Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

87. Telegram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State¹

Paris, December 13, 1956—11 p.m.

Secto 18. Brentano, accompanied by Hallstein, met with Secretary Dulles for half hour this morning. Views on variety of subjects were exchanged in cordial atmosphere, and there appeared to be general agreement in points of view.

Brentano mentioned his pleasure that report of Committee of Three had just been adopted, and Secretary agreed this should be major step forward for NATO.

Secretary remarked that unrest in satellites seemed to him to increase risk of war by miscalculation on part of Soviets, who might be tempted to take actions to offset Soviet difficulties. Brentano, agreeing, said that he was fearful that if situation in Poland deteriorated radically East Germany might blow up in revolution. Secretary said he realized it would be difficult for people of FedRep to refrain from reacting under such circumstances and this could start major war. Brentano agreed and said problem would become particularly acute for FedRep if border between East and West Germany were blocked (meaning presumably that this would prevent outflow of refugees). Secretary said that this would create dangerous situation, and went on to speak briefly of need for German as well as United States forces in Germany in order that there should be “fair sharing” of defense burden. He expressed United States gratification that there were now concrete plans for raising of German forces. He then said that United Kingdom is in serious financial and economic trouble and that it seemed to United States that Germany should try find ways to help United Kingdom. Secretary mentioned United States, despite increasing defense burdens, is taking substantial steps to ease Britain’s serious financial problem. He stated that Germany, “out of her present economic strength,” should be willing also to assist. Brentano stated, “we are ready to do so”.

Secretary mentioned his understanding that United Kingdom may cut down on size of its divisions and stated that United States also plans to reduce size of its divisions in Europe and elsewhere in light of weapons development and evolving military concepts. This would give United States divisions greater mobility and fire power. Brentano said it was his understanding that German divisions would conform in size roughly to new divisional strength of United States divisions.

With respect to political climate for rearmament in Germany, Brentano Stated situation was greatly improved. He mentioned fact that draft law had been approved by two-[thirds?] majority in Bundestag and that in preliminary lists of draftees, less than one percent have asked for exemptions on pacifist grounds. This he described as good symptom and mentioned many had worked actively to create “conscientious objectors” and had predicted that 30 percent of draftees would apply for exemptions. Secretary again expressed view that once good German army begins to take shape, German people will take pride in it and will support necessary defense measures. Brentano agreed and thought this would have good effect on 1957 elections.

Brentano then raised question of how to deal with Bulganin note on disarmament,² stating FedRep definitely thought West should be very wary in responding to proposals, which have number of dangerous features. Secretary replied that United States has draft reply which will be discussed in NAC shortly. He described reply as brief one which “dismissed” Soviet proposals. He said one of basic defeats of Bulganin proposals is that they are based on assumption of a permanent division of Germany, since dividing line runs through Germany. He said we also view the coverage of aerial inspection proposed by Soviets as not being responsive to President’s proposal³ since it excludes Soviet Union and gives obvious military advantages to USSR. He said he would expect our views to be discussed in NAC possibly next week. Brentano fully agreed with this line of thinking, emphasizing fact Soviet Union itself was not included in zone of inspection and that Soviet proposal, if accepted, would be “beginning of idea of withdrawal of US and UK forces from Europe.”

Brentano then handed Secretary a memorandum,⁴ which he described as basic ideas of FedRep concerning Middle East (memorandum not yet translated but will be sent immediately when available in English). Secretary stated while United States not yet decided on details, we are definitely prepared to make our presence felt more actively in Middle East than heretofore. When Brentano mentioned that this was [garble—one of] points of memorandum, Secretary laughingly remarked that perhaps he should have points of memorandum before telling Brentano of our decision. He then briefly sketched ill effects which had come from United Kingdom and French action in Suez—violence done to our alliance, to UN, to political position of UK and France in the Middle East, and to their influence in Arab world, extremely adverse economic effects on all Western European countries and particularly UK and France, and cloak that this action gave to Soviet repression in Hungary. He said he had last summer pointed out all this to British and French; despite this fact, he now noticed tendency to blame US for consequences of their folly. Pointing out that United States will do all it can to help its allies recover from this folly, we cannot be expected completely to right situation for them.

Brentano said that for reasons given by Secretary and particularly because UK-French action gave cover to Soviet repression in Eastern Europe, majority of German public opinion opposed UK-French action. However, he explained that Germany had to strive to prevent a breakdown of European unity and for that reason Chancellor and he had gone to Paris in November to talk to French. One of results of this trip, he thought, was ratification of Saar treaty by French Assembly. He also mentioned that he was returning to Bonn tomorrow to be present for third reading before Bundestag of Saar treaty.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–1356. Confidential. Repeated to Bonn.
2. For text of Bulganin’s letter to President Eisenhower, November 17, 1956, see Documents (R.I.I.A.) for 1956, p. 605.
3. For text of President Eisenhower’s “Open Skies” proposal, see vol. V, pp. 447–456.
4. Not found in Department of State files.