Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

214. Draft Memorandum From the Secretary of Defense (McNamara) to the President¹

Washington, November 5, 1961.

Bundy recalled that following the Saturday morning meeting described in Document 211, McNamara asked him to draft a memorandum directed toward the question McNamara raised at the meeting, namely whether the United States should make a clear “Berlin-type” commitment to Vietnam. Bundy said that the draft memorandum, which he finished on Sunday, November 8, was sent to the President only after “extensive discussions” with the Joint Chiefs and other Defense Department officials and with “important revisions in the last part.” (Unpublished Bundy memoirs, Chapter IV, pp. 24-2S) For text of the memorandum, see Document 227.

The basic issue framed by the Taylor Report is whether the US shall:

a. Commit itself to the clear objective of preventing the fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism, and thus holding the non-Communist areas of Southeast Asia.

b. Support this commitment by necessary immediate military actions and preparations for possible later actions.

My judgment is as follows:²

1. The fall of South Viet-Nam to Communism would lead to the fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation to Communism, in the rest of mainland Southeast Asia right down to Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide would be extremely serious.

2. The chances are against, probably sharply against, preventing that fall by any measures short of the introduction of US forces on a substantial scale. I³ accept General Taylor’s judgment that the various measures proposed by him short of this (what we came to call “the seven points”)⁴ are useful but will not in themselves do the job of restoring confidence and setting Diem on the way to winning his fight.

3. The introduction of a US force of the magnitude of an initial 8-10.000 men—whether in a flood relief context or otherwise—⁵ will be of great help to Diem. However, it will not convince the other side (whether the shots are called from Moscow, Peiping, or Hanoi) that we mean business.⁶ The response would be an intensified effort that would probably outrun the successive increments of our own effort as it developed. We would thus be almost certain to get increasingly mired down in an inconclusive struggle.

4. The other side can be convinced we mean business only if we accompany the initial force introduction by a clear commitment to the full objective stated above, accompanied by a warning through some channel to Hanoi that continued support of the Viet Cong will lead to punitive retaliation against North Vietnam.

5. If we act in this way, we must proceed at once to increase our military forces available to CINCPAC by about (2) divisions over the next (4) months. The initial force may succeed in turning the situation around; Hanoi, possibly under pressure from Moscow, may decide to cut down its support so that the situation will gradually come under control. However, the chances of this are probably not more than 50-50, and certainly not so good that we can fail to prepare for follow-up action. Above all, we must decide now that we will in fact take that action as and when it is needed.⁷

6. The ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced.⁸ The struggle may be prolonged and Hanoi and Peiping may intervene overtly. In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, I believe we can assume that the maximum US forces required on the ground will not exceed (6-8) divisions, or about (220,000) men, and that our military posture is, or can be made, adequate to furnish these forces. For the immediate purpose of raising the needed (2) additional divisions we (will/will not) need additional legal authority from the Congress. However, we can do the job without serious interference with our present Berlin plans.⁹

7. I return to my central view, that clarity of objective is crucial.¹⁰ To accept the stated objective is of course a most serious decision. Military force is not the only element of what must be a most carefully coordinated set of actions. Success will depend on factors many of which are not within our control-notably the conduct of Diem himself and other leaders in the area. Laos will remain a major problem. The domestic political implications of accepting the objective are also grave, although it is my own feeling that the country will respond better to a firm initial position than to courses of action that lead us in only gradually, and that in the meantime are sure to involve casualties. The over-all effect on Moscow and Peiping will need careful weighing and may well be mixed; however, permitting South Viet-Nam to fall can only strengthen and encourage them greatly.

8. In sum, I¹¹ recommend an affirmative decision on the issue stated at the start of this memorandum.

Robert S. McNamara

1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files, 1961 Chron. Top Secret. Drafted by William P. Bundy on November s and attached to Bundy’s memorandum of that date to McNamara, in which he asked whether the draft “at least raises the basic points you wanted” and noted that “one possible omission is the issue of nuclear weapons as part of a punitive action.” On the source text are McNamara’s handwritten revisions and interpolations, apparently done on November 6 since he wrote November “6” over the “5”. McNamara’s changes are described in footnotes below.
2. McNamara crossed out this sentence and wrote above it, “The JCS, Mr. G[ilpatric], and I have reached the following conclusions:”
3. McNamara replaced the word “I” with “We”.
4. McNamara deleted the entire parenthetical phrase.
5. McNamara changed the first part of this sentence to read, “The introduction of a US force of the magnitude of an initial 8,000 men in a flood relief context”.
6. McNamara inserted the following sentence at this point: “Moreover, it probably will not tip the scales decisively.”
7. McNamara deleted all of paragraph 5 and accordingly renumbered the subsequent paragraphs.
8. McNamara revised the first sentence to read, “5. If we act in this way, the ultimate possible extent of our military commitment must be faced.”
9. McNamara revised the last three sentences as follows: “In view of the logistic difficulties faced by the other side, we believe we can assume that the maximum US forces required on the ground in SEA will not exceed (6-8) divisions, or about (220,000) men. Our military posture is, or, with the addition of more N[ational] G[uard] divisions, can be made, adequate to furnish these forces without serious interference with our present Berlin plans.”
10. McNamara deleted the entire first sentence and renumbered the paragraph “6.”
11. McNamara renumbered the paragraph “7” and replaced “I” with “we”.