Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

110. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, May 23, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Your Meetings with Chancellor Adenauer

While the Chancellor desires to use his visit to Washington in order to demonstrate his close relationship with the United States Government for the purposes of his election campaign, he has for some time been anxious to come here for a discussion of major policy issues. He will hope that the communiqué will reflect a close association of German and American policies and will give him substantial satisfaction on the major points he intends to discuss with you and the President.

Although he suffered some losses last year, the Chancellor’s political fortunes rose after the Hungarian crisis. The events in Hungary were cited by the Chancellor and his adherents as proof of the correctness of their foreign policy. However, the recent debate regarding atomic weapons in Germany, in which the Chancellor finds his position in opposition to the prevailing emotional moods of the German population, has undoubtedly caused him considerable concern. Recent press reports of changes in American policy regarding Europe in connection with the disarmament negotiations again revived fears of an American deal with the Soviet Union at German expense and are also being used to attack the German Government.

1. Disarmament, German Reunification and European Security.

While the Chancellor and his adherents have expressed gratification regarding our recent official statements clarifying the true United States position on rumors regarding a neutralized or demilitarized zone in central Europe, speculation on these subjects continues to run high in the German press. There still appears to be concern in the German government as well that they have no firm and clear assurance that an agreement will not be made on disarmament which will result in a relaxation of tension on the basis of the status quo. The Chancellor will undoubtedly seek to obtain, both in the communiqué and in the proposed Four Power declaration on German reunification, statements not only that nothing will be done to prejudice the reunification of Germany but that in fact the Western powers, and in particular, the United States, will insist upon German reunification as a condition to a comprehensive agreement on disarmament. The Chancellor will admit that initial steps, particularly in the field of inspection, can be taken without bringing in the question of German reunification. While he would like to obtain as tight a link as possible between disarmament and reunification, he may confine himself to seeking assurance that progress should be made on the two subjects pari passu.

I think that it is important that we speak with the Chancellor as frankly as we can about our general approach to the disarmament problem and tell him as much as we can regarding what may come into the public domain in the coming months, if we are to avoid the type of problem which arose at the time of the press reports regarding the so-called “Radford Plan”. The publication of press reports regarding this alleged plan soon after the Chancellor had visited Washington last year gave rise to charges in Germany that the Chancellor did not enjoy the confidence of the United States Government and deeply affected the Chancellor himself.

The Chancellor may refer to the confusion which has occurred in public discussion regarding various concepts of inspection zones, zones of limitation, demilitarized zones, neutralized zones, etc., as well as the confusion which has arisen over various Eden plans. As to the former, he may well propose to you that some steps be taken to clarify in the public mind the distinction between zones for inspection purposes which are being discussed in the context of the disarmament discussions, and zones of force limitations, which have been discussed in the context of European security As to the various Eden plans, the British have made clear that the only Eden plan which has any current validity is the plan for reunification with free elections in Germany.² The various other proposals put forward by Eden have been overtaken in subsequent discussions and proposals.

2. German Reunification and Report of the Four Power Working Group.³

The Chancellor will no doubt endorse the idea of the early issuance of a Four Power declaration on German reunification⁴ along the lines proposed by the Four Power Working Group. It would be helpful if agreement could be reached between us and the Germans during the course of the Chancellor’s visit on the proposed text of the declaration so that we could jointly seek British and French agreement on a final text. It would also be well to agree on a time of release. The Germans hope for an early release and would like to have the declaration issued at Berlin in order that it might become known as “The Declaration of Berlin”. A paper on this subject is attached. (Tab C)⁵

The Germans have received intelligence reports, to which they give considerable credence, that the Soviets will soon take a new initiative in this field, aimed at separating Germany from NATO and preventing the Federal Republic from acquiring atomic weapons. The Chancellor will undoubtedly wish assurance that we will continue to work closely with the Federal Republic in countering Soviet moves. In responding, you may wish to thank the Chancellor for the manner in which his Government has kept us informed and consulted with us and in NATO in connection with its exchanges with the Soviet Government.

The Chancellor will also wish to raise, perhaps in his conversation with you and the President, the question of a Four Power conference with the Soviets. His purpose may be to ensure that, if progress is being made in the field of disarmament, the unification issue will be pressed simultaneously. You may wish to remind the Chancellor that the Soviets proposed in February that a meeting of the Disarmament Committee should be attended by Foreign Ministers. At that time we thought it possible, although unlikely, that the Soviets might wish to have the meeting as a screen to bring the Foreign Ministers together. We solicited the German views, which were not in favor of having a meeting at the Ministers’ level. While pointing out the dangers of a meeting with the Soviets in the absence of any indication that it would be fruitful, you may wish to leave the matter somewhat open in the light of developments in the London disarmament talks. There is a danger that if we leave the matter open, the Germans may let this be publicly known and create the impression of a more favorable United States attitude than is the case.

3. NATO Military Problems.

The main problem under this heading which the Chancellor will undoubtedly wish to discuss is the relation between nuclear and conventional capabilities and he may express his continuing concern over the drift which he sees toward a situation in which the Western Powers will have only the capability to conduct nuclear warfare.

While the Chancellor has exhibited a deep interest in these subjects, it is not wholly clear to us that he is fully familiar with the relevant NATO Ministerial decisions. It might be well if you could go over the main points in MC–48 and the Political Directive,⁶ stressing both (a) the need for the progressive development of a NATO atomic capability in the shield forces and (b) the fact that such adequate shield forces should also be able to deal with incidents such as infiltrations, incursions and local hostile actions without necessarily using nuclear weapons.

You may wish to point out to him that the question of the exact relationship between capabilities needed in conventional and nuclear fields must be based on advice from the NATO military authorities. A study of what is needed is being made by General Norstad at NATO’s request, pursuant to the Political Directive and the resolution of the WEU Council last March which the Germans sponsored. We have the utmost confidence in General Norstad’s judgment and we are certain that the studies which he is making will permit governments to focus on this problem effectively in the fall.

Recent public opinion polls suggest a very high degree of public resistance in Germany at the present time, not only to the German possession of atomic weapons, but to the possession of these weapons by forces stationed in Germany. This sentiment is being exploited by the Socialist Party. You may wish to express appreciation of the difficulties confronting the Chancellor, while pointing out to him that the Soviet campaign of intimidation is designed to divide the Western Allies and to prevent us from defending ourselves effectively.

You may also wish to lay a basis in discussions under this heading for a discussion on the German military build-up by pointing out that there are substantial shield forces on the European central front but that they are largely from non-continental countries and that they must be supplemented by the full German contribution if NATO strategic plans are to be capable of implementation.

The Chancellor will wish to be reassured regarding the maintenance of U.S. Forces on the Continent. He also continues to fear that the United States would hesitate to engage in all out war with the Soviet Union in the event of an attack on Europe. His concern on this point stems in part from his misinterpretation of a talk which he had with Secretary Quarles last year.⁷ It would be helpful if both you and the President could reassure him on these points.

The Chancellor may again raise the suggestion he made to you in Bonn May 4⁸ that the U.S. Forces be moved to the British defense sector in the North German plain. If he does, you might point out there continue to be substantial effective British forces in the area, at the same time noting that this is in the first instance a deployment question within SACEUR’s responsibility.

4. German Military Build-up.

It is not entirely clear to us that the Chancellor is aware of the degree to which the German defense effort is lagging and the extent to which current German planning falls below what we have for some time been led to expect the Germans would do. It would be well if Mr. Sprague of the Defense Department could speak on this point. The present German Defense Minister has, in effect, disavowed the plans of his predecessor for a rapid build-up to a force of 500,000 men. The German Government has not submitted new plans to NATO. However, we have reason to believe that they are operating on a plan which would produce a total of 343,000 men by 1961, of which 200,000 would be ground forces. While this would produce twelve divisions, some of them would be under-strength and they would be inadequately supported.

The fault lies partly in the unwillingness of the German Government to devote more money to the build-up, partly to indecision regarding military planning, partly to faulty administration. We do not expect the German Government to undertake new commitments or to make announcements prior to the elections. However, by the fall, when the elections are past, SACEUR’s requirements based on the Political Directive will have been established. We think we should expect the Germans to come into NATO in the 1957 Annual Review with a statement at least in general terms of what they plan to do to meet these force requirements and within what time period.

5. European Integration.

The Chancellor’s primary concern under this heading will be the effect of the recent change in the Italian Government and the French political crisis on the prospects for ratification of the Common Market and EURATOM treaties. He will be anxious to obtain your analysis of the political prospects in these two countries. A paper on this subject is attached. (Tab G) He may perhaps also raise the question of some American pressure to bring about the ratification of the treaties.

6. German Relations with the Soviet Union and the Satellites, Particularly Poland.

The Chancellor may give you an indication of the plans of the Federal Government for the conduct of its negotiations with the Soviet Union on trade matters and on the repatriation of Germans from the U.S.S.R. If he does not volunteer a statement on this subject, it would be useful if you could ask for one.

On the subject of Poland, he may wish your appraisal of most recent developments and a statement of the outcome of our aid discussions. It appears to us that Gomulka has successfully maintained his position and there is every indication that his regime will continue with the foreign policy and domestic programs initiated last fall. A paper on Poland is attached. (Tab K)

The Chancellor will probably indicate a German desire to intensify trade relations with Poland as a preliminary to development of relations in the political field. It would be useful if you could say that, although the Poles did not wish to bring the matter into their recent negotiations with us, we for our part would be disposed to examine some triangular arrangements, once the United States-Polish bilateral agreement has been finally concluded.

7. German Assets in the United States; Stinnes Case.

The German Ambassador has outlined to us the proposals which he sketched out to you in his talk on May 20.⁹ These are discussed in an attached paper. (Tab L) The proposals would involve a substantial outlay of United States Government funds (at least $100 million). The Germans feel that, if the United States Government were willing to put up $100 million, representing the amount of German assets used to pay claims against Japan, as was proposed by the Administration in 1955, a satisfactory compromise could be reached. The Germans think this would permit substantial satisfaction of U.S. claims against Germany and a 70% return to former German owners.

The significant fact in the German approach is the desire to seek some compromise. On the other hand, the Germans are unwilling to put forward a proposal themselves and apparently expect that we will do something during the course of the discussions. It would appear undesirable to reject the German suggestion out of hand. It is suggested that you indicate that the difficulties in the way of doing anything more than has been proposed by the Administration are very serious and that we cannot do more than study the suggestions.

The Germans have made a new approach to us on the Stinnes case, requesting an extension of 30 to 60 days in order to permit them to organize a consortium to bid for the property. This matter has been raised with the Department of Justice and will have to be dealt with on the basis of the situation when the talks occur.

The Germans will undoubtedly press very hard for some reference to these subjects in the communiqué.

8. Financial Assistance for United States Forces in Germany (Support Costs).

Discussions with a view to reaching an agreement on the basis of your conversation with Von Brentano still are going on in Bonn. The Germans have given us drafts which we do not think adequately reflect the agreement reached with Von Brentano. The financial position of military forces is becoming increasingly acute and we are informed by Defense that some funds must be made available by June 1. Meanwhile, the House Appropriations Committee has stricken from the defense appropriation the entire amount which we requested from [for?] the Germans for the current year.

If no agreement has been reached by the time of the conversations on Monday, we feel that you should press Von Brentano to settle the wording of the agreement with us in Washington.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 888. Secret. Drafted by Reinstein.
2. For text of the Eden Plan, FPM(54)17, January 29, 1954, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. VII, Part 1, pp. 1177–1180.
3. See Document 98.
4. A draft of this declaration is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 888.
5. No tabs were found attached to the source text.
6. For documentation on MC–48 and the NATO Political Directive, see vol. IV, pp.1 ff.
7. See Document 72.
8. See Document 105.
9. A copy of the Secretary’s memorandum of conversation with Krekeler is in Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199.