215. Editorial Note
On November 5, 1961, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and a party including his daughter Indira Gandhi and Foreign Secretary M.J. Desai arrived in the United States for a 10-day visit. Briefing papers for the visit, including an undated position paper on Vietnam, NIN D-14, prepared by the Department of State, are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1990. Also in this folder is a memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Chester Bowles to the President, November 3, offering suggestions on the talks with Nehru. The Acting Secretary made the following comments regarding Southeast Asia, which he said was possibly “the most important single question” the President would discuss with Nehru:
“You might consider broadening the discussion by pointing out the grave decision you personally might be called upon to make in the coming months with the weakening situation in Vietnam, the great uncertainties in Laos, and potential instability in Thailand.
“Naturally, you hesitate to think of committing major troops to this area, and you would give everything in the world to avoid it if possible in this era of nuclear weapons when a local war can quickly spread and intensify.
“Yet if the Chinese should move into this region, the whole of Southeast Asia would be opened up from Australia to the east and India to the west. and this would be hard for us to accept.
[Page 541]“Can the Prime Minister think of any way to achieve a new power balance in the area that would relieve us of our present direct confrontation with the Communists which we did not seek and do not want?
“With that opening, it is conceivable that the possibility of a neutral and independent Southeast Asia, guaranteed by India together with the Soviet Union and the United States, and for the record, at least, by China, might emerge naturally out of the discussion.
“If not, it might be worthwhile to consider opening this subject yourself. In my opinion, a settlement in Laos is very nearly meaningless unless we can find some way to create stability in Vietnam. If the latter situation deteriorates much further, Thailand is almost certain at some point to make her own adjustments with Peking, and this could turn our present position into a shambles and present us with an ugly and dangerous choice.”
After appearing on NBC’s “Meet the Press” in New York on the evening of November 5, Nehru, along with some members of his party, went the following day to Hammersmith Farm, Newport, Rhode Island, the home of Jacqueline Kennedy’s mother and stepfather. Already at the farm were the President, members of his family and the Ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith. In his journal, Galbraith described the luncheon discussion that day as follows:
“At the residence, we had a long lunch, mostly on South Vietnam. The President and I pressed Nehru hard on what we should do to put down Communist terror. Could Ho Chi Minh do anything? The U.N.? What about a U.N. observer corps? What could the I.C.C. do? Nehru was rather negative on all of these matters and most interested in making clear that we should not send in soldiers. I agree heartily but we need an alternative with a plausible chance of success.” (Galbraith, Ambassador’s Journal, page 246)
On the evening of November 6, the Nehru party and the President flew to Andrews Air Force Base in Washington, where they were greeted by Vice President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, other United States officials and members of the diplomatic corps. From the airport, Galbraith rode to the Department of State with Rusk to whom he described the luncheon discussion that day together with his own arguments against the introduction of United States troops into Vietnam. (Ibid., page 247)