94. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, March 4, 19571
SUBJECT
- Developments in Eastern Europe
PARTICIPANTS
- U.S. Side
- The Secretary of State
- Deputy Under Secretary Murphy
- Senator George
- Mr. Bowie
- Mr. Sullivan—Defense
- Mr. Elbrick
- Mr. Timmons
- Mr. Reinstein
- Mr. Creel
- Mr. Parker
- German Side
- Mr. Von Brentano, German Foreign Minister
- Dr. Krekeler, German Ambassador
- Professor Grewe, German Foreign Office
- Baron von Welck, German Foreign Office
- Mr. Von Kessel, Minister, German Embassy
- Mr. Harkort, German Foreign Office
- Mr. Limbourg, German Foreign Office
- Mr. von Lilienfeld, German Foreign Office
Turning to the second item on the agenda, the Secretary asked Mr. Von Brentano if he would like to speak on this item.
Brentano said this item was of particular interest to the Germans. They felt some concern that the Middle East crisis tended to push the Eastern European problem into the background. They felt it was most important for us to keep in mind at all times that the principal field in the East-West struggle lay in Eastern Europe.
Brentano said there were two related questions: (1) Do recent events in Eastern Europe compel us to make a change in our own policy toward the Soviet Union, and (2) should we follow a uniform policy toward the Soviet Union and the various satellites, with particular reference to Hungary and Poland?
As for the Soviet Union Brentano felt that the effects of the Twentieth Party Congress and the de-Stalinization program were not yet clarified. The series of developments set in motion thereby were still going on. He was convinced, however, that no events had taken place which would justify us in deviating in any way from our present policy. Such changes as have taken place were merely in personages [Page 209] and he was convinced that there had been no change whatever in the basic political objectives of the Soviet Union. He cited in this connection the Soviet November 17 proposals.2 and the Khrushchev interview with Alsop. He therefore considered it extremely dangerous, and he wished to be clear about this, to think now in terms of making concessions to the Soviet Union. He referred to various discussions now going on in certain quarters on the possibility of troop withdrawals, neutralization of Germany, establishment of a neutralized belt in Central Europe, etc. Brentano said that he wished to say frankly and firmly that, in the opinion of the Federal Government, any proposals along these lines would be extremely dangerous.
Brentano then turned to the question of the satellites. In Hungary he said the will of the people had been turned back by brutal oppression and there appeared little that could be done to reverse this. He felt, however, that for humanitarian reasons something should be done to assist the Hungarian people even though in the process we might grant some measure of relief to the Soviets.
In Poland, Brentano said, the line of development was not clear. He was not optimistic that Gomulka could maintain his position. He urged that we develop and maintain a common policy toward Poland and coordinate the implementation of the agreed policy. Unilateral action would be highly undesirable. In response to a question from the Secretary, Brentano made it clear that the coordination he had in mind involved not just the United States and the Federal Republic but the entire free world.
Turning to the Soviet Zone of Germany Brentano referred to his conversation with the Secretary at Paris.3 He said that there was no immediate danger to a revolution there. The present stage of relative calm there was due primarily to the fact that the people still had hopes that developments in process would bring about German reunification and to their realization that any uprising would be immediately suppressed by the Soviets with brutal force as in Hungary. The principal danger would arise if there were a revolution in Poland which could spread to East Germany and produce another June 17.4 This was his great fear.
Here again, Brentano emphasized, it was important that we coordinate our policies. He cited as an example of this need a recent shipment from the United States of 87,000 tons of hard coal to the Soviet Zone via Hamburg. This created a difficult problem for the Federal Republic, which had been endeavoring to use the East Zone’s [Page 210] need for hard coal as a political weapon in order to get some quid pro quo for any hard coal shipments. The Federal Republic has been giving substantial financial assistance to the hard-pressed Evangelical Church in East Germany. The East Zone regime had refused to permit this to continue unless it were supplied with hard coal by the Federal Republic and had arrested a man who was sent to the East Zone with 800,000 marks for the Evangelical Church. If the East Zone succeeded in getting hard coal from other sources the Federal Republic was deprived of a political weapon. Brentano asked the Secretary for his views on how we might best coordinate our policies on such matters.
In reply to these points the Secretary said he agreed entirely on what Brentano had said about the situation in the Soviet Union. Despite the developments set off by the Twentieth Party Congress he felt nothing had happened which justified any change in our policies toward the Soviet Union.
As for Hungary, he also agreed with Brentano’s analysis and his concept that some humanitarian relief should be given to the Hungarian people even though that might involve some advantages to the Soviet Union. There was no point in protracting misery. If these relief measures could be administered in such a way that they could be identified as coming from the West, possibly the net balance would be in our own favor.
The Secretary said the situation in Poland was different. He believed that the Government of Poland wished to gain some measure of independence from the Soviet Union. It obviously did not wish to do anything which would provoke what had happened in Hungary and it was not in our interest to do so. Our view was that the gradual development of Polish independence should be promoted by peaceful evolution rather than by violent revolution as in Hungary.
The Secretary referred to the fact that a Polish Trade Mission is now in Washington.5 He said that the talks were as yet in an exploratory stage and no decisions had been reached. We felt it useful that Poland not feel entirely dependent economically on the Soviet Union and that it have some assurance the Soviets cannot destroy it by economic measures. The process of gradual evolution can be promoted by cautious steps along this line. It would be very useful to give the Poles a taste of what it is like to get economic support from the West. This might also make the Soviets realize the unwisdom of putting too much pressure on the Poles. With regard to economic aid to Poland at this time we are not thinking of anything of great magnitude. The principal commodities in which the Poles have indicated [Page 211] interest are short-staple cotton, coal-mining machinery and wheat. We understand the Poles are also talking with the Canadians, the British and the French regarding the same commodities.
As for the matter of coordination of this problem, probably the best forum was the North Atlantic Council. We have already made a preliminary statement there and will make a further one after the situation has developed. It would be useful if other countries could also discuss in the Council what steps they are taking. The Secretary said that he did not think coordination should be carried on in a way in which nothing is done until it is fully coordinated. He believed that what Brentano had in mind on this was the kind of talk they were having at the moment. Brentano nodded assent.
As for the problem of coal shipments to East Germany, the Secretary thought the best place for coordinating the matter was in Bonn. He pointed out that COCOM controls were limited to strategic goods and that it was not so easy to control non-strategic items. He was sorry if the coal transaction had been embarrassing. While he was not sure we have the machinery to control this, we did recognize some primacy of interest on the part of the Federal Republic in the matter of trade with East Germany and we would try to work this problem out. Brentano said he thought this problem could be dealt with by the quadripartite Working Group in Bonn.
The Secretary asked Brentano whether any thought was being given to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland by the Federal Republic. Brentano said there were groups in the Federal Republic urging that this step be taken. However, the Federal Government had taken a basic position against this. It was the Government’s policy not to recognize any government which recognized the German Democratic Republic. Only one exception had been made to this policy. That was in the case of the Soviet Union where it was felt the exception was justified because of the matter of repatriation of German war prisoners and because of the special responsibilities of the Soviet Union for the reunification of Germany.
Brentano said he would be interested in the Secretary’s views as to whether establishment of diplomatic relations with Poland would be a good idea or not. One aspect to be borne in mind is that such a step might amount to a “kiss of death” for Gomulka. Brentano had recommended in the Bundestag Foreign Relations Committee that no steps be taken at this time toward recognition of the Polish Government and this would continue to be the Federal Government’s posture in the immediate future. At this time the Germans were thinking only in terms of limited economic assistance, without any overall trade agreement, in such commodities as grain. A figure of 200,000 tons was under discussion. It was conceivable that in the future trade missions could be exchanged which would have no political powers [Page 212] and would not involve diplomatic recognition. Any such step would be taken only in consultation with the other Powers.
The Secretary said that while this problem lay primarily within the competence of the Federal Republic, nevertheless since Brentano had asked his views on the establishment of diplomatic relations, he would consider it premature at the moment. He could see, if the evolutionary process should develop, that it might be helpful if it led to a discussion of the problem of the Polish-German frontier. The Soviet Union was in a position to bring pressure to bear on Poland by alleging that the frontiers would be changed to the disadvantage of Poland. This question had repercussions even in the United States, where there are substantial groups of Polish extraction. The time might come when it would be useful to do away with the fear that without Soviet support Poland would be dismembered. In any event he supposed it would probably not be fruitful to have this issue come to the fore before the coming elections in the Federal Republic. Brentano nodded assent.
It was agreed that in response to any inquiries from the press it would be said that the Secretary and the Foreign Minister had had a useful exchange of views on the Middle East and Eastern Europe and that the discussions would be continued the next day.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 834. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein and Creel on March 11.↩
- For text of the Soviet declaration on disarmament, see Department of State Bulletin, January 21, 1957, pp. 90–93.↩
- See Document 87.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 57.↩
- For documentation on talks between the Polish Trade Mission and U.S. officials, February 26–June 7, see vol. XXV, pp. 582 ff.↩