Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

46. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, June 17, 1958—5 p.m.

3207. Regarding Deptel 2868,² to Karachi as 3100 information London 8848. Following is joint Karachi-Delhi message after consultation with Knight (Karachi telegram 3144 to Department,³ repeated London 181).

1. Basic premise from which we should operate is that Nehru is interested in following up “any development that might arise or any avenue that might offer itself for exploration.” In other words, he has left door open and first phase of our planned operation, negotiation with one of the parties, has begun with him. Not only is this the only constructive attitude which we can take at this juncture, but we also believe this to be the case in fact.

It perfectly possible Nehru may think delay will serve further to strengthen his position over Paks. But we believe he finds no profit to India in Pakistan’s deteriorating into chaos or coming under Communist control or influence, and so will not delay beyond elections if he can satisfy himself stable enough government exists then in Karachi to warrant his attempting come to agreement.

2. President should reply to Nehru only after Nehru returns from Kulu last week of June and we see direction his thinking is taking. We hope he will send for Bunker soon after return and we hope restraint shown by GOP in putting off request for SC meeting will have somewhat increased his confidence in GOP. In this connection, both Langley and Bunker believe President’s letter already has exerted moderating influence on those Paks and Indians who know of it. If matters turn out this way, President’s reply could be drafted to take advantage of good atmosphere created thereby. If Nehru attitude is not constructive or if he does not call for Bunker, nature of reply will be different. In any case, we think letter should be delivered not later than first week in July. A suggested text being pouched today to Bartlett, for consideration in light of circumstances after Nehru’s return.⁴ We are agreed U.S. should not now give any indication of pressuring Nehru nor of having more interest in settlement than he does. Apart from his personal idiosyncrasies, we believe (A) he has sincere doubts of Pak stability (as suggested in Deptel 2881,⁵ to Karachi 3119); (B) we must tread lightly at this stage since we have reason believe we are suspected of being not quite impartial; (C) to appear to have too eager interest in settlement would probably increase any inclination towards slow motion Nehru may have.

Regarding (B) above, no matter how we and Department may disagree with Nehru on this point, we are convinced he holds this view; as clearly reflected in Bunker’s conversations with him, Pillai, et al, it is based on fact of our relationships (SEATO, BP, arms aid) with Pakistan and not on any personal reaction to demeanor American representatives Karachi and Delhi. Indians have lauded to Bunker Ambassador Langley’s objectivity and it is doubtful they would have spoken on substance as frankly with Bunker had they doubted his own good will.

The above does not mean, however, a policy of inaction on the part of Ambassador Bunker who intends to avail himself of any and all possibilities which may open to him for influencing Nehru short of using tactics which would be interpreted as pressure by the latter. (See four below)

3. Outline of immediate position to be taken with Pakistanis might be something as follows:

(A) We are now engaged in talking with Nehru as to methods of procedure. No one had ever expected Nehru to jump at idea. Nehru’s character and idiosyncrasies are as well-known to our Pak friends as to us. In particular Nehru believes negotiations in first instance should be carried out by our respective ambassadors.

(B) What is now going on is precisely how we had envisaged conversations might go. We now find ourselves in first stage thereof, i.e., talking with one party (India). Progress bound to be slow and care must be taken to avoid impression U.S. Government exerting pressure on Nehru.

(C) We should mention Nehru’s hesitation about engaging in substantive negotiations with Pakistan before the national elections are held.

(D) Since at best it will be difficult to sustain the patience of Mirza and Noon during what may be long-drawn-out first negotiating phase with Nehru, we may have to refer to other considerations. For example, it may be necessary to mention without taking sides a possible cooling effect on Nehru toward entire complex which President’s letter stands for of drastic military action by Pak detachment at Fazilka and of intemperateness of public charges re diversion of Sutlej waters. Pak statesmanship in connection with delay SC action would be lauded with view encourage extension of such farsighted attitude to other areas of Pak-Indo friction.

(E) Fact that new Indian High Commissioner Karachi is man with record of such highly responsible assignments as Dayal’s, which indicates he enjoys Nehru’s confidence, could also be pointed out.

4. Outline of position to be taken with Indians: Pending further developments with Nehru, Bunker should continue fruitful off-record conversations with Indians in one act, who we note with interest now include M.O. Mathai.⁶ These talks to date have fully satisfied him Nehru means leave door open and is proposing own way of studying approach and of implementing our proposal. Procedure he suggests will enable him avoid appearance to Cabinet colleagues of intervention by third party and likewise possibly delay having to come to grips with substance before Pak election. Further, re third paragraph reftel, Bunker has been told in these conversations settlement along cease-fire with certain adjustments in favor Pakistan (not a few in Poonch area) would be acceptable basis for negotiation. Map exhibited at one point. Told also this should logically be brought forward in connection waters matter, after successful settlement of both of which the other problems would follow as matter of course. These conversations expected to continue.

Later on, if Nehru does not send for Bunker, latter might call on him and discuss possibility London talks being propitious time for attempt at some sort of link up with other outstanding issues. We should want to know how talks are going and particularly whether Pak proposal for storage along Jhelum in Azad Kashmir appears to be accepted by Indians as meaning that part of disputed territory will remain in Pak hands.

Bunker

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6–1758. Secret; Priority; Presidential Handling. Repeated to Karachi and London.
2. Supra.
3. In telegram 3144, June 12, the Embassy in Karachi reported that Knight would be flying to New Delhi for consultations on June 16, in accordance with the Department’s instructions. (Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/6–1258)
4. This text was forwarded to Bartlett on June 17. (Ibid., SOA Files: Lot 62 D 43, Package)
5. Dated June 13. (Ibid., Central Files, 790D.00/6–1258)
6. Special Assistant to Prime Minister Nehru.