footnote 2, Document 112.
4. Not further identified.

5. Reference is to two papers drafted by Hilsman, Monday, September 16, but first prepared on September 11, entitled, “Reconciliation with Rehabilitated GVN” and “Pressure Plan.” Copies are in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda, Meetings on Vietnam (without annexes), and ibid., Vietnam Country Series, Action Plan (with three annexes). The first annex is a Department of Defense memorandum, September 11, entitled “Implication of Partial Cessation of US Military Aid Upon the Military Campaign in the Republic of Vietnam” plus tabs. This document is published in Declassified Documents, 1982, 466 A. The second annex is a list of AID programs and a chart detailing them and the probable effects on Vietnam if they were suspended; neither is printed. The third annex is a copy of Document 110.

   Apparently advance versions of these papers were sent to the President by Forrestal on September 15. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Vietnam Country Series, Memos and Miscellaneous, Part II)

6. Copies of the paper, “Reconciliation With a Rehabilitated GVN,” were given to McNamara, Gilpatric, and Taylor, all of whom made written comments on them. McNamara’s and Taylor’s copies are at the National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-186-69, and Gilpatric’s copy is at the Washington Federal Records Center, McNamara Papers: FRC 31-A-3470, Viet Sensitive.
7. These cables, which are similar in substance to Hilsman’s papers, are printed as attachments to Document 114.