Office of the Historian

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam1

Washington, November 4, 1961–6:50 p.m.

545. For Ambassador. Ref: EmbAir A-50, Aug. 17; Embtels 414, Sept. 28; 545, Oct. 25; 549, Oct. 27; 558, Oct. 28.2 There will be highest level discussion here November 7 on Viet Nam. Effectiveness Diem government will be closely examined. Highest levels request your views prior to meeting on extent to which you believe Diem can be induced to modify and broaden his government if US decides to make substantial additional contribution along lines you discussed with General Taylor.

Feeling is strong that major changes will be required if joint effort is to be successful in that US cannot be asked further engage its prestige and forces while machinery of Diem government remains inadequate and thus full capabilities South Vietnamese forces and population not being realized.

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For example, delegation of authority to Vietnamese civil and military authorities commensurate with their responsibilities to overcome present GVN paralysis and sense nonparticipation seems mandatory.

Would appreciate your comments on following possible changes:

1.
Creation of National Emergency Council (pursuant to Diem’s declaration National emergency) headed by a person of importance and capability (if possible Vice President Tho) through which all GVN business to and from Diem would be transacted. Nhu would coordinate between Diem and NEC. Thuan would be Secretary of NEC. A mature, discreet and hard headed US member would be appointed to participate in all decisions and coordinate with Ambassador. Membership primarily civilian, presumably members present Cabinet.
2.
On military side there would be comparable delegation of authority commensurate with responsibility to be achieved placing all services under Joint General Staff and by intelligence unification.

If these basic and difficult changes could be achieved, might then be possible make progress on following:

a)
simplify GVN structure and programs.
b)
greater role for VP Tho as capable man and constitutional successor.
c)
improved contacts between GVN and Vietnamese people, including Sects and labor unions.
d)
Other reforms agreed to if CIP but not carried out (refAir).

In addition to foregoing, would appreciate your full comments and suggestions with respect this entire problem.

Bowles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-461. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Wood, cleared with McConaughy and S/S, initialed by Johnson (G) for the Acting Secretary, and repeated to CINCPAC for PolAd.↩
  2. Airgram A-50 is not printed. Telegram 414, a detailed status report on the political aspects of the counterinsurgency plan, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5-MSP/9-2861) Telegram 549 is not printed. For telegrams 545 and 558, see Documents 193 and 199.↩