95. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 5, 19571
SUBJECT
- German Reunification and European Security
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S. Side
- The Secretary of State
- Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
- Senator George
- Mr. Sullivan—Defense
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Elbrick
- Mr. Timmons
- Mr. Reinstein
- Mr. Creel
- Mr. Parker
- German Side
- Mr. Von Brentano, German Foreign Minister
- Dr. Krekeler, German Ambassador
- Professor Grewe, German Foreign Office
- Baron von Welck, German Foreign Office
- Mr. Von Kessel, Minister, German Embassy
- Mr. Harkort, German Foreign Office
- Mr. Limbourg, German Foreign Office
- Mr. von Lilienfeld, German Foreign Office
- Mr. Jaenicke, German Foreign Office
Mr. Von Brentano said he was sure the Secretary would understand that this subject (the third item on the agenda) was of special significance and importance to the Federal Republic. He believed they had agreed yesterday that there was no reason to change our policies in view of the absence of any evidence the Soviets had changed their policies. It was important that we make perfectly clear we have no intention of changing our policies. On the other hand it was also important that we not be guilty of rigidity and inflexibility. Great changes have taken place in the Soviet Union and these may present important possibilities. We must remain prepared to take advantage of them. Therefore we need on the one hand to continue our present policy with great determination, while on the other hand, we must remain flexible in our ideas and prepared for some Soviet initiative. Brentano said he personally expected such an initiative. While it might be designed primarily for propaganda purposes he foresaw that the Soviets might make some spectacular proposals within the context of the German election campaign which would go considerably beyond those in Bulganin’s recent letter to Chancellor Adenauer.
Brentano felt it should be one of the special tasks and duties assigned to the Four-Power Working Group,2 the creation of which he welcomed, to examine all the possible changes in order to be able if necessary to adjust our policies to changing conditions. It would be unfortunate if we were caught unprepared by any new Soviet initiative. It was also important to take into account public opinion on this subject in our two countries.
The Secretary replied that he felt he need not say much on this subject beyond echoing Brentano’s remarks regarding the usefulness of the Working Group. He agreed that we must be prepared for proposals from the Soviets which might be spectacular, or seem to be, and we should be prepared to react quickly and in unison. He stressed the importance that the Working Group be identified primarily with the problem of German reunification rather than that of European security, in view of the interest of many other countries in [Page 214] the latter question. We should avoid giving the impression that the Four Powers were setting up an executive committee to deal with political matters.
Brentano agreed it was necessary to avoid the impression that the Working Group was forming policy on matters primarily within the competence of other organizations. At the recent WEU meeting the Italian Foreign Minister had made rather suspicious inquiries about the purpose of the Working Group, but it had not proved difficult to allay his fears. Brentano had assured him that, if anything were decided, the North Atlantic Council would be informed. He had gone on to point out that the question of German reunification was inseparably linked to European security. He had said to Martino that it would be helpful for studies to be made in the first instance by those governments which would be responsible for signing a treaty on reunification. Brentano stressed that the question of reunification could not be treated in isolation but must be dealt with in relation to European security and European disarmament. Mr. Von Brentano referred to Mr. Ollenhauer’s recent visit to the United States.3 He said that ideas of a somewhat nebulous character were being put forward in certain circles. He thought that these ideas should be studied by the Working Group.
Brentano said he felt we could avoid any misinterpretation by stressing that the Working Group would merely study the problem and was not authorized to make any decisions binding governments. He said he would welcome it if it could be indicated publicly that the Working Group would not terminate its studies after its initial session but would continue in being thereafter. This would make a good impression on public opinion in Germany. The Group could be somewhat smaller than presently constituted and could meet as necessary.
The Secretary said it has always been his view that the Working Group would continue in existence almost indefinitely. One of its purposes was to deal with Soviet proposals when they came. We did not know when we could expect such proposals. Therefore the Working Group should continue in existence until it was decided to terminate it.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 834. Confidential. Drafted by Reinstein and Creel on March 11.↩
- See Document 98.↩
- See Document 92.↩