Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, South and Southeast Asia, Volume XV

49. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan¹

Washington, July 25, 1958—3:51 p.m.

224. Under urgent instructions Bottomley of British Embassy twenty-fourth delivered British FornOff memo re Indo-Pakistan relations² and asked for “initial” US reaction immediately in view probable discussions with Noon re this subject during forthcoming BP meeting London.

British memo summarized as follows: (1) progress re Kashmir at this stage “unrealistic,” IBRD negotiations re canal waters delicate and should not be disturbed, pause in arms race would be worthwhile. (2) Noon should be sounded out at London³ jointly by UK and US “informally and noncommittally” re prospects achieving arms limitation agreement and meanwhile pending US letter to Nehru re package be deferred. (3) Line with Noon would be: (a) current GOP restraint re pressing Kashmir issue at UNSC appreciated, (b) continues be in GOP interest cooperate in package approach and hold off UNSC action, (c) we struck by possibilities of reducing tension by means arms limitation agreement of kind Noon had suggested Macmillan and we prepared explore this with Nehru in August, (d) we realize Pak domestic difficulties re Kashmir but believe deferment elections reduces urgency of going to UNSC, and (e) it in common interest for Noon hold present position at least another month during which time we would make every effort bring about serious negotiations between India and Pakistan starting with arms limitation. If necessary, we would add if sufficient progress not made during August we would understand GOP might be compelled raise Graham report in UNSC and in that event we would hope discuss with Noon how matter might best be handled before he committed himself to any precise course of action.

Subsequently Bottomley was informed Dept [has] no objection Brits sounding out Noon informally and noncommittally but we do not favor joint approach for following reasons: (1) in view other preoccupations during his brief stay London highly doubtful Secretary will have time address himself this matter (2) USG desires maintain its present position re package deal without unnecessary diversion (3) given present crisis in Mideast⁴ and indications frustrations in Pakistan reaching new peak any USG approach to GOP at this time suggesting curtailment military supplies would appear untimely (4) Macmillan’s previous discussion with Noon and traditional Anglo-Pak relationship suggest Brits alone can take successful sounding (5) if British soundings show hope for approach along British-proposed lines, USG prepared coordinate such approach with package approach and consider role each country can play to achieve ultimate result desired.

Bottomley not happy at USG reaction since he apparently under strong instruction from London to secure USG approval for joint approach.⁵

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7–2558. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Meyer and approved by Bartlett. Also sent to New Delhi and repeated to London and USUN.
2. Not printed.
3. Noon was scheduled to be in London for the fifth meeting of the Ministerial Council of the Baghdad Pact, July 28–29. Dulles was scheduled to serve as the official U.S. observer at the meeting.
4. Reference is to the recent developments in Iraq and Lebanon.
5. The Embassies in Karachi and New Delhi both concurred in the five points made in telegram 224. (Telegrams 240 from Karachi, July 26, and 234 from New Delhi, July 27; Department of State, Central Files, 690D.91/7–2658 and 690D.91/7–2758)