Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

202. Memorandum From Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, October 31, 1961.

SUBJECT

• Planning for Viet Nam

I have prepared this memorandum to give you the current picture of Washington planning relating to Viet Nam and to deal more specifically with the matters General Taylor mentioned in his 626 from Bangkok.²

I. The State of Washington Planning

Military Planning

As part of the preparation for General Taylor’s trip a series of papers were prepared in Defense³ briefly discussing twenty different military measures, short of the introduction of large U.S. combat troop units, that might be undertaken in Viet Nam. At the same time that General Taylor left, the Joint Staff began its own analysis of these twenty proposals. The results of the Joint Staff’s work were to be submitted to the JCS on Monday.⁴ Some of this work has a bearing on certain of General Taylor’s recommendations. In particular, as indicated below, the question of lift, including helicopters, has been caught up in this study.

Turning now to General Taylor’s recommendations, much of the staff work involved is being done in the field. General Taylor’s message No. 625 from Bangkok⁵ outlined the work that was to be done by him and by the Country Team in South Viet Nam. Apart from the Joint Staff exercise already mentioned Washington planning has concentrated primarily on General Taylor’s principal proposal-a military flood relief task force. The Pentagon is engaged in a review of a troop list for such an operation prepared by the MAAG in Viet Nam. It generally agrees with the MAAG’s proposals which envisage engineering construction units (including road-building units), a hospital task force, two helicopter companies, small boat units, etc. It has also examined such questions as the problem of the Geneva Accords and the need for a status of forces agreement.

There are two interrelated questions that seem to be causing some considerable difficulty to Washington agencies in thinking about General Taylor’s concept:

a. General Taylor has stated that combat troops would be included in the task force for protection of relief operations. He also envisages that the flood relief task force would constitute a military reserve in the event of a heightened crisis. He has stated in addition however, that the flood relief task force concept is not intended as a cover for introduction of combat troops. Many in Washington are convinced that the longer the forces remained in Viet Nam, the more they would come under attack and the more they would become involved in combat. If we do not intend to be forced out of SEA altogether, there is real doubt as to whether. once we committed forces, we could withdraw them until reasonable security had been restored in Viet Nam.

b. There is some question as to whether General Taylor intends that the task force will remain in Viet Nam only long enough to do the immediate relief and rehabilitation job or whether it will stay on to engage in reconstruction activities. There is some evidence that suggests that General Taylor’s intention is the latter for he refers in various messages to their staying for “an extended period” and for “a matter at least of months”.

This question is related to the one above for, as has been stated the longer the troops remain, the more they are likely to become involved in combat operations. This uncertainty also poses problems for the AID aspects of such a relief program. The estimates from the USOM that are still awaited will apparently cover only immediate relief and rehabilitation needs and will not cover reconstruction requirements.

Political Planning

A political and diplomatic plan developed by Ben Wood, the Deputy Task Force Director, for Alexis Johnson has attempted to solve these two problems by approaching the operation on a two stage basis.⁶ Wood’s paper suggests that, for the immediate purpose of dealing with the flood, a U.S. force of 1500 made up of two helicopter companies, a 500-man Navy landing craft unit and a 500man logistic support unit be sent to Viet Nam. These units would be entirely for flood relief operations, would have no combat-unit support, would be prepared to defend themselves, but would move out of an area if attacked. We would justify their introduction entirely on the basis of relief needs. We would temporarily hold back the Jorden report on North Viet Nam’s activities in South Viet Nam since it would not be relevant to the justification of this operation. We would also argue that as a relief operation, our activities did not constitute a breach of the Geneva Accords.

The paper argues that the introduction of a large force-say 10,000-would require a prior decision that we were prepared if necessary to go on to a much larger, presumably SEATO, operation. The paper proposes that the President send a letter to Diem in which he would say that the commitment of U.S. troops to security operations would be conditional upon GVN performance on a whole series of measures on which we have been long attempting to obtain action.

This approach is designed in part to solve some of the timing dilemmas by which we are now faced. It would simplify the problem for the Nehru visit by temporarily by-passing the Geneva Accords question and would permit immediate action to deal with the flood while giving more time to consider the tougher questions involved in sending larger military units. By sorting out the two elements involved in General Taylor’s proposal, it does tend to weaken one of the principal advantages of that proposal. General Taylor’s recommendation would permit creation of a base for a subsequent direct U.S. military contribution to the handling of the security problem while temporarily avoiding some of the political disadvantages of intervention and giving us at least some continuing freedom of action on commitment to combat operations.

I do agree, however, that in making a decision on the Taylor proposal we need to face and to decide in principle the question of whether we are prepared, if necessary, to step up very considerably our military commitment in Viet Nam. If we commit 6-8000 troops and then pull them out when the going got rough we will be finished in Viet Nam and probably in all of Southeast Asia.

Economic Planning and Financing

A final area to which some thought has been given is the financing of a relief and rehabilitation operation. I attended a meeting in State on Monday on this subject.⁷ Some action was taken a week or more ago to provide immediate rice supplies, to offer additional such supplies and to provide medicine. Washington, however, is still waiting for the Country Team’s long-promised list of other requirements. The list should be received within the next few days; as a result of my suggestion a message will be sent to Saigon to ensure that we have at least some preliminary estimates by the end of the week so that something will be available when General Taylor’s recommendations are considered.

Since the Country Team estimates are expected to cover only relief and rehabilitation, it is believed that they will present no serious funding problems. A reconstruction program could be much more expensive and would probably pose real problems, including the possible necessity for some kind of supplemental aid appropriation. The recommendation to the President will probably take the form of a proposal that he simply decide in principle that this is a priority operation and that necessary funds will be provided to finance it.

I have been assured by both State and Defense and they are keeping informed of each other’s planning. I also raised at the meeting Monday the question of whether we could be sure that USOM’s planning of flood relief requirements would be carefully related to the composition of the military task force that the MAAG had proposed; if we were going to send highway engineers we would, for example, need also to provide for road and bridge repair materials. Although there was some indication that some others present considered this a potential problem, the general view seemed to be that we must assume that the different parts of the Country Team would coordinate their work.

II. General Taylor’s Recommendations for Immediate Action

The first of General Taylor’s recommendations for immediate action in his message of last Friday⁸ was for a survey of the flood problem, perhaps by a team of experts from the U.S. As I have told you, before this message was received State had prepared a message suggesting that George Tanham head a MAAG-USOM group to make this study. That proposal was killed on Saturday by Alexis Johnson. Instead a more general message asking Saigon whether they needed any help on this problem was apparently sent. The answer, we are told, was that no help was required; that the Country Team could do the job.⁹ However, these messages are not available outside of the State Department and it was not clear whether they referred specifically to General Taylor’s proposal. At the meeting on Monday morning I was assured by State and Defense representatives that the MAAG and USOM did indeed have all the experts required. However, with some difficulty I did obtain the apparent agreement of State people on Monday afternoon that they would send a message to Saigon which would refer specifically to General Taylor’s proposal and request embassy views.

The situation with respect to the 64 helicopters is rather complex. As indicated earlier, the entire question of requirements for short-take-off-and-landing (STOL) aircraft and helicopters is being studied by the Joint Staff as a single problem. An estimate of two companies (44 helicopters), furnished earlier by CINCPAC, is included in this study. These 44 helicopters were intended solely for the purpose of providing greater mobility to the Vietnamese army. General Taylor’s concept envisaged use of helicopters for flood relief purposes as well. It is not clear to DoD how the new MAAG estimate of 64 helicopters to which General Taylor referred in his Friday message is related to the previous requirement for 44. Since there are already nineteen helicopters in Viet Nam, it was considered possible that no further addition was intended. At the other extreme, the entire 64 might be intended as a separate flood relief requirement. At my urging the Pentagon has agreed to send a message to MAAG seeking clarification.

Supplying these helicopters is going to require a Presidential decision for at least two reasons: (a) it will involve a judgment that the risks involved in taking them from other units in the continental U.S. or in the Pacific are acceptable; and (b) if they are to be used in support of GVN army operations, a clear-cut violation of the Geneva Accords will be involved. DoD apparently has decided in principle that the 44 can be provided, but the Services and overseas commands are going to scream when helicopters are taken away from them. I have urged that a decision be sought to get the helicopters earmarked and pre-positioned. I will pursue this aspect of the matter further today.

As the above indicates, it is very difficult for Washington to get into the act very effectively until it has been exposed in much more detail to General Taylor’s thinking. He has promised specific recommendations on November 1.

If you have an opportunity at the Planning Lunch today¹⁰ you might wish to pursue the following questions with Alexis Johnson: (a) The need for help from outside the MAAG and USOM in surveying the flood problem and actions to deal with it; (b) Whether the President must not address himself to the broader question of how far we intend to go in providing military support to Viet Nam when he considers the Taylor recommendation for a flood relief task force; and (c) How we deal with Nehru on the question of the Geneva Accords. I just don’t see how we can by-pass this last problem if we intend to accept the Taylor recommendations as we now understand them. (No reference should be made to the Wood paper. The copy I have is a bootleg copy and is still being considered by A. Johnson.)

RHJ

1. Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Viet-Nam Country Series. Top Secret. Copies were sent to Rostow, Smith, Ewell, and Parrott.
2. Document 197.
3. Document 168.
4. Apparently a reference to October 30.
5. Printed as telegram 146, Document 196.
6. Document 195.
7. No other record of this meeting has been found.
8. Apparently a reference to Document 196.
9. The messages under reference are telegram 509 to Saigon, October 28, and telegram 563 from Saigon, October 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/10-2861 and 751K.00/10-2961)
10. No record of the Planning Group luncheon meeting on October 31 was found.