229. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State1
SUBJECT
- Viet Nam
PARTICIPANTS
- Mr. M.J. Desai, Foreign Secretary, Government of India
- Mr. D.N. Chatterjee, Minister, Embassy of India
- The Secretary
- Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia
- Rogers B. Horgan, Officer-in-Charge, India-Ceylon-Nepal
The Secretary requested Mr. Desai’s estimate of the Indian influence on Hanoi.
Mr. Desai said it was now very little, mainly because of India’s difficulties with China. The primary influence in Hanoi was held by the Soviet Union.
The Secretary said there was some debate here as to the relative ascendancy of Moscow’s and Peiping’s influence in Hanoi.
Mr. Desai remarked that Hanoi must pay court these days to Peiping but they try to keep as clear of Peiping influence as possible. In contrast, their relations with Moscow are firm. Washington can talk straight to Moscow and the Soviets will understand us. In turn, Hanoi will accept what Moscow says. If we try to relay messages through India or Yugoslavia, Hanoi will be uncertain how to interpret what Delhi or Belgrade says, and may well go to Moscow for advice on that point.
The Secretary pointed out the U.S. would have some difficulties over going directly to the Soviets on questions involving South Viet Nam. They would seize upon our approach as a negotiating point and try to become involved in the South Viet Nam situation, just as they are now in Laos.
Mr. Desai predicted that in such circumstances the USSR would ask for a discussion of the Viet Nam situation in a conference. He said, however, that he believed we would be able to satisfy them by taking the stand that unification could not possibly be negotiated under present circumstances, and then setting a date, such as 1963, for further talks on unification. (Mr. Desai did not make it clear whether he meant that the USSR would be satisfied with this answer in bilateral talks with us, or whether he envisaged that a [Page 568] conference would be brought to agree on such an arrangement. In earlier conversations, notably his conversation with the Secretary on November 7,2 Mr. Desai had reported that he had advised Ambassador Harriman against trying to solve the Viet Nam situation by the conference method. He feels that at a conference there will be a demand for unification by elections as envisaged in the 1954 Geneva accord.)
The Secretary remarked that in Viet Nam, as in other situations, the U.S. is being asked to negotiate and make concessions in order to get the other side to cease and desist from what amounts to highway robbery by them.
Mr. Desai demurred from this view of the Viet Nam situation, saying that the other side has some justification in its claim that the 1954 agreements have never been carried out. The Secretary dismissed this line of reasoning by pointing out that since 1943 it is hard to find an agreement we have had with the USSR that has not been violated by them. Mr. Desai responded by merely noting that violation of agreements between opponents was not unusual in international affairs, Pakistani agreements with India having often been violated.
The Secretary told Mr. Desai that, looking beyond the present situation in Viet Nam, if it were not possible to bring to a stop the present Communist activity there, and if the solution in Laos were to prove unsatisfactory, there would be a strong possibility that the United States would pull out of Southeast Asia very fast and simply “take the area off our agenda.”
Mr. Desai responded by suggesting that we need not take a pessimistic view. In Laos, for example, we can count on the fact that Souvanna Phouma needs our aid, so that we can put much pressure on him.
The Secretary noted that it was Souphanouvong who is dragging his feet on reaching agreement now. Mr. Desai noted that for the past several years Souphanouvong has had to rely on the Viet Minh for everything. It will take a while to rehabilitate him: he cannot be expected to turn his back on his benefactors overnight. Mr. Desai implied, however, that he believed Souphanouvong could be rehabilitated, relying on the fundamental Laotian dislike of the Vietnamese.
The conversation then turned to the consideration of the Joint Communiqué to be issued by the President and the Prime Minister in the afternoon.3
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 6s D 366, CF 1990. Secret. Drafted by Horgan and approved in the Office of the Secretary on November 17. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books)↩
- See Document 221.↩
- For text of the joint communiqué issued on November 9, see Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1961, pp. 927-928.↩