Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

228. Draft Memorandum for the President¹

Washington, November 8, 1961.

SUBJECT

• South VietNam

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree:

1. The fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious.

2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam by any measures short of the introduction of U.S. forces on a substantial scale.

3. It would be desirable if the fall of South Viet-Nam could be prevented without commitment of U.S. combat forces. It is our agreed judgment, as indicated above, that we cannot base a policy on that hope. On the other hand, if we proceed with the energy and confidence based upon a determination to see the matter through, and if this were made evident to both friend and foe, there might be opportunities to accomplish the objective without the actual commitment of the entire effort for which we would be prepared.

4. In a situation where a nation of twenty million people is being intimidated by an active force of fifteen to twenty thousand Viet Cong, it is obvious that the self-help of the Vietnamese and their attitude toward U.S. forces are crucial to success. U.S. and SEATO forces from outside Viet-Nam cannot accomplish our basic national objective without a determined effort by the Vietnamese. This factor constitutes the critical limitation on our own commitment.

Probable Extent of U.S. Commitment

If we commit combat forces to South VietNam, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment in Southeast Asia must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged, and Hanoi and Peiping may overtly intervene. It is the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the light of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, we can assume that the maximum United States forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia would not exceed six divisions, or about 205,000 men. This would be in addition to local forces and such SEATO forces as may be engaged. It is also the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our military posture is, or, with the addition of more National Guard or regular Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces² without serious interference with our present Berlin plans.³

Relation to Laos

It must be understood that the introduction of American combat forces into Viet-Nam prior to a Laotian settlement would run a considerable risk of stimulating a Communist breach of the cease fire and a resumption of hostilities in Laos. This could present us with a choice between the use of combat forces in Laos or an abandonment of that country to full Communist control. At the present time, there is at least a chance that a settlement can be reached in Laos on the basis of a weak and unsatisfactory Souvanna Phouma Government.⁴ On the other hand, the introduction of U.S. forces into Viet-Nam after a Laotian settlement could serve to stabilize the position both in Viet-Nam and in Laos by registering our determination to see to it that the Laotian settlement was as far as the U.S. would be willing to see Communist influence in Southeast Asia develop.

Use of ICC and Geneva Conference Procedures

The question naturally arises whether Viet-Nam can be settled through the use of the ICC and a resort to a Geneva-type conference in an effort to find a negotiated settlement. The dangers in this procedure are very high, if our objective is to prevent a serious increase in Communist influence in Southeast Asia. South Viet-Nam resulted from the partition of Viet-Nam and represents that portion which is entitled to be free from Communist penetration or control. To embark upon a course of negotiation with the Sino-Soviet Bloc would acknowledge that the Communists are entitled to negotiate about South Viet-Nam alone and would mean that they would insist upon some sort of settlement comparable to that in Laos. We do not believe this is desirable or necessary, given the scale of Viet Cong action and the stronger position of the GVN and the greater accessibility of Viet-Nam to the United States and SEATO.

Action Short of U.S. Combat Forces

Our only hope of achieving some stabilization of the situation in South Viet-Nam without the commitment of the major⁵ U.S. combat forces would seem to lie in:

1. The prompt revamping of the administrative and military command structure of the GVN;

2. Sharply increased U.S. military assistance to the GVN in airlift, intelligence, watercraft, and increased U.S. participation in the direction and control of GVN military operations;

3. Large-scale use of U.S. funds to act promptly to support flood relief and rehabilitation, increases in military and civilian pay full supply of a wide range of materials such as food, medical supplies, transportation equipment, communications equipment, and any other items where material help could assist Diem in winning his own war;

4. The maximum political involvement of other nations, including neutrals.

5. A significant diminution in Communist support to the Viet Cong, brought about by a firm⁶ indication to the Communist Bloc that we were prepared to do what was necessary to prevent further support of the Viet Cong.

It should be pointed out, however, that point 3 above, could not be accomplished unless we ourselves had first taken a clear decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism⁷ including whatever U.S. combat forces may be required to accomplish this objective.

Multilateral Action

From the political point of view, both domestic and international, it would seem crucial to involve at least some combat⁸ forces from other nations alongside of U.S. forces in VietNam. It would be difficult to explain why no effort had been made to invoke SEATO or why the United States would have to carry this burden unilaterally. Our position would be greatly strengthened if the introduction of combat⁹ forces could be taken as a SEATO action, accompanied by units of other SEATO countries, with a full SEATO report to the United Nations of the purposes and limitations of the action itself.

Recommendations

In the light of the foregoing, it is recommended that:

1. We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South VietNam¹⁰ to Communism and the willingness to commit whatever United States combat¹¹ forces may be necessary to achieve this objective. (At such time as combat forces may be committed, they would at least initially be deployed into the area south of the 17th Parallel with the mission of being prepared to meet any overt North Vietnamese attack across the demilitarized zone and of relieving GVN forces presently deployed in that area for offensive operations.¹²

2. We immediately undertake consultations initially with the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, and subsequently with other SEATO members to inform them of the foregoing decision and to obtain the widest possible SEATO participation. However, our decision to act in South Viet-Nam is not contingent upon SEATO agreement¹³ thereto.

3. We communicate our decision by suitable diplomatic means at an appropriate time to the Communist Bloc and selected friendly countries other than those in SEATO.¹⁴

4. We continue our efforts to obtain a settlement in Laos.

5. Ambassador Nolting be instructed to make an immediate approach to President Diem to the effect that the Government of the United States is prepared to join the Government of Viet-Nam in a massive joint effort to cope with the Viet Cong threat, and the ravages of the flood, if, on its part, the Government of Viet-Nam is prepared promptly to carry out an effective total mobilization of its own resources, both material and human, for the same end.

a. Specifically, the United States is prepared on its part to:

(1) Deploy U.S. combat forces to South Viet-Nam in the area south of the 17th Parallel to meet any overt North Vietnamese attack and to relieve SVN forces presently there for offensive operations against the Viet Cong;

(2) Invite SEATO members to participate in the above deployment, but will not be deterred by any lack of participation;

(3) Provide individual administrators for insertion into the Governmental machinery of South Viet-Nam in types and numbers to be agreed upon by the two governments;

(4) Assist the GVN in effecting surveillance and control over the coastal waters and inland waterways, furnishing such advisers, operating personnel and small craft as may be necessary for quick and effective operations;

(5) Reorganize MAAG-VietNam and increase its size as may be necessary by the implementation of these recommendations;

(6) Review its economic aid program to take account of the needs of flood relief, to give priority to projects in support of the expanded counter insurgency program, and to supply material in support of the security effort;

(7) To support a request by the GVN to FAO or any other appropriate international organization for multilateral assistance in the rehabilitation of the flood area.

b. The United States believes that the following joint enterprises with the GVN are required:

(1) A joint effort to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level and extending upward through the Government and armed forces to the central intelligence organization;

(2) A joint survey of the conditions in the provinces to assess the social, political, intelligence, and military factors bearing on the prosecution of the counter-insurgency in order to reach a common estimate of these factors and a common determination of how to deal with them;

(3) A joint effort to free the army for mobile, offensive operations. This effort will be based upon improving the training and equipping of the civil guard and the self-defense corps, relieving the regular army of static missions, raising the level of the mobility of army forces by the provision of considerably more helicopters and light aviation, and organizing a border ranger force for a long-term campaign on the Laotian border against the Viet Cong infiltrators. The U.S. Government will support this joint effort with equipment and with military units and personnel to do those tasks which the armed forces of Viet-Nam cannot perform in time. Such tasks include air reconnaissance and photography, airlift (beyond the present capacity of SVN forces), special intelligence, and air-ground support techniques.

c. It is the view of the United States Government that the unilateral U.S. actions and the joint US-GVN undertakings listed in a and b above will succeed in defeating the Viet Cong only if:

(1) They are accepted and carried out with the complete and unreserved approval of and cooperation by the GVN

(2) The GVN takes appropriate legislative and administrative action to put the nation on a wartime footing to mobilize its entire resources;

(3) Establishes appropriate governmental wartime agencies with adequate authority to perform their functions effectively;

(4) Overhauls its military establishment and creates an effective organization to prosecute the war;

d. Before setting in motion the U.S. proposals listed above, the U.S. Government would appreciate confirmation of their acceptability to the GVN, and an expression from the GVN of the undertakings it is prepared to make to ensure the success of this joint effort.

1. Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, T-2~71. Top Secret. No drafting information is given on the source text except for the date, but the memorandum was apparently drafted in the Department of State. Document 230 refers to what apparently is this draft memorandum as the “State SEA Paper”. Moreover, it seems to be an enlarged version of Document 222, which is five pages in manuscript form. A handwritten notation on the source text indicates that it is the “initial draft” of the November 11 memorandum to the President (see Document 234). Another handwritten notation indicates that the source text was discussed at the meeting with the Secretary of State on November 9, apparently a reference to the meeting described in Document 232.
2. A handwritten insertion at this point reads, “and support them in action.”
3. Written above the final four words of this sentence are the words, “the discharge of our obligations”, apparently intended as a suggested substitution.
4. When?” is written in the margin alongside this sentence.
5. The word “substantial” is written above major.
6. An illegible word is written above “firm”.
7. An alternate ending to this sentence is handwritten at this point: “including the introduction of a US military presence at once followed by whatever additional U.S. combat forces may be required to accomplish this objective.”
8. Handwritten brackets are around the word “combat” and a question mark is written in the margin.
9. Handwritten brackets are around the word “combat” and “time?” is written in the margin.
10. “SEA” is written above “South VietNam” and “when act?” is written in the margin.
11. Handwritten brackets are around “combat” and the word “military” is written above it.
12. Handwritten brackets are around the phrase “for offensive operations” and “how many?” is written in the margin.
13. Written in the margin at this point is “any support?”
14. Handwritten interpolations reverse the sequence of actions as follows: “We communicate our decision by suitable diplomatic means to selected friendly countries other than those in SEATO and at an appropriate time to the Com. Bloc.”