Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

47. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Karachi, June 19, 1958—1 p.m.

3214. Upon instruction from Ambassador Langley, Knight saw Prime Minister Noon and Baig at 6:30 p.m. June 18. While he would have preferred waiting for Department’s answer to Delhi’s 3207² such course action hazardous as Mirza, who is now at Nathiagali, was aware of Knight’s call there on Langley June 15 and of former’s subsequent trip to Delhi. Baig had also Lewis June 17 a.m. referring to message from Mirza to Noon. In sum there were many reasons why appearance of avoiding Pakistanis re Nehru’s answer could have been dangerous. Furthermore, during his trip to Delhi, Knight had obtained clarifications as to Nehru’s position referred to in Deptel 3100 to Karachi³ as being necessary prerequisites to talking with GOP re Nehru’s reply to President.

Outline of Knight’s presentation follows:

1. We are now engaged in talking with Nehru as to methods of procedure.

2. We never expected Nehru to jump.

3. Noon and Baig know Nehru’s idiosyncrasies better than we do.

a. He took particular exception to mere suggestion of special envoy.

b. He believes negotiations in first instance should be with ambassadors.

c. He has some doubt as to what could usefully be done prior to Pakistan elections.

d. But he has written that he is interested in following up with Ambassador Bunker any development that might arise or any avenue that might offer itself for exploration.

4. In sum, what is now going on is precisely how we had envisaged conversations might go.

We are in first stage, i.e., taking with one party (India). This may take some time.

During conversation which followed, Noon showed he did not have clear idea of type of long drawn out negotiation ahead. His first query was “Did Nehru give his terms for settling Kashmir”? Thereupon Knight repeated his presentation with much stress on fact that only methods of procedure are now subject of discussion with GOI. Point made of our belief tactics which would be interpreted by Nehru as obvious pressure would be unproductive. Likewise we did not want Nehru to think that we were more interested than he was in solving his problems with Pakistan. (Believe implication as to equal truth of reverse was obvious.) At this point Baig made his only contribution to entire conversation with outburst to effect Nehru was obviously stalling, would continue to stall and that pressure and force were all Nehru understood. Noon made no comment.

Noon then developed at some length reason why Nehru should engage in negotiations of substance now rather than later after Pakistan national elections. Noon said Nehru could never have Pakistan government more anxious to arrive at Pakistani-Indian settlement than government which he led. He, Noon, was responsible for new Pakistan proposals re Indus waters which had led to success of talks at Rome and would now be further discussed at London. He was personally on good terms with Nehru and their private correspondence was friendly. His great ambition was so settle Pakistani-Indian affairs that treaty of perpetual peace and friendship would ensue. Noon added that pressures were building up and that no politician worth the name could afford to remain inactive re Kashmir and canal waters. He made special mention of his government’s concern over Ghulam Abbas’ threat of crossing ceasefire line and to stern as well as politically difficult orders which he had given to army to prevent these crossings (Knight interjected expression of US admiration for this statesmanlike attitude). Thus, according to Noon, chances for a reasonable settlement would become less as time passed. To a remark by Knight that while he did not know, it might be that Nehru was deterred by thought that early settlement could be repudiated later by another government, Noon stated categorically “That is impossible”.

At this point Noon sent for a map of Kashmir. He referred to proposal made by Krishna Menon in UN to effect that India could accept partition of Kashmir along ceasefire line with a few minor adjustments here or there. He then repeated well-known Pakistan position that Pakistan had to insist on Vale because of “95%” Moslem population. Likewise for her security, Pakistan had to control headwaters of three western rivers. However, he would be quite willing to draw boundary line along eastern bank of Chenab, with Jammu area thus going to India. He interjected that while the Jammu population in 1947 comprised roughly half Hindus and half Moslems, he was sure there was a Hindu majority now as a result of Indian policy. As to method of assigning Jammu to India, he would do it either with or without a plebiscite as Nehru would prefer. All he would insist on would be that same would obtain in Vale, i.e. that it should go to Pakistan either with or without a plebiscite depending on method used for Jammu.

At this preliminary stage when our main objective is to get negotiations under way rather than attempt to negotiate, Knight thought it preferable refrain from comment. Noon expressed hope that his idea as to a settlement could be tried out on Nehru but stressed that this should not be presented as Noon or Pakistan proposal. Knight observed this was one way in which our good offices might be useful.

Comment: Knight was impressed by apparent sincerity of Noon’s desire to arrive at an overall settlement with India. At same time, he was struck by emotion and hatred which seemed characterize Baig’s attitude.

Throughout talk, Knight sought on one hand to avoid undue pessimism re Nehru attitude which could lead to Noon upsetting applecart by breaking secrecy and publicly claiming credit for Pakistan cooperative attitude and on other hand to steer clear of excessive optimism as to GOI reaction which might merely postpone and perhaps compound future difficulties with GOP.

Lewis flying north June 20 to inform Ambassador fully—he sees Mirza daily—re contents this message and re Knight’s trip to Delhi.

After returning from Delhi, Knight brought acting UK High Commissioner Fowler up to date, placing accent on positive line agreed with Ambassador Bunker and will also brief him re above.

Langley

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6–1958. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Repeated to New Delhi and London.
2. Supra.
3. Printed as telegram 2868 to New Delhi, Document 45.