Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

216. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, November 6, 1961, 7 p.m.

598. Eyes only for the Secretary. Reurtel 388 October 5 and my reply 445 October 6.² A great deal has occurred here in interval of one month since exchange reftels. In first place, security situation has markedly deteriorated in terms of increased incidents and lack of noteworthy government victories and, above all, in effects of these retrograde developments on public and official morale. In this situation, special mission of General Taylor has tended bring situation here to a head more rapidly than anticipated. Government and people of VietNam, and especially military forces, now expect major underwriting by US. Public expectation has developed, on basis largely of hope, to such extent that failure on part US to make major new commitments here would, I fear, cause rapid deterioration present unsatisfactory situation and collapse of morale.

I heartily endorse the six recommendations which General Taylor sent from here (Embtels 536 and 544³). Nevertheless, I am sure that neither he nor you will be under any illusions as to formidable obstacles to implementing some of them. You will note that several of the six points are procedural, involving better utilization existing GVN resources and development better techniques, with our help. These recommendations hit the principal spots where improvements should and can be made, but I caution against assumption that miracles can be worked here in field of GVN organization for two reasons: severe shortage of capable, trained, cooperative-minded people with a will to national unity, and the personality of President Diem. Nevertheless, we have made some, and can make further improvements in GVN organization, and under the pressure of present emergency Diem speaks as if he is willing to allow us to become more intimately involved in GVN plans and their execution. We should certainly make best use this opportunity.

Main new substantive US contributions recommended in Taylor’s six points are: (1) three helicopter squadrons (63 helicopters) to give much-needed mobility to GVN forces especially in vicinity of Laotian border, and (2) US military task force to do job of rehabilitation flooded provinces of Mekong Delta. With respect to (1), it is clear that if these helicopters are to be useful in time, American pilots and maintenance crews are required.

As valuable and necessary as I consider these two additional US contributions to be, and without them I think there is likely to be a collapse of morale and/or a military coup d’etat here, I am not sure that these commitments, coupled with other actions undertaken and planned, will be sufficient for the long run. I would expect the Communists to react by increasing the tempo and strength of their campaign within SVN, by heavier infiltrations into central Viet-Nam and perhaps also in the delta, thus attempting to discredit US military presence here. In final analysis, in order to win we may have to force Communist side to conclude that further attempt to take this country by introduction of force from outside will be met direct US action against North VietNam. I think the steps recommended by General Taylor are necessary now, but I wanted you to have my private and personal assessment as you consider them.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-661. Top Secret; Niact.
2. See Document 147 and footnote 2 thereto.
3. Telegram 536 is printed as Document 190. Telegram 544 is not printed.