Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

199. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

Saigon, October 28, 1961, noon.

558. Task Force VN. Thuan gave me following information today (October 27) on actions pursuant recent discussions between GVN, Taylor mission, and ourselves:

1. Flood relief and rehabilitation. GVN cabinet meeting today had decided set up organization for a broad nationwide contribution to flood relief and rehabilitation in delta, composing following elements;

(A) A steering committee in which diverse elements of SVN population and political opinion would be invited to participate, anti-Communist oppositionists, fence-sitters, businessmen, lawyers, trade unionists, etc., to be presided by National Assembly President Truong Van Le. Steering Committee would be charged with fundraising, recruitment of volunteer workers from other provinces, including youth movement, boy scouts, women’s organizations, and others. Steering committee would also furnish ideas for relief and rehabilitation, which would be screened by:

(B) Executive head of flood relief and rehabilitation Huynh Van Diem, an engineer who is now GVN Planning Commissioner. Huynh Van Diem would be man through whom US contribution would be tied in. He described by Thuan as able and tough-minded;

(C) Committee of control, headed by Nguyen Thanh Lap, well known banker. This committee would control expenditure of funds. I commended this broadly-based organization, and asked Thuan when the specific requirements paper would be ready. He promised it for Monday next.² (Will forward to Manila and Washington.)

2. Intelligence. Thuan said he had proposed to President Diem, who had accepted, reorganization of GVN intelligence services, combining present Surete (NBI) with CIO, with Colonel Yankee in charge…. Said that General La, present head Surete, would go out. GVN intends keep J-2 of ARVN separate but bring about closer coordination with reorganized CIO. I said this welcome decision, and felt sure we could help with US experts. (Comment: I particularly stressed need of best possible people from our side if this is to work. Specific requirements will follow.³)

3. Survey teams. I said we are studying how best to organize these. Our tentative thought is about three people from each side, and possibly three teams, to begin in most critical provinces. Thuan said his ideas corresponded with ours; that GVN seeking best men possible, but would find it difficult to find nine people of really high calibre, who could be spared. I suggested 2, or even 1, good teams preferable to three poor ones. Value of survey teams depends on quality of men on them.

4. Montagnard problem. In response to earlier suggestion from me, Thuan said President had agreed to appoint commissioner for Montagnards at high level in GVN. They are looking for best possible man to fill this position.

5. Border force. Thuan inquired whether request for 3,000-man augmentation for special forces was in addition to idea for ranger border force, and whether augmented special force would be under separate or same command nearer border force. He added that augmentation of special forces by 3,000 should not be done from existing military units, but if agreed should be recruited separately. I said that I would have to discuss this further; tentatively I thought that a special force for special operations should be continued under separate organization and command, but that I was not sure special force of 3 to 4,000 in addition to and separate from ranger border force was desirable. Thuan said he hoped special forces could be financed under separate budget not DOD budget. On ranger border force, Thuan thought up to 4 to 5,000 rangers could be organized and deployed as suggested by General Taylor. We discussed in some detail suggested arrangements for giving them airborne mobility. Thuan understands thoroughly that suggestion re US helicopter squadrons involves MAAG command of these transports on which effectiveness ranger force would depend, and fact that this would involve closest operational coordination and agreement between GVN commanders and MAAG. He feels this can be made to work provided best men selected on both sides under General Minh and General McGarr. Suggested General Lansdale as ideal choice to help organize ranger border force and to command US transport units assigned to help it.

6. Top-level GVN organization. Thuan reverted to this suggestion previously made to me privately⁴ re possibility persuading President Diem to delegate full authority and responsibility, subject to Diem’s policy directives, to executive board composed of Ngo Dinh Nhu, chairman, and 3 or 4 other members of present cabinet, including Thuan to carry out more efficiently and promptly GVN policy decisions. Said his present thought is that Nhu should be given a specific cabinet responsibility with, namely, coordinating secretary for national security. Said, as previously, that only person to whom President would delegate so much authority, and leave it delegated, was his brother Nhu. Said he felt such a board would materially improve GVN performance. Asked my reaction. I told him that I did not wish to meddle officially in questions involving personnel of Government of Vietnam, but that I say officially that any organization under President Diem’s policy guidance which would give government greater efficiency and cut down on reaction time would be a welcome development, and is in fact an urgent necessity. I added that I did not know personally Mr. Nhu’s ability as an executive, I had known him rather as a planning and philosophical type; but if Thuan and others felt that this would improve top-level organization and efficiency of GVN I personally would be inclined to try it. Thuan said he and others felt that this would make a definite improvement; that they could guarantee faster and better executive performance; and that in any [case] it was only feasible way to bring about a delegation of authority by the President and have it stick. (Comment: It is highly necessary to protect Thuan re this matter. He said he would talk to President and Nhu about it).

For General Taylor’s and task force Washington information, we are developing here detailed recommendations on matters discussed by General Taylor with President Diem. These will be forwarded as soon as possible.

Nolting

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Bangkok, Hong Kong (for General Taylor who was stopping there en route from Bangkok to Manila), Manila for General Taylor, Paris, London, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Geneva for FECON, and CINCPAC for PolAd.
2. October 30.
3. No subsequent communication on intelligence requirements was found.
4. The date that this suggestion was made has not been determined.