Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

200. Letter From the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Viet-Nam (McGarr) to the Secretary of Defense (McNamara)¹

Saigon, October 30, 1961.

Dear Mr. Secretary: Due to the increasing seriousness of the situation in Viet-Nam as well as General Taylor’s suggestion that you might find my sensing of events useful, I shall follow this initial round up with pertinent recurring reports. Upon the completion of my first twelve months as Chief MAAG, Vietnam, this September, I forwarded to CINCPAC a brief but fairly comprehensive situation report.² This report, together with MAAG concepts for “Border Control,” an outline of our proposed “Geographically Phased National Pacification Plan,” the critical need for an overall National Plan with recommendations for improving the “Present GVN System of Control and Coordination of Counter-Insurgency,”³ and MAAG’s doctrinal treatise titled “Tactics and Techniques for Counter-Insurgent Operations”⁴ is being hand carried to you by Brigadier General Ed Lansdale.

To very briefly summarize the past year, I feel that considerable progress has been made but that developing conditions leave much yet to be done with time of the essence. Due to Viet Cong actions, “finding time” for even marginal troop training has been a major problem since 1959. Therefore, training programs have been integrated and appropriately reoriented to improve overall ARVN, Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps training, while at the same time placing heavy emphasis on conducting counter-guerrilla operations. Induction of the additional 20,000 force ceiling recommended by MAAG in October 1960, approved in May 1961 and further retarded due to a question of U.S. fund support, will be completed by January 1962. This 20,000 which was primarily justified as a “rotational training base” and to strengthen the RVNAF logistical support is, of course, not yet adequately trained or ready for employment except in case of critical emergency and then on a partially trained basis. The induction of the additionally approved 30,000 will begin January 1962 with a completion date of January 1963. To increase ARVN combat capabilities, a Combat Development Test Center has been organized and MAAG has developed and furnished the RVNAF a specially tailored tactical counter-guerrilla treatise titled “Tactics and Techniques for Counter-Insurgent Operations,” which has been used extensively since last November by MAAG advisors and RVNAF and which is under continuing joint MAAG-GVN refinement. Following MAAG insistence, the Civil Guard was finally transferred from the Department of Interior to the Department of Defense allowing MAP and MAAG advisory support. Likewise, certain U.S. military support and MAAG advice for the Self Defense Corps has also been authorized. During the year, heartening improvement was made in Navy, Marine and Air Force operations as well as in logistical capabilities throughout all three services. Also, although significant problem areas in implementation still remain, many of the military recommendations in the U.S. Counter-Insurgency Plan have been approved by GVN edict such as a single chain of command and the establishment of Field Command with its three subordinate tactical corps. Of course, as mentioned previously, much of importance remains to be done, not only with respect to new innovations, but also in the all important areas of urgency, implementation and follow through. As MAAG has no command authority, this is quite difficult. For example, the single chain of command has been too much downgraded by continuing Presidential insistence on retaining the Province Chief in the military chain of command and supporting him against higher military commanders in purely military matters. This problem will be further discussed in a later paragraph.

Since my September year end report, significant and revealing trends which were beginning to emerge have since further materialized. The most indicative is the recently accelerated infiltration and build up of Viet Cong strength, particularly in the northern and central sections of South Vietnam. The sparsely settled and rugged jungle terrain along the VN-Lao border make it exceedingly difficult to stop or materially slow down Communist infiltration from North Viet-Nam through Laos. Positive hard intelligence on infiltration of personnel from North Vietnam, especially accurate numbers, has been difficult to obtain as our intelligence is necessarily based on GVN reports with whatever verification can be gotten from our MAAG advisors with tactical and intelligence units. Although as you know, MAAG under its present staffing and current terms of reference cannot function as an intelligence evaluating or producing agency, reports from American intelligence agencies, plus circumstantial evidence when correlated with known events reasonably establishes a high degree of infiltration as a fact. The current fairly firm estimate of regular, numerically designated Viet Cong units in Viet-Nam is approximately 17,000 as compared with an estimated 7,500 upon my arrival fourteen months ago. This force in itself, not considering the additional Communist capability due to their build up in Laos, is capable of selective large scale operations in South Vietnam. This capability is significantly increased by Communist control of the terrain along the Lao-SVN border and intelligence indications that the Viet Cong are “regularizing” and reorganizing territorial units within South Vietnam.

The Viet Cong initiative in September in both the north and central areas-I and II Corps Zones-gave further testimony of this infiltration capability. In marked contrast to the previous comparatively low level of Viet Cong activities in these areas, the September attacks were larger and more numerous. October has been deceptively quiet in both I and II Corps as far as large scale attacks are concerned but political and subversive incidents have risen sharply. In September, Viet Cong activities included at least a dozen attacks by units reported by ARVN in strengths of from 300 to 500 each. The attacks in Kontum Province on 1 September were made by a force estimated by ARVN and our advisor on the ground as three “battalions” totalling 1,000 personnel (Viet Cong battalions vary from 100 to 600). These troops were reportedly much better trained and equipped than any previously encountered and the attacks were executed with considerable professional skill. Although they overran small isolated Civil Guard posts, relieving ARVN troops, in most cases, inflicted comparable casualties in return for casualties suffered. During this same period, Viet Cong armed activity in the southern or Delta region continued at a normal high level with, however, a significant increase in political and subversive activity. Furthermore, the major portion of the Viet Cong forces, about 10,000, are located in this region and they are considered the best trained and best equipped of the Viet Cong regular forces.

Considering the currently identified regular Viet Cong forces in the country, they have the capability of increasing both the frequency and magnitude of their attacks. These attacks may well be coordinated to a greater degree, but will more probably follow the present pattern of hit and run, with the limited objective of further weakening government control. If, however, infiltration continues to accelerate significantly, it may well indicate that the Communists have stepped up their timetable and plan to move into a larger scale, more conventional campaign designed to conquer a portion or all of South Vietnam. The “National Front Liberation of South Vietnam” has announced its intent of seizing and holding an enclave in South Vietnam, declaring it a liberated area and establishing a government which would then be quickly recognized as “legal” by the Soviet bloc. That they have not yet been able to accomplish this indicates the “Front” has not yet gained adequate political or military strength to overcome the GVN military capability here.

As the Viet Cong offensive is multi-pronged, I believe it very important that our officials at all policy and decision making levels be fully current on the inter play and effect of the application of all elements of national power by both sides on the overall pacification effort here. Currently, the main emphasis is in the military field because of the advanced development of the insurgency. However, as MAAG has spelled out in the military section of the Counter-Insurgency Plan and in its Tactics and Techniques of Counter-Insurgent Operations treatise, military action alone, even though successful, is not the answer and can even be counterproductive if not preceded and followed by coordinated interlocking political, psychological and economic action in consonance with an overall National Plan. Without the development and employment of a politico-military-paramilitary infrastructure to secure militarily cleared areas for the GVN, the Viet Cong will move back as ARVN forces, of necessity, go to new missions. Of course, this has an adverse psychological impact on the population. Military successes of June-July-August have been dissipated by GVN failure to follow through and truly reassert and maintain government control. This control and reconstruction phase can only be accomplished by the civil authorities with the help of the paramilitary forces. I am convinced that a concerted effort at US-GVN level is absolutely necessary if President Diem and the GVN are to develop the required National Plan together with an adequate Intelligence Organization and a working control and coordination framework in which all governmental elements including the military can operate in a meaningful and effective manner. The GVN excuse that they do not have sufficient trained leadership must not be allowed to postpone the implementation of these required actions. Otherwise, the military will continue to be held responsible, both in Viet-Nam and in our country, for failure to obtain and capitalize on desired and timely results which, acting alone it cannot hope to achieve.

Although increasing emphasis on military planning and combat operations is certainly in order, additional measures other than military are required to motivate the people to resist Viet Cong blandishments and terrorist methods to the point of actively assisting the government’s counter-insurgency efforts. The inability of the GVN to protect the lives of the people in far flung villages is, of course, an important factor. Also, the population must be induced through political, economic and psychological measures to support the GVN with greater patriotic ardor than now appears evident. For example, General “Big” Minh, Commanding General of Field Command, reported to General Taylor that the RVNAF is receiving progressively less cooperation from the villagers in the matter of information on Viet Cong presence and activities. This could be the result of governmental relations with the people. Also, it could be the result of the impact of Viet Cong initiative in the north following so closely upon the ARVN initiative and successes in the Delta. Whatever the cause, it again emphasizes the need for an adequate overall GVN organization which will operate from the top levels to the villages and hamlets to properly counter the insurgency. Until this is accomplished, military operations can, at best, result in a series of isolated and temporary victories. I have repeatedly and forcefully urged in my letters and in conversations with both President Diem and Secretary of Defense Thuan the necessity for the development of a National Level Operations Plan into which a Military Operations Plan can be integrated. Such a plan must include at all appropriate levels an adequate Command/Control Structure such as agencies subordinate to the National Internal Security Council designed to dynamically apply all elements of national power in proper combination-economic, political and psychological, as well as military. In this respect, although the National Internal Security Council has been established by Presidential Decree, it is not yet functioning in its intended role.

At MAAG’s urging, “Big” Minh’s Field Command, the headquarters charged with planning and executing the military phase of the counter-insurgency effort, is now developing the military portion of such a plan. While the plan needs to be coordinated on a geographically phased “amoeba principle” starting with the clearance of various key areas and expanding these areas until the entire country is covered, MAAG does not feel this plan should or could be prepared on a rigid or mechanical time schedule basis. Because of the advanced state of the insurgency and because of the limited forces available to counter it, I feel that an inflexible timetable approach would be unrealistic. As indicated in the paper Lansdale will furnish you, MAAG has prepared an outline for a National Geographically Phased Operations Plan which it is hoped will assist in furthering the military effort and could serve as a point of departure for GVN planning in this area. In addition, MAAG currently has representation on a Saigon Task Force committee which is now writing such an overall National Plan for presentation to the GVN.

Military morale continues to be a problem stemming from GVN failure to properly plan and organize their counter-insurgency effort. Slow promotion, low pay in the lower grades, charges of political favoritism, unavoidable long separation from families due to necessarily extended operational troop commitment, poor family housing and the like no doubt have an adverse affect on soldier and officer morale. Although some of these are normal soldier “gripes” which in most cases can and are being remedied, the import of this situation is not discounted here. However, I feel a more serious morale problem lies in a deep sense of frustration caused primarily by too often seeing hard won victories watered down by inadequate civil-military follow through measures which allow the Viet Cong to regain control in areas after clearance by military action.

As noted previously, another critical problem hampering the GVN in its pacification effort is the serious lack of hard and timely intelligence. This results from the uncoordinated condition of the presently established GVN intelligence community. Although, of course, MAAG is primarily concerned with instructional advice and assistance in the military intelligence field, we have repeatedly pointed out to the GVN that the present fragmentation of the overall countrywide intelligence effort into several unrelated and uncoordinated civil and military agencies will not answer the requirement in a situation where the value of information is measured in minutes and hours. In response to MAAG and Country Team urging for central intelligence control and direction in the Counter-Insurgency Plan, President Diem created the Central Intelligence Organization. However, at present this organization has neither the personnel nor the charter to do the job and there now appears to be some doubt that Diem actually intends that centralized control and direction of intelligence be vested in one organization. Apparently, he does not feel he has a suitable man or that he can trust any one official to this degree. However, despite the problems facing the GVN, some method of obtaining adequate, timely, grass roots level intelligence must be developed if the Viet Cong is to be defeated.

With respect to MAAG’s all important mission of guiding RVNAF training, a Master Training Plan designed to overcome the long standing situation of units being inadequately trained due to continuing operational commitments has been developed jointly with RVNAF. This plan is a sound and logical extension of the improvements in the training effort here which has, during the past year, been fully reoriented on counter-guerrilla operations and ranger type training as well. In addition to regular ARVN units including the 20,000 and 30,000 increases, this plan is also designed to train the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps. As previously mentioned, the Civil Guard was formerly under the Department of Interior where they received limited police type instruction and the Self Defense Corps, for all practical purposes, received no military training. As you know, over two years ago this insurgency had developed far beyond the capability of normal police type law enforcement. Since the transfer of the Civil Guard to DOD, ARVN, with MAAG guidance has trained these units to the full extent possible considering operational commitment, time and facilities which, of course, leaves much to be desired. Their training schedules have been most carefully worked out and repeatedly reviewed to ensure at least adequate training in the shortest possible time. I feel that the Civil Guard is currently receiving a minimum amount of training consistent with developing an acceptable capability to perform their mission and that to further reduce training time could well result in a “paper trained” force not capable of success against the Viet Cong. Provided MAAG’s Master Training Program is not further cut by directive and can be followed, all ARVN units, including the 20,000 and 30,000 force increases, plus the Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps will be developed into a trained force within the shortest possible time consistent with local conditions, facilities and necessary heavy operational commitments.

Considering the language barrier and personnel requirements, I am convinced that the worldwide MAAG concept of teaching indigenous personnel to act as instructors rather than “face to face” training by U.S. personnel is certainly the soundest way to build a strong, viable, self sufficient Armed Force in the host countries. For this reason, MAAG has resisted sporadic pressures here beamed at Americans running all training centers and schools. In this respect, the shortage of ARVN officers to act as instructors could be somewhat alleviated by calling back the large number of officers now on non-military assignments. To speed training, additional MAAG advisors have been requisitioned. This will also allow us to do a better job of teaching the RVNAF to stand on its own feet as the Army of a sovereign nation should do.

As you know, General Taylor and his group have proposed a series of actions designed to further assist the GVN in countering the insurgency while concurrently coping with the floods in the Delta area.⁵MAAG, in association with the other U.S. agencies here is now working out coordinated positions and recommendations for implementation of these proposals.

One of the actions under study is the matter of blocking infiltration from Laos into the high plateau area. Currently MAAG has finally induced ARVN to combine small, inefficient static border posts into larger mobile patrol bases and to build light plane strips in some areas along the border. Presently, ARVN does operate clandestine cross border patrols from five blocking units astride main penetration routes… . Also, over a year ago, when I found that the borders could not be sealed by political action, I proposed to President Diem that a “cordon sanitaire” be established along the entire land border of South Vietnam. General Taylor’s proposal for a Border Force to be organized from existing ranger units trained and equipped for prolonged service along the border zone is similar in many respects to the MAAG concept which Lansdale will furnish you. The major difference is that the MAAG plan did not envision GVN forces operating regularly or deeply on the Lao side of the border. Also, the Taylor group proposals envision that all elements of this force be completely under military control. As no purely military action can completely seal the border, I feel our planners and policy makers should understand that presently contemplated action can do no more than reduce the present rate of infiltration. Therefore, I believe that intensified action at our highest diplomatic levels should be continued toward a workable border control arrangement not only with Laos, but with Cambodia as well.

A most significant proposal by the Taylor group is the introduction of U.S. military forces-to be accomplished, at least initially-under a cover plan centered around the present flood conditions in the Delta.⁶ This plan envisions service type troops as part of a Flood Relief Task Force which, over an extended period of time would assist the GVN in rehabilitation of the area. For the protection of these units, U.S. combat troops would also be committed here. I fully recognize the advantages, for psychological as well as military reasons, of establishing a U.S. military presence in Vietnam. As you know, as recently as last spring, MAAG recommended a brigade task force of at least two Battle Groups be committed here as “school troops” to assist in speeding up ARVN training. At that time, considering the level of Viet Cong activity in the I and II Corps areas where it was planned to station them, it was felt that these two battle groups, provided they were not fragmented into small isolated packages, could perform their mission without becoming heavily involved in fighting the Viet Cong. Later, due to increased Viet Cong activity,MAAG recommended that if U.S. combat troops were to be introduced for the primary purpose of freeing ARVN fighting units, which would then result in their becoming involved in counter-guerrilla warfare, a strength of two divisions, suitably reinforced with combat, logistic and air support would be required initially. Provided U.S. combat troops are to be used solely to protect U.S. logistic units in the flood area, three battle groups are considered adequate. However, I am now convinced that unless deployed in sufficient strength the Viet Cong, both for military and propaganda reasons, will eventually consider U.S. troops a prime target. Of course, I have no doubt that American troops will fully live up to their traditions if forced to fight. However, it is important that combat troops sent here be specially trained and equipped for counter-guerrilla warfare, that they come expecting to fight and that they be prepared for extended commitment. Most important of all, it is essential that these forces be totally under U.S. command and that command and control relationships, support and other arrangements such as a status of forces agreement and the like be fully agreed between the two governments prior to and not after their arrival.

A joint survey of the security situation at the Provincial level has been proposed by the Taylor group and accepted by the GVN. This is a logical and forward looking extension of a recently obtained joint MAAG-GVN agreement to inspect Province Chiefs’ security arrangements at all installations employing ARVN units. The proposed joint survey is of particular interest to MAAG because of the previously mentioned “dual position” of Province Chiefs with respect to the military and political chain of command and because of the importance of working out improved civil-military cooperation at Province level.

One of the basic conclusions reached during my initial assessment of the military situation in September 1960, was the absolute necessity for a single, inviolate chain of command. In addition to previous recommendations, the necessity for the reorganization of the command structure of the RVNAF and for the establishment of a single chain of command was spelled out in the Counter-Insurgency Plan. A significant degree of success was achieved when a Presidential Decree, and the subsequent implementing directive, enacted most of the MAAG recommendations. While this decree did not remove the Province Chief from the military chain of command, it is the most workable solution obtainable at this time. This is because Diem, who personally selects his Province Chiefs and holds them in high regard, desires that these officials retain a high degree of control. Of the thirty-eight Province Chiefs in Vietnam, all but six are military officers and are supposedly under tactical zone (divisional) commanders for military operations involving any significant number of ARVN troops. For this reason, although their military qualifications vary greatly, Diem feels that for all practical purposes, the military chain of command is now satisfied. However, in actual fact, this is not entirely true.

It is hoped that the proposed joint survey can be used as a vehicle to remedy this situation as it cannot be rectified by the military alone. Because of the dual role of the Province Chief and his “direct line” to the highest civil levels of the government, it will be necessary for the political member of the survey group to insist on corrective action.

Other Taylor group proposals which are primarily in the nature of measures to improve intelligence and further improve RVNAF mobility are now being staffed as priority matters. These actions present no particular problem except that with respect to intelligence a change in MAAG terms of reference may be required.

In conclusion, this report has been frank and objective with emphasis on what remains to be done rather than the very significant improvements which we have made over the past year. Naturally, our progress is due in large part to the fine cooperation and support of CINCPAC and all agencies throughout the Department of Defense. Again, our position here is complicated primarily by lack of authority to direct the GVN to take proper politico-military measures which will adequately coordinate the overall counter-insurgency effort from the viewpoint of required political-military-economic-psychological actions. For the above reasons, I feel that these interlocking military-political actions need heavy pressure from our political side if they are to be accomplished adequately and in time.

Sincerely,

Lionel C. McGarr
Lieutenant General, USA

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 71 A 6439, Viet 091. Top Secret. The source text is stamped: “SecDef has seen.”
2. A copy of this 29-page report, dated September 1, is part of a packet of documents entitled “South Viet-Nam Information Folder,” dated October 25. (Ibid., RG 84, Saigon Embassy Files: FRC 66 A 878, Internal Security 1961)
3. These three papers, all undated, are also part of the “South Viet-Nam Information Folder” cited in footnote 2 above.
4. A copy of this 426-page treatise, originally published November 10 and 15, 1960, and subsequently published in four revisions-on January 18, 1961; May 1, 1961; October 1, 1961; and February 10, 1962, was given by General McGarr to the Department of State in 1984 and deposited in the Saigon Embassy Files cited in footnote 2 above. On the inside front cover is the following undated inscription signed by McGarr’s successor as MAAG Chief, Charles J. Timmes: “Copy Number 2 presented to Lionel C. McGarr, Lt. Gen., USA (Ret.), who was the originator and driving force behind the production of this treatise and one of its principal authors.”
5. See Document 190.
6. See Document 191.