Office of the Historian

48. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan1

Washington, June 30, 1958—8:59 p.m.

3264. Department concurs in presentation made by Knight to Noon re American proposal. Department suggests, however, if both Ambassadors Langley and Bunker agree, that on some suitable occasion Ambassador Langley, without laboring point, might wish indicate to Mirza that, although Nehru interested in following up with Ambassador Bunker any development that might arise or any avenue that might offer itself for exploration, we believe that we cannot realistically expect Nehru prior Pakistan elections do more than continue present talks as to methods of procedure.

FYI only—Reason why Department believes it advisable, in interpreting to GOP nature Nehru’s reply to President, to give slightly more weight to Nehru’s apparent unwillingness to negotiate substantively until after Pakistan elections (as indicated second paragraph joint recommendation telegram)2 is to protect USG’s freedom of action re Kashmir issue in UN. Department, that is, does not want to give GOP any excuse to claim, if only GOP had fuller information re Nehru’s reaction to package proposal, that GOP would have taken different course of action or timed its action differently and that GOP would expect, therefore, stronger support from USG than latter could give. End FYI.

Department has purposely avoided citing previous telegrams by number in order permit this series to be recommenced on limited distribution basis.3

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6–3058. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Bartlett and approved by Rountree. Also sent to New Delhi and repeated to London.↩
  2. Reference is to Document 46.↩

  3. In telegram 37 from New Delhi, July 4, Bunker informed the Department as follows:

    “I agree the chances seem to favor Nehru’s going cautiously until he sees what Pakistan looks like after election. While this most probable Nehru is often unpredictable and I think we should not be too categoric in predicting he will do nothing but talk procedures until then. I believe he wants settlement and if for instance progress is made in connection with July waters talks in London, it might be possible to persuade Nehru time was opportune to consider substantive proposals on other Indo-Pakistan issues as well.” (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7–458)

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