Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

190. Telegram From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 25, 1961, 3 p.m.

536. For Under Sec Johnson.

1. The essential conclusions which we have reached at the end of a week of briefings, consultations, and field trips follow:

A. There is a critical political-military situation in SVN brought on by Western policy in Laos and by the continued build-up of the VC and their recent successful attacks. These circumstances coupled with the major flood disaster in the southwestern provinces have combined to create a deep and pervasive crisis of confidence and a serious loss in national morale.

B. In the field, the military operations against the VC are ineffective because of the absence of reliable intelligence on the enemy, an unclear and unresponsive channel of command responsibility in the armed forces and the tactical immobility of the VN ground forces. This immobility leads to a system of passive, fragmented defense conceding the initiative to the enemy and leaving him free to pick the targets of attack. The harassed population exposed to these attacks turn to the Government for better protection and the latter responds by assigning more static missions to the Army units, thus adding to their immobility. In the end, the Army is allowed neither to train nor to fight but awaits enemy attacks in relative inaction.

C. The situation in Saigon is volatile but, while morale is down and complaints against the Government are rife, there is not hard evidence of a likely coup against Diem. He still has no visible rival or replacement.

2. To cope with the foregoing situation, we are considering recommending a number of possible forms of GVN-US cooperation to reverse the present downward trend, stimulate an offensive spirit and build up morale. In company with Ambassador Nolting, Dr. Rostow and Mr. Mendenhall, I discussed some of these Oct 24 with Diem and Thuan, advancing them as personal ideas to which I was seeking their informal reaction.² The following outline, distributed in French translation at the start of the interview, indicates the scope of the discussion.

A. Improvement of intelligence on VC: The available intelligence on VC insurgency is inadequate both for tactical requirements and for basis of judgment of situation at governmental levels. A joint GVN-US effort should be able to improve organization, techniques and end product to mutual advantage both parties.

B. Joint survey of security situation at provincial level: The current situation can best be appraised at provincial level where the basic intelligence is found, the incidents occur, and the defenses are tested. The problems vary from province to province and hence require local analysis on the spot. Such a survey should result in better understanding of such important matters as quality of basic intelligence on VC, needs of Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps, command relationships between provincial and Army officials and conditions under which assumption of offensive might be possible.

C. Improvement of army mobility: It appears that size of ARVN cannot be much increased before end 1962. To make it more effective and allow it to cope with increasing number of VC, it must be given greater mobility. Such mobility can come from two sources, (1) freeing army from static missions and (2) making available to it improved means of transport, notably helicopters and light aircraft. Both methods should be considered.

D. Send blocking infiltration into high plateau: Increase in enemy forces in high plateau requires special measures for defense and for counter-guerrilla actions. It is suggested that a carefully tailored “border ranger force” be organized from existing Ranger Units and introduced into the difficult terrain along the Laos/ Viet-Nam frontier for attack and defense against the Viet Cong. This force should be trained and equipped for extended service on the frontier and for operations against the communications lines of the VC who have infiltrated into the high plateau and adjacent areas.³

E. Introduction of US Military Forces: GVN is faced with major civil problem arising from flood devastation in western provinces. Its allies should offer help to GVN according to their means. In the case of O.S., two ways of rendering help should be considered. One is of emergency type, such as offer of US military helicopters for reconnaissance of conditions of flooded areas and for emergency delivery medical supplies and like. A more significant contribution might be a flood relief task force, largely military in composition, to work with GVN over an extended period for rehabilitation of area. Such a force might contain engineer, medical, signal, and transportation elements as well as combat troops for the protection of relief operations. Obviously, such a military force would also provide U.S. military presence in Viet Nam and would constitute military reserve in case of heightened military crisis.

F. Actions to emphasize national emergency and beginning of a new phase in the war: We should consider jointly all possible measures to emphasize turning point has been reached in dealing with Communist aggression. Possible actions might include appeal to United Nations, an announcement by GVN of governmental changes to cope with crisis and exchange of letters between the two heads of state expressing their partnership in a common cause.

3. Diem’s reaction on all points was favorable. He expressed satisfaction with idea of introducing US forces in connection with flood relief activities, observing that even the opposition elements in his Congress had joined with the majority in supporting need for presence of US forces. In the course of the meeting, nothing was formally proposed or approved but the consensus was that the points considered might form framework for a program of increased GVN-US cooperation offering promise of overcoming many of the current difficulties of GVN. There were no specific figures discussed with regard to such matters as troop strengths, additional equipment, or flood relief.

4. As follow-up on this session with Diem, in consultation with Embassy and MAAG, we will develop specific recommendations for carrying out the concepts discussed with Diem. To assist us, Ambassador Nolting is obtaining further data on the flood from the GVN. We have agreed with Diem to guard against any premature leaks of these matters under consideration.

5. Because of the importance of acting rapidly once we have made up our minds, I will cable my recommendations to Washington enroute home.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2561. Top Secret; Priority. The Department of State was asked to pass the telegram to the White House for Bundy, Defense for McNamara, JCS for Lemnitzer, and CIA for Dulles. Received in the Department at 9:06 a.m. Telegrams to and from General Taylor in Saigon were numbered in sequence with other telegrams to and from Saigon. The incoming telegrams bear Ambassador Nolting’s signature.
2. A more detailed report of this conversation was transmitted in telegram 540 from Saigon, October 25. (Ibid.)
3. Paragraph D and the heading for paragraph E were omitted from the text as transmitted from Saigon. They were transmitted in telegram 544 from Saigon, October 25, with instructions that they be inserted at the proper places in the text of telegram 536. (Ibid.)