Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

195. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Viet-Nam Task Force (Wood) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson)¹

Washington, October 25, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Diplomatic and Political Preparations for Sending U.S. Troops to Viet Nam

The following suggested guidelines for diplomatic and other preparation prior to sending U.S. troops to Viet-Nam are set forth in outline form. They were requested today by Secretary Johnson.

I. Recommendation

That 6-8,000 U.S. logistical troops plus combat troops for their protection be sent to Viet-Nam to participate in flood relief and to provide a military presence which will assure President Diem that we will join him in a military showdown. These troops would have a specific humanitarian task in a specified area. They could be taken out after the flood, or phased into other activities.

II. Diplomatic and Political Factors Which Cannot Be Ignored

1. For the U.S.

A. Troops. A prior decision that if necessary we will send in enough troops to finish the job or alternatively a prior decision that we will fix a ceiling (say 100,000) on the number of U.S. troops which we would commit to Southeast Asia no matter what circumstances might arise. (Presidential decision prior to November 6, date of submission of Note to ICC-see below).

B. Command. A prior decision to simplify the U.S. chain of command, e.g. a U.S. Commander for Southeast Asia whose plans would require a) the general prior approval of the U.S. Ambassador as the President’s representative, and b) the subsequent approval and cooperation of the local Government.

If the U.S. effort is to succeed, the U.S. Command structure must be simplified so that our actions may be flexible, resolute, and rapid. Our Commander should be the best available for guerilla war, perhaps a Marine General. (Presidential decision prior to November 11, date on which first contingents of U.S. troops would arrive.)

2. For VietNam.

Before committing ourselves so fully to Viet-Nam and to the Vietnamese Government we should require, as a minimum, the following pledges from Diem:

A. Military. Simplified chain of command. Intelligence coordination.

B. Administrative. Increased salaries for provincial officials; reduced salaries for Saigon officials. Rotate officials between Saigon and provinces.

C. Political. Create, under Diem, an Internal Security Council through which Diem would conduct all business.

D. Concurrence in proposed U.S. Command structure (see above).

E. An assurance that we would have full GVN support for all movements of troops and equipment in Viet-Nam as necessary. (Exchange of letters between President Kennedy and President Diem prior to November 11. Assigned to: Ambassador Nolting and Mr. Cottrell.)

3. Allied Cooperation.

This should be limited to gifts for flood relief. We cannot hope to defeat the fast moving Viet Cong if we are required to seek multilateral consultation and concurrence prior to every move. It is difficult enough to obtain fast action within the U.S. Government and in cooperation with the Vietnamese Government. We should seek the general assent and approval of our allies. As leaders of the Free World, we must retain responsibility for our actions in a war situation. This applies to SEATO and the UN as well as to individual nations. We must show great respect for, but not be entangled by or ask decisions of any international Organization.

4. Timing.

First contingent U.S. troops to arrive November 11 while there is flood work to do. This allows time to inform world opinion, but not time enough for international objections to coalesce. It gives 16 days for military preparations.

III. Steps

1. Continue and increase publicity on DRV threat and importance of VietNam’s independence. (Timing: continuous; Responsibility: Jorden; Heavner of TF/VN; P, USIA.)

2. Parallel U.S. and Vietnamese diplomatic conversations with the British, Canadians and Indians to inform them that the Vietnamese Government considers that the Geneva Cease Fire has been flagrantly violated and this situation plus the flood disaster has created a situation in which the GVN has decided to ask increased U.S. assistance in the flooded area. We should not indicate what form our assistance may take. It would be unconvincing to cite only the flood as a reason for bringing in U.S. troops. The purpose is to give the ICC powers some private, advance notice of our views and intentions. (Timing: November 1; Drafting responsibility: C.B. Wood.)

3. ICC. Prepare with the GVN a Note which they would submit privately in Saigon to the ICC and to the British Co-chairman (through the British Embassy) stating that due to the flood disaster and the continued violation of the Geneva Cease Fire Agreement by the DRV, the GVN has decided that it will request the assistance of U.S. troops to assist in the flood relief program thus freeing Vietnamese troops to. defend their country. In extending this invitation, the GVN does not criticize the ICC. It considers the situation has gone beyond minor infractions of the cease fire which the ICC was designed to control. Regretfully, it can no longer voluntarily observe Articles 16 and 17 of the Geneva Accords controlling the importation of men and equipment. It is prepared to resume observance as soon as the DRV ceases to violate them. This Note to be supported by a White Paper based on the Jorden Report. (Timing: November 6; Drafting responsibility: Jorden and Wood).

4. Presidential Discussion of Step 3 with Prime Minister Nehru on November 7.²

5. Public circulation of GVN Note and White Paper and of U.S. reply at SEATO and the UN.

With the greatest respect we should inform these bodies that in response to the GVN’s request we are sending a limited number of U.S. troops to help in the flood relief and that we consider their presence an important symbol of our determination to assist Viet-Nam in maintaining its independence. We will welcome contributions to the relief work, and will be prepared to consider withdrawing our troops as soon as the UN and/or SEATO is prepared to send to Viet-Nam an international force which can successfully assume these responsibilities. We will be prepared, with the GVN, to enter international negotiations on Viet-Nam as soon as the DRV adheres to the Geneva Accords by removing all its troops and cadres from VietNam, but not before. (Timing: November 9; Responsibility: Mr. McConaughy and Mr. Johnson.)

6. Geneva Conference (if it has survived the above). A full statement that we still support the concept of an effective ICC in Laos as a means of enforcing the existing cease fire. However no ICC, whether in Laos or VietNam, can be expected to control a war situation. It would need a body of international troops under its control. We should make it clear that we will only discuss Laos at Geneva. (Timing: November 10; Responsibility: Ambassador Harriman.)

7. Ambassador Trimble explains our purpose generally to Sihanouk. (Timing: November 10.)

8. Arrival of first contingents of U.S. troops by air at the flood area at dawn on November 11 coupled with a U.S.-GVN public request that all fighting in Viet-Nam cease for 24 hours in observance of Armistice Day-and a pledge that no GVN or U.S. soldier will fire a shot until a Viet Cong soldier attacks.

IV. Concurrent Actions-October 25-November 11.

1. Appoint George Tanham³ as a temporary Special Assistant to Ambassador Nolting to study the flood area with a MAAG and a USOM representative and submit recommendations to the Ambassador on how the flood relief and rehabilitation work can best be carried out. They should, if possible, work with Vietnamese opposite numbers. They should suggest clear-cut roles for U.S. troops, MAAG, USOM and IVS volunteers and for representatives of private, charitable organizations willing to work in the flood area. They should consult with the Thompson mission and formulate recommendations for a simple, effective rehabilitation program designed to give maximum credit to GVN officials. (Warren Silver of TF/VN to draft message to Saigon).

2. DOD to have full and unimpeded responsibility for getting the troops to the flood area.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.5/10-2561. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Also addressed to McConaughy. Drafted and initialed by Wood and sent through S/S. A copy was sent to Anderson (SEA).
2. Nehru was scheduled to visit the United States in early November.
3. Tanham was an employee of the Rand Corporation.