223. Note From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)1

At the risk of blitzing you with paper, I attach some think-pieces on the Viet-Nam problem, by myself and Harry Rowen’s staff..2 The key paper, however, is the first one on possible outcomes. It is a first cut. Paul Nitze agrees with it.

Yesterday’s discussion3 did not bite deep on Laos. My own strong feeling is that we must let that one come to us-i.e., wait and see what the 8000 produces as reaction, but be ready to move fast on the off chance that Hanoi decides to take over before we can react. We cannot politically move into Laos right away, and we should try not to let our intervention in South Viet-Nam kill the [Page 553] chances of the Souvanna “solution” in Laos. In other words, one at a time.

WP Bundy

[Attachment 1]

Draft Paper Prepared by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)4

Reflections on the Possible Outcomes of US Intervention in South Vietnam

The range of possible outcomes:

“Good” Scenarios

  • Scenario A: Diem takes heart and also takes the measures needed to improve efficiency, with only the 8000 man force and US specialist help. Hanoi heeds our warning and lays low, so that control is reasserted in South Vietnam. (Laos is a big question mark here and in other Scenarios.)
  • Scenario B: The struggle continues to go against Diem, and his own efforts at improvement are feeble. Thus, the US moves into the driver’s seat and eventually brings the situation under control, using forces on the scale of 25,000-75,000. Hanoi and Peiping do not intervene directly, and we do not attack Hanoi.
  • Scenario C: As the struggle becomes prolonged, the US strikes at Hanoi (or Hanoi and Peiping intervene overtly). The US wins the resulting conflict, i.e., obtains at least a restoration of the status quo, after inflicting such punishment on Hanoi and/or Peiping that further aggressive moves are forestalled for a long time to come.

“Bad” Scenarios

  • Scenario X: The US decides not to put in the 8000 men, or later forces, and Diem is gradually overcome.
  • Scenario Y: The US puts in the 8000 men, but when Diem fails to improve his performance pulls out and lets him be overcome.
  • Scenario Z: Moscow comes to the aid of Hanoi and Peiping, supplying all necessary equipment (including a limited supply of air-deliverable nuclear weapons to retaliate in kind against US use) so [Page 554] that the outcome is a stalemate in which great destruction is wreaked on the whole area.

Of these, only A is truly a good outcome from all long-term standpoints-it stiffens us generally vis-à-vis the Bloc, holds the area (save perhaps Laos), does not discomfit us unduly in the neutral world, excellent for domestic US will and drive. Only trouble is-it’s unlikely! However, it is still so much better than any other that it is worth accepting some added degree of difficulty in achieving B and C to give A every chance to happen.

The choice between B and C is a hard one. Despite all our warnings and Jorden Report, our case of aggression against Hanoi will not convince neutrals of its accuracy and justice, or major allies of its wisdom and practicality. On the other hand, B is a road that has almost no end in sight. The US is poorly cast as a permanent protecting power, but the local capabilities would be so low at the end of such a struggle that we would almost have to assume that role. There is a very considerable chance that under continuing US protection, South Viet-Nam and the area as a whole would become a wasting asset and an eyesore that would greatly hamper all our relations worldwide. On the whole, the short-term onus attached to C may be preferable. However, as we play the hand toward C (especially if we use Moscow as the channel to Hanoi) we may well raise the chances of Moscow acting to bring on Z.

On the “bad” side, X and Z are clearly nightmares. Though X means loss of the area for a long time to come, it is probably better in the long run than Z. The chances of the Soviets acting to bring about Z do not appear great in the short run, but we must certainly try to keep those chances low (e.g., by making our dealings with Moscow private).

Y is also a nightmare. It loses the area. Moreover, vis-a-vis the Bloc it would be worse than X, since they would take it as an almost final proof that we would not stand up. It might have some compensating gains in the neutral world, at least in the short run. But on the whole it seems the worst possible outcome.

The basic strategic issues are:

a.
How long to give A a chance?
b.
Whether B is preferable to the weighted odds of C vs. Z?

Note on the Scale of US Intervention in South Vietnam

In deciding on the appropriate level of a possible US Intervention in Vietnam, it is important to consider the objective of preserving Vietnamese prestige. The preferred US outcome is for the Vietnamese, and Diem, to get credit for the defeat of the Communists with the help of the US. The next best outcome, a defeat of [Page 555] the Communists as a consequence of large scale intervention on the part of the US is a distinctly inferior outcome to the former. Diem would very probably be discredited and progress toward the formation of a cohesive nation slowed.

The problem of a US take-over of the conflict hardly arises at the 6-8000 US troop level-especially if these troops are mostly engineers. It would seem to arise only if the scale of intervention is of the order of several divisions. (Even then the outcome of the war would be very largely dependent on the Vietnamese effort.) The introduction of a large US force may turn out to be necessary in any case. This would be so if Hanoi and Peiping intervened openly or if sizeable forces are needed in Laos. Short of such clear and urgent demands for a large US force on the scene we should restrict our effort to a level that leaves the burden primarily on the Vietnamese. The US role would be (1) to assist South Viet-Nam more actively in a variety of ways, and (2) to bail out the Vietnamese if things go badly.

  1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, McNamara Files: FRC 71 A 3470, SE Asia 1961. Secret.
  2. The second attachment, “Effects Upon Laos of U.S. Actions to Defend South Viet Nam,” is not printed.
  3. Perhaps a reference to the meeting between McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff described in Document 217.
  4. Top Secret. The following typewritten notation is at the top of the source text: “2nd Draft. W.P. Bundy. 7 Nov. 1961.”