194. Memorandum for the Record by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Bundy)1
SUBJECT
- Conversation with Admiral Felt, October 25, 19612
1. VietNam. Mr. Williams and I asked Admiral Felt what he thought the major items were on which we could move at once without awaiting the Taylor report. He singled out the following:
a. Helicopters in a strength adequate to provide a force for each of the province governments and for the central government, i.e., 4 in [Page 435] all. He supposed that 2 Army aviation companies would be necessary to man these, and said he had no judgment whether these should be in uniform or sheep-dipped. He thought this item was vital in Diem’s mind and as a basic military necessity to provide mobility.
Comment. FE should get status on this. It may be a political question, but in this connection Admiral Felt suggested using the flood situation as an immediate cover. This idea should certainly be followed up strongly.
b. An Army engineer and a Navy Seabee unit. These could build a pipeline for POL from the off-loading point near Saigon to the Saigon airport (we asked about sabotage possibility and he admitted that this would be a problem), and also to build a road east from Attopeu in Laos. For the latter purpose, combat troops would be needed to protect the engineers.
Comment. This undoubtedly has serious political hurdles, but again the flood situation might provide a cover for immediate activity that would lay a foundation.
c. T-28 Aircraft. Admiral Pirie had just informed him that the Navy had a going production line and could add seal-proof tanks and armor at once (making the Navy version similar to the Air Force version) and deliver thereafter in 6 weeks.
Comment. This is contrary to previous information, and should certainly be followed up at once. I believe it is agreed in principle that these additional aircraft should be supplied.
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Apart from these urgent needs, the Admiral had the following comments:
e. In general, he thought that the Taylor report would probably recommend all possible assistance short of the introduction of combat forces. (Apparently this would not exclude the helicopters and engineer operations suggested above.)
f. The Caribou aircraft need was very much downgraded by Admiral Felt. He thought C-47’s could do the job and that the Caribou had simply appealed to Diem when introduced by the Godel group.
g. Admiral Felt did see a legitimate need for T-33 aircraft, with 2 as a starter. The military purpose would be to build up a Vietnamese air defense capability, leading eventually to the introduction of F-86F aircraft as in Thailand. He wants an immediate start in training Vietnamese pilots in the United States.
Comment. This seems much more dubious to me from a military standpoint. If the North Vietnamese or ChiCom air forces become involved now or later, surely we would deal with them by US carrier aircraft. In any event, any useful Vietnamese [Page 436] capability is at least 1-2 years away, and this might be a poor time to divert effort for such long lead-time projects.
h. ChiNats. Admiral Felt reported Diem’s view that some ChiNat forces could be introduced, naturalized as Vietnamese, and used profitably in the Delta area, where there is already a large number of ethnic Chinese. He understood that State had turned this down, and asked us to see what could be done.
Comment. FE should review the bidding on this one and see if we can make additional arguments.
[Here follows discussion of military assistance to Korea and Pakistani forces in SEATO.]
Acting