213. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs(Johnson) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- General Taylor’s Recommendations
Attached is a copy of General Taylor’s recommendations.2 (This is the only copy in the Department. At the President’s direction, they have been held very closely and thus far have been seen only by Mr. Ball, Mr. McConaughy and myself.) The eight specific recommendations begin on page 3. In summary, they are:
- (1)
- Insertion of some U.S. individual administrators into the GVN.
- (2)
- A joint effort to improve the military-political intelligence system beginning at the provincial level.
- (3)
- A joint survey by individual provinces of the social, political, intelligence and military factors.
- (4)
- A joint effort to free the GVN Army for mobile offensive operations by improving the training and equipping of the civil guard and self-defense corps and increasing the helicopter, light aviation and reconnaissance capabilities with U.S. military units to the extent necessary. Also, establishment of a “border ranger force” for use on the Laotian border.
- (5)
- Furnishing U.S. advisers, operating personnel and small craft for control of coastal waters and inland waterways.
- (6)
- Increasing size of MAAG (up to about 2,400) with more clearly defined mission of active direction and indirect control of GVN forces.
- (7)
- Introducing into South Viet-Nam a “military task force” to
provide:
- (a)
- U.S. military presence to raise national morale and show seriousness of U.S. intent;
- (b)
- Conduct logistical operations in support of military and flood relief operations
- (c)
- Conduct combat operations as are necessary for self defense and security of area in which such forces stationed;
- (d)
- Provide an emergency reserve to back up the GVN forces; and
- (e)
- Act as an advance party if CINCPAC or SEATO contingency plans are invoked.
- (8)
- Review U.S. economic aid program to take into account flood relief needs and give priority to those projects supporting the counter-insurgency program.
General Taylor and some members of his party met privately with the President on their return Friday afternoon.3 Saturday morning George Ball and I, with Fowler Hamilton for a part of the time, met with General Taylor, Walt Rostow and Cottrell, with McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Cabell and Dick Bissell also present.4
The essence of the discussion revolved around whether the United States should make a “Berlin-type commitment” to South VietNam, and it was agreed that discussion with the President should focus on this basic question. McNamara took the position that, if this decision were made, Defense could cope “with the problem of forces”. It was also agreed that, if this decision were made, the question of whether, when and how to introduce American forces would much more easily fall into place. There was little enthusiasm for the concept that, by introducing American forces for flood relief purposes, we would thereby retain greater flexibility and be able more readily to withdraw our forces if we decided to go no further. There was also concern over introducing and involving our forces in the delta area, where conditions are most difficult for the effective combat deployment of American forces.
At the President’s request we are doing up a paper on what reforms we can and should expect from Diem, and have sent a telegram to Nolting on this.5
A meeting with the President is tentatively scheduled for 5 p.m. Tuesday.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/11-561. Top Secret. Drafted and initialed by Johnson and sent through S/S. Rusk returned to Washington on November 5 from his trip to Japan.↩
- Not found as an attachment to the source text, but presumably a reference to the first of the two attachments to Document 210.↩
- See footnote 1, Document 210.↩
- Apparently a reference to the meeting described in Document 211.↩
- Document 212.↩
- November 7.↩