Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

193. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 25, 1961, 9 p.m.

545. Task Force VN. There has been noticeable rise in Saigon’s political temperature during past week. Taylor visit, though reassuring in some respects, has been interpreted by many persons as demonstrating critical stage which VC insurgency has reached. Public funeral of VC-tortured and murdered Col Nam had profound effect on Saigon public. Following deterioration of general security conditions over past two months cancellation October 26 National Day celebrations to devote resources to flood relief and terse, dramatic declaration national emergency caught an unprepared public by surprise and contributed additional unsettling elements to growing atmosphere of uneasiness.

Judging from conversations we have had with such persons as President National Assembly, Vice President, another prominent National Assembly Deputy, lawyer who is regular Governor for Southeast ASIS, former Foreign Minister, etc, net effect most these developments has been negative rather than positive. Flux and uncertainty now beginning develop. As result there has been some scare buying and stocking. Certain commodity prices such as rice and pork have again moved up. (From previous 1961 average price of about 7 piasters per kilo, first quality rice stood at 9.5 at beginning last week, 11.9 October 25.) This in itself most unfortunate development, though flood conditions in southwest probably as much a factor in it as increased insecurity.

This growing public disquietude accompanied by increasing dissatisfaction with Diem’s methods of administration on part senior GVN officials. There is considerable Cabinet level criticism and growing though still inchoate determination force organizational reforms on President. Similar attitude seems be developing in ARVN upper levels. Though trend of thinking these groups taking parallel courses, there nothing indicate at this moment that collaboration between them taking place. Beginnings of this would, of course, be serious indicator something brewing.

At same time … movement certain platoon to company-size VC units (totalling perhaps 200-500 men) toward Saigon to profit from any disturbances or confusion which may occur. Knowledge these reports within GVN apparently tending deter disaffected officials from developing radical place [plans?] at this moment.

Situation here thus one of insecurity, uneasiness and emergent instability. A genuine and important military victory over VC would do more than anything else to redress balance and allay for moment high-level mutterings of need for change. On other hand, further deterioration of situation over next few weeks or months or new VC success similar Phuoc Hanh incident might well bring situation to head.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2561. Secret. Repeated to Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Geneva for FECON, Paris, Tokyo, Bangkok, Manila, CINCPAC for PolAd, and London. Received in the Department at 8:50 p.m.