Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

221. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State¹

Washington, November 7, 1961, 5:13 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Viet Nam

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. M.J. Desai, Foreign Secretary, Government of India
• The Secretary
• Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary, Near East and South Asia
• Rogers B. Horgan, Officer-in-Charge, India-Ceylon-Nepal

The Secretary asked Mr. Desai for his thoughts on how it might be possible to reverse the trend in Viet Nam from its present slippery downward slope. Mr. Desai said, after some thought, the basic thing was to have in South Viet Nam a regime-the present one or another-that would be non-Communist, though not necessarily anti-Communist; the regime should be interested in economic development; and it should be willing to agree to a continued separation of North and South Viet Nam. At present each regime in Viet Nam is threatening to absorb the other.

Mr. Desai professed to be too out of touch with South Viet Nam, which he had left in 1955, to have any thoughts on any possible alternative to Diem. He characterized Diem as sincere, courageous, self-centered, stubborn. He told a number of anecdotes of his own contacts with Diem, not just from his position on the ICC. but as a disinterested advisor to Diem. These stories illustrated Mr. Desai’s failure to convince Diem that he should subordinate everything to Diem’s big problem, which was and is the enmity of the North Viet Nam regime. For example, he had tried to persuade Diem to make his peace with Prince Sihanouk but Diem told him he could not deal with such a madman. Mr. Desai expressed his belief that Diem must be persuaded to broaden the base of his government and evoke the assistance of other South Vietnamese rather than merely to run the government for the benefit of his own family.

Mr. Desai said he felt it was important for us to take into account the objectives of the North Vietnamese in considering steps we might take in Viet Nam. He gave his analysis of North Vietnamese objectives, starting in 1954. He said at that time Hanoi was willing that Laos and Cambodia be neutral because Hanoi believed it would get South Viet Nam through political means, especially by exploiting differences between ourselves and the French and British.

During the period 1955 to 1958, Hanoi toyed with the Laotian situation and used Laos as a bargaining point with regard to a settlement of its relations with South Viet Nam. In 1958 he believed that Hanoi was somewhat worried about Laos but nevertheless allowed a settlement between Souvanna and the Pathet Lao. More recently our activities and the succession of governments in Laos caused Hanoi to intervene actively again.

Mr. Desai then moved to a consideration of the effect of various moves that could be made with regard to the Vietnamese situation. If a conference were to be held, the immediate result would be a call for elections. He said he had advised Ambassador Harriman against the United States using the conference approach to a settlement of the Viet Nam situation. If a small number of U.S. troops were to be moved in, he did not believe they would materially help the South Vietnamese. If a large number of troops were to move in, it would upset the Laotian situation and fighting would be renewed. Even if the U.S. ended up in military occupation of South Viet Nam and Laos, where would we be?

Mr. Johnson stressed the point that the fighting in South Viet Nam was very severe and very dirty, and that some immediate action appeared to us to be called for. Mr. Desai dismissed the dirtiness of the fighting as an old Vietnamese custom. He stressed that there was no immediate solution available in Viet Nam, and that the problem was to work on Diem and gradually to convince him of the necessity of changing his methods.

Mr. Desai also was asked for his suggestions for immediate action. He said first to get the Laotian settlement out of the way.

Second, we should get Diem to cooperate with the ICC and to expose through the ICC to the world what was happening. He said that he had received the Government of Viet Nam letter of October 24² from Ambassador Harriman in Geneva and that it was the first really well-documented case South Viet Nam had made. He said that when he had learned in Delhi last month of the protest from South Viet Nam on Col. Nam’s assassination, he had told the Indian ICC representative to ask for facts and that the ICC now had something to work with. He said that with ICC exposure it would be possible for the U.K. to press the U.S.S.R. to stop what was going on.

Third, he suggested that there should be no settlement of the reunification question while the war was going on. Mr. Johnson asked him whether he thought the Viet Minh would listen to the Soviet Union. Mr. Desai replied indirectly by saying that the Vietnamese hate the Chinese and always have. He predicted Hanoi would be Peiping’s Yugoslavia in ten years. He suggested that it would be useful for Diem to announce publicly three policies: (1) cooperation with the ICC, (2) his determination to work for the economic development of the country in peace and freedom, and (3) his renunciation of force for the unification of the country. In short, Mr. Desai said he should carry the political offensive to the enemy’s camp.

At the close of the conversation, Mr. Desai made the suggestion that South Viet Nam try to get economic help from its fellow Asians in the Colombo Plan.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1990. Confidential. Drafted by Horgan, approved in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs on November 17, and in the Office of the Secretary on November 26. The time of the meeting is taken from Rusk’s Appointment Book. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Books)
2. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-861)