Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume I, Vietnam, 1961

168. Estimates Prepared in the Department of Defense and Other United States Agencies¹

Washington, October 15, 1961.

Suggestion Number 1

1. Deploy a U.S. Combat Unit to SVN to Train RVNAF.

2. Brief. It will probably be difficult to make RVNAF units available for unit training. If they can be made available, possibly on a rotational basis, and a U.S. unit is used as proposed, RVNAF unit effectiveness can probably be increased. The proposed U.S. unit could possibly be deployed in connection with the CINCPAC exercise program. It should be noted, however, that the U.S. already has a large MAAG in South Viet-Nam and that CINCPAC has proposed almost a 50% increase to be effective in November and December of this year. It is also understood informally that the Chief, MAAG Viet-Nam will request another 300-man augmentation to be effective in January and February, 1962. These facts should be considered in connection with this proposal and with other related proposals summarized in this folder.

3. Availability. If the unit selected is from USARYIS or from Schofield, it could probably be made available relatively soon, possibly within 15 days.

4. Estimate of Effectiveness. Effectiveness would be dependent upon the regularity with which RVNAF units could be made available for training and upon the manner in which the language barrier was overcome. Generally, it is believed that considerable improvement could be achieved.

5. Acceptability. The Chief, MAAG Viet-Nam favors this proposal. Diem has been opposed to deployment in Viet-Nam of U.S. combat units, but might reconsider in light of the current situation. Diem’s fullest support is a prerequisite if the program is to be effective. The position of CINCPAC on this specific proposal is not known at this time. Like other proposals herein, this proposal, if implemented, would be in violation of the Geneva Accord.

Suggestion Number 2

1. Station a U.S. Combat Unit (Battalion or Larger) at Tourane.

2. Brief. Stationing of such a force at Tourane could relieve GVN forces for other duties. It would probably be correlated with the stationing of another such force at a port in the south. It would demonstrate U.S. presence in the country. It might be used to assist in the program referred to in Suggestion No. 1. The proposal might be accomplished, in part at least, in connection with the CINCPAC exercise program. Hanoi would probably be uneasy at the presence of such a U.S. force so close to the 17th Parallel. DRV might test the seriousness of such an effort so close to its borders by subjecting the force and its LOC’s to harassment, ambush, and guerrilla attack. Political and psychological objectives would probably, initially at least, be realized.

3. Availability. In event the decision is made to implement this proposal, the force could be made available relatively soon, possibly in as little as 15 days.

4. Effectiveness. Implementation of this proposal would increase the combat capability and the morale of the RVNAF. It would probably bolster the morale of the Vietnamese people, and enhance the prestige of the Diem regime. In addition, it would contribute to the security of the port area, and its capabilities might be exploited in training.

5. Acceptability. As would be the case with many other suggestions this proposal would involve a violation of the Geneva Accords. Diem has been opposed to stationing U.S. combat units in South Vietnam, but, in view of the current situation, might favor this proposal at this time. The position of CINCPAC on this proposal is not known.

Suggestion Number 3

1. Deploy U.S. Combat Engineer Battalion (Army or Navy) to SVN for Support and Training Purposes.

2. Brief. This suggestion is closely related to Suggestions 16 and 17 and to other suggestions. If implemented, the proposal would make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of the RVNAF. The unit could assist in unit training if Diem would insure support of the training program (possibly by making RVN Army units available on a rotational basis). Use of this battalion to assist in road, port and airfield construction would enhance combat capabilities of RVNAF, and would facilitate the support of units in isolated areas. In view of the number of bridges being blown by the Viet Cong, the unit should probably be capable of considerable bridge construction and repair. The proposal might be implemented, in part at least, in connection with the CINCPAC exercise program. There is a related requirement for a similar unit to construct a by-pass road in Thailand (Chachoengsao-Prachinburi).

3. Availability. Unless additional requirements arose because of heightened tensions in other areas, the unit could probably be made available from CONUS sources, and could be operational in South Viet-Nam in less than six months. In event it was decided to utilize the USARYIS battalion on Okinawa, the time requirement could be considerably reduced.

4. Effectiveness. The unit would further the combat capability of the RVNAF. It would assist the road, airfield, and port construction programs, and possibly other infrastructure projects. It could help in the training of counterpart RVNAF units, if these units could be made available periodically for training.

5. Acceptability. CINCPAC recently supported a similar proposal for Thailand (see paragraph 2 above). Diem was originally opposed to deployment of U.S. combat units to South Vietnam, but in view of the current situation, might reconsider in this case. As in the case of other proposals, this proposal, if implemented, would be in violation of the Geneva Accords.

Suggestion Number 4

1. Station US logistic units in South Viet-Nam to assist RVNAF.

2. Brief.

a. Strictly speaking, this proposal is not in consonance with the Geneva accords. In view of this and our past experience in Laos it might be more appropriate to increase logistic support capability through suggestion 2, i.e. augmentation of the MAAG. Under this proposal (No. 4) the personnel would be working types rather than advisors. During General Craig’s visit to South Viet-Nam in August 1961, the MAAG Personnel stated that the logistic support was sufficient for the current forces (150,000-170,000). However, expansion of the forces to 200,000 would tax the country’s resources, i.e., availability of skilled and semi-skilled labor and maintenance and supply facilities.

b. A US logistic force, composed of selected direct support, general support, and depot units, could be deployed to appropriate locations in South Viet-Nam to provide for the receipt, storage, issue, and maintenance of MAP equipment as required. Such actions would result in more efficient distribution and maintenance of MAP equipment and supplies needed to buildup the RVNAF. The deployment of US logistic units to South Viet-Nam would be beneficial in the initial deployment of US combat forces should such a decision be forthcoming.

c. The introduction of US logistic units may retard the development of an adequate in-country logistic posture unless measures are taken concurrently to insure that the build-up in the RVNAF includes sufficient logistic units to provide for a properly balanced force. The US units could then be withdrawn as qualified indigenous units become available to take over their missions.

d. Current US Army logistic forces are austere. Diversion of forces to support in-country forces will degrade the capability to support our own forces.

3. Availability.

a. The force tabs which have been developed for augmentation and build-up of forces in Europe leaves only an understrength unbalanced logistic force for deployment. Therefore, availability of CONUS support units cannot be determined until specific logistic missions are defined. Each must be considered on a case-by-case basis.

b. The only theater logistic force considered to be available is the Army’s 9th Logistical command on Okinawa. This type of contingency is within its mission assignment. It is organized at reduced strength and would have to be augmented by selected logistic operating units from CONUS. As presently organized, it could form the nucleus of a logistic force to function separately and/ or train in-country logistic units. Other theater forces are capable of carrying out only essential peacetime operations.

4. Estimate of Effectiveness. It is considered that the introduction of US logistic forces will improve the effectiveness of the in-country logistic systems.

5. Acceptability to South Vietnam. There are indications that this proposal might be acceptable to President Diem.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 64 A 2382, 092 Viet-Nam 1961. Top Secret. Printed here are the first 4 of 20 estimates bound together and apparently given to the members of the Taylor Mission prior to their departure. A note on the table of contents page reads, “The summaries in this folder represent preliminary estimates which were prepared, in the limited time available, at action officer level in DOD, the Joint Staff, and the Services. They are furnished for the information and convenience of this party. Each of the problems will be completely staffed within the next two weeks.” The estimates not printed include: (5) increase MAAG personnel as necessary to place advisers at company level, (6) expedite training of civil guard and self defense corps, (7) provide large-scale helo support to RVNAF for increased combat mobility, (8) provide GVN all technical assistance possible, (9) provide RVNAF with STOL aircraft capability with both medium and small aircraft, (10) provide ARVN army with organic air support capability, (11) provide RVNAF with jet aircraft, (12) increase pay of RVNAF including conscripts, (13) expedite GVN junk force and shallow draft boat company programs, (14) provide U.S. naval assistance in interdiction of Viet Cong junk traffic, (15) provide RVN navy with additional small ships through MAP, (16) undertake expedited construction program in SVN (airfields, roads, port facilities, etc.), (17) undertake with GVN a program of small airfield construction to exploit STOL aircraft capabilities, (18) use U.S. military aircraft for logistic support within SVN, (19) undertake defoliant spray program, and (20) provide increased bounties for information or capture of Viet Cong and increase covert efforts. A note on the source text indicates that the last suggestion was being explored by the Central Intelligence Agency.