96. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 5, 19571
SUBJECT
- Western European Union and NATO
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S. Side
- The Secretary of State
- Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
- Senator George
- Mr. Sullivan—Defense
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Elbrick
- Mr. Timmons
- Mr. Reinstein
- Mr. Creel
- Mr. Parker
- German Side
- Mr. Von Brentano, German Foreign Minister
- Dr. Krekeler, German Ambassador
- Professor Grewe, German Foreign Office
- Baron von Welck, German Foreign Office
- Mr. Von Kessel, Minister, German Embassy
- Mr. Harkort, German Foreign Office
- Mr. Limbourg, German Foreign Office
- Mr. von Lilienfeld, German Foreign Office
- Mr. Jaenicke, German Foreign Office
Turning to the fifth agenda item on Western European Union, Brentano said he had only a few comments to make. In the recent WEU Ministerial Meeting in London the main question brought up had been the British plan for reducing their troops in Europe. It had been a good meeting, and there had been a frank and objective discussion of this problem. The other members of WEU had expressed very serious misgivings about the British plans. For one thing, the presence of British forces on the Continent had been an essential pre-condition for the WEU treaty coming into being.. Brentano mentioned his fear of a chain reaction being set off by this British move, which could be disastrous vis-à-vis the Soviet Union because the Soviets might interpret this as the start of unilateral disarmament by the West. It had been the consensus of the WEU meeting that this problem must be dealt with in NATO, although there was a problem about timing. He said it would be appreciated if the United States would set forth its views on this subject when the matter came up in the North Atlantic Council on the coming Friday.
[Page 216]The Secretary replied that we shared the concern expressed by Brentano but were not quite sure how the problem could best be dealt with. We had the impression that the British position was very firm and that they had concluded that their financial situation is such that they must take this step. We were aware that the Federal Republic was prepared to help alleviate the British financial problem but the British seemed determined to go ahead anyway. The Secretary said it was a difficult situation. It did not involve a voluntary contribution since it was specifically provided for in the Brussels Treaty. It would be unfortunate if there had to be important changes in this respect. The Secretary agreed there might be repercussions elsewhere. On the other hand, we must recognize that the United Kingdom does face serious financial strains. Even though the United Kingdom has treaty engagements, these engagements do not provide it with the resources to carry them out. He believed we must accept as inevitable the fact that there will be important reductions in British forces in Europe and try to see to it that these reductions are brought about as gradually as possible and as consistent as possible with the strategic concepts and military views of SACEUR. We had expressed this view to Mr. Sandys when he had visited Washington. The Secretary said he hoped there was some flexibility in the British position, but he was not too optimistic as to the degree. He feared they had taken pretty definitive decisions.
The Secretary said that we would do what we could at the meeting on Friday. He felt there was nothing to be gained by putting the UK in the position where it must openly make a breach in its treaty obligations. This would not be a healthy development in our relations. He said that we as members of NATO and the Germans as members of WEU would have to adapt our convictions to the hard realities of the situation. He agreed there would be repercussions, certainly in Europe and possibly also in the United States. Our original formula had been that we would carry our fair share of the whole. He did not know what the application of this would be to the new situation. He did not think it would lead to any change in our plans, certainly not as to the Executive Branch. He could not guarantee what the reaction would be in Congress.
The Secretary said that in connection with the reaction in Congress it was important that we have good news from Germany regarding the build-up of its own military strength. He assumed this was going forward as fast as possible within the framework of the present exigencies of the political situation. However, it was not as fast as we had hoped.
Brentano replied that as of January 1, 1957 the Germans had 70,000 men in uniform. By the end of this year the figure would be 135,000. By July 1, 1957, three infantry divisions would be organized [Page 217] and by the end of the year two armored divisions, two naval squadrons, and two air transport wings. In addition, by the first of next year sufficient cadres would have been trained to enable the Germans to build up their tactical units in greater strength. Brentano said the figures he had given were definitive and he felt the Germans were making considerable progress.
The Secretary then said that our own plans do not call for any reduction in our troop strength in Germany, although there may be some adaptation in the structure of our divisions in Germany as in the case of those at home. The Secretary asked Mr. Sullivan to speak on this point. Mr. Sullivan said that the reorganization of our divisions had been under study for some time. Cuts in actual division strength of 2,000 to 3,000 men would be involved, depending on whether the division was infantry or armored. The surplus of personnel, however, would be absorbed into support units for artillery or new weapons. Mr. Sullivan stated that our plans for fiscal year 1958 which had just been approved called for no cuts in personnel in Germany.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 834. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein and Creel on March 11.↩