Office of the Historian

222. Draft Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President1

Washington, November 7, 1961.

SUBJECT

  • South Viet-Nam

The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agree:

1.
The fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation [Page 551] to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia and in Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, would be extremely serious.
2.
The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam by any measures short of the introduction of U.S. forces on a substantial scale.

If we commit combat forces to South VietNam, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment in Southeast Asia must be faced. The struggle may be prolonged, and Hanoi and Peiping may overtly intervene. It is the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that, in the light of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, we can assume that the maximum United States forces required on the ground in Southeast Asia would not exceed six divisions, or about 205,000 men. It is also the view of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our military posture is, or, with the addition of more National Guard or regular Army divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without serious interference with our present Berlin plans.

While it is clear that, from the standpoint of South Viet-Nam alone, the introduction of American combat forces into that country is most desirable, it is not clear what effect this action might have on Laos if this action is taken prior to a settlement with respect to that country. It could have the effect of causing the Communists to break off negotiations and renew their offensive in that country, thus requiring us also to commit forces in Laos or to abandon that country to full Communist control. While a fully satisfactory settlement with respect to Laos does not now appear probable, it may be possible in the near future to reach a settlement on the basis of a very weak and unsatisfactory Souvanna Phouma government.

Our only hope of achieving some stabilization of the situation in South Viet-Nam without the commitment of major United States combat forces may lie in:

1.
Our prompt revamping of the administrative and military command structure of the GVN;
2.
Sharply increased U.S. military assistance to the GVN in air lift, intelligence, water craft, and increased MAAG participation in the direction and control of GVN military operations; and
3.
A sharp diminution in Communist support to the Viet Cong.

It might perhaps be possible to achieve point 3 above if we were able to communicate to the Communist bloc our firm and clear intention to intervene with United States combat forces in South Viet-Nam unless they took prompt steps to halt their support of the Viet Cong. However, this intention could not be communicated with conviction unless we ourselves had first taken a clear decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South [Page 552] Viet-Nam to Communism and the willingness to commit whatever United States combat forces may be required to accomplish this objective.

In the light of the foregoing, it is recommended:

1.
We now take the decision to commit ourselves to the objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism and the willingness to commit whatever United States combat forces may be necessary to achieve this objective.
2.
We communicate this decision by suitable diplomatic means to the Communist bloc and selected friendly countries.
3.
We continue our efforts to obtain a settlement in Laos.
4.
We immediately undertake the first seven points of General Taylor’s recommendations, deferring the decision on the timing of the introduction of combat forces into South VietNam.

Dean Rusk2
  1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 66 D 150, Taylor Report on VN. Top Secret. Drafted by U. Alexis Johnson. The similarity between certain sections of the source text and Document 214 suggests that Johnson consulted with William Bundy in the preparation of this draft.↩
  2. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩