Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

105. Memorandum of a Conversation, Palais Schaumburg, Bonn, May 4, 1957, 11 a.m.–2 p.m.¹

Bonn, May 4, 1957, 11 a.m.–2 p.m.

USDel/MC/6

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
• Secretary Dulles
• Assistant Secretary Elbrick
• Ambassador Bruce
• Mr. David R. Thomson
• Germany
• Chancellor Adenauer
• Foreign Minister Von Brentano
• Defense Minister Strauss
• State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Hallstein
• Ambassador Krekeler
• Lt. General Heusinger
• Interpreter Weber

SUBJECT

• Middle East; Defense strategy

Election Prospects

The Secretary asked the Chancellor how he thought the elections would come out. The Chancellor replied that he thought that the prospects were good—the other parties of the coalition were now coming closer to the CDU, though there were still grounds for caution in assessing prospects. The Chancellor remarked that the Russians had “dropped their bomb” regarding atomic weapons much too early in the German election campaign.² The Secretary said that Adlai Stevenson had made an issue of atomic tests during the American election last fall. The Soviets had sent a note in support of his position,³ and this had not helped Stevenson at all. The Secretary added that one can almost count on the Russians to make tactical errors of this kind in dealing with elections.

The Chancellor stated that, in considering the forthcoming German election, a principal factor was the effect on German public opinion of the past war and the consequent great fear of any new war. The SPD was doing its best to exploit this feeling. The Chancellor continued that he had seen a brochure on Ollerihauer’s visit to the United States, however, and had noted that Ollenhauer had never spoken about the issue of atomic weapons there—and the American press had not even questioned him on it.

Atomic Weapons

The Chancellor said that the SPD takes the position that the Federal Republic should have no atomic weapons and that the Allies should not keep them on German territory. This view, the Chancellor said, was completely senseless. The Chancellor said that the United States, as the principal power which has undertaken the responsibility of protecting Germany, must have the right to determine its own weapons. The Chancellor felt that steps should be taken to make this point plain for all to understand. He suggested that between now and the time of his visit to the United States, the Secretary give some consideration to the kinds of statements which might be made.

The Secretary said that he had made a somewhat similar statement in his press conference that morning. He had wished to make clear his view that, unless an international agreement on disarmament can be obtained, the development of atomic weapons must continue. Naturally, all efforts for controlled disarmament must be made. But abstention from development of atomic weapons under present circumstances would be like undertaking to face any enemy’s rifles with bows and arrows.

With reference to the NATO Ministerial Meeting, the Secretary said that he had been surprised and impressed by the reluctance of other Western nations to see atomic weapons abolished.

Von Brentano said that he had received no hint of such a feeling from French Foreign Minister Pineau, with whom he had had a completely frank conversation that morning. He said that Pineau’s feeling, on the contrary, was that the defense of Europe should not be left entirely to non-continental European powers, and should not be allowed to depend too greatly upon Great Britain, in particular.

The Chancellor said that his main concern in the military field was with relations with the United Kingdom, and that there were no reasons for worrying about relations with the French. He referred to confidential conversations and exchanges of letters with Premier Mollet some time ago, and said that it had been agreed that French and German military staffs and individual officers be brought together as much as possible, to prevent the development of differences. Strauss emphasized this by referring to the Protocol of January 18, 1957 on technical military cooperation between France and Germany, which confirmed this proposal and established a committee.

German Relations With Italy

The Chancellor said that, likewise, the Federal Republic’s relations with Italy, including his personal relations with Italian statesmen, could hardly be better. He had assured Foreign Minister Martino that Italy would not be pushed aside as a weaker power. He also enjoyed excellent relations with Segni and Fanfani. The Secretary remarked that Fanfani was indeed a good man, but that President Gronchi was something else. The Chancellor replied that Segni, Martino and Fanfani had also expressed the latter view and had in fact “opened their hearts” to him about Gronchi.

The Secretary said he felt the Western nations should consider having the Italians participate more fully on matters which could be handled on a five-power basis. The Chancellor said that he could indeed understand Italy’s feelings in this respect. Von Brentano, however, suggested that any steps in this direction must be taken with caution, because of the parallel feelings of the Benelux nations. He noted that there had been many signs of jealousy on their part resulting from Germany’s excellent relations with France. The Chancellor stated, conclusively, that good German-French relations were of first importance, and that other nations would have to accommodate themselves to this principle.

The Western nations must think of ways, the Secretary continued, to satisfy the pride of the Italians—small measures would suffice, it was not necessary to do too much. Last year, he recalled, the Italians had been very pleased to be included on the committee considering the shipment of arms to the Middle East. Even though the effectiveness of the committee had come to nought because of the French, the Italians had not forgotten this favor. The Secretary asked the Chancellor to give him any suggestions along these lines which might occur to him in the course of events. The Chancellor remarked that these questions could be discussed completely frankly with Italian leaders, even with Saragat.

The discussion then proceeded to a number of points which the Chancellor had listed on a personally hand-written agenda.

Soviet Penetration of the Mediterranean

Indicating that he had not yet had a chance to discuss this matter with Von Brentano, the Chancellor said he was concerned that the NATO Ministerial Conference had failed to discuss Soviet penetration of the Mediterranean area and the consequent dangers, particularly for Italy. He said that Segni had brought this up with him years before. The Chancellor continued that Soviet designs on the Mediterranean area, part of a vast pincer movement against Western Europe, were presumably one of the bases for the recent Soviet intervention in the Middle East crisis.

The Middle East

The Secretary said that there was no doubt about Soviet ambitions to obtain control of the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The German documents captured in Berlin showed that conversations between Molotov and Hitler regarding a possible division of the world into three spheres of influence had broken up on the issue of Molotov’s insistence on control of the Persian Gulf area. At the first Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in 1945, furthermore, Molotov had demanded a Soviet trusteeship of Tripolitania.

The Secretary said that the Soviets had undoubtedly made some progress in penetrating Egypt and Syria, and Syria today must be considered as almost having reached the status of a Soviet satellite. If the British and the French had pursued their ill-fated venture in the Middle East, the Soviets would undoubtedly have become the dominant power in the Arab world. Now that the United States had taken the problem of the Middle East in hand, however, the Secretary expected a reduction of Soviet influence in the long run. The British had made too many of the kind of errors which a nation is inclined to make when it has become weak but believes it must appear strong—such as the seizure of Buraimi and the effort to force Jordan into the Baghdad Pact. The Secretary said that the temptation to use force was always at hand, but that the United States believed that the problems of the Middle East could be peacefully worked out in time and Soviet influence reduced. He said that the beginnings of a reduction of Soviet influence in Jordan could now be perceived, and there was a much improved relationship with Saudi Arabia. He expected that the situations in Syria and Egypt would eventually change to Western advantage. The whole problem of Soviet influence in the Middle East would be easy to handle, the Secretary continued, if it were not for Israeli-Arab enmity. In summary, the Secretary felt that, with inevitable fluctuations, the trend in the Middle East problem was toward improvement.

Economic Assistance in the Middle East

The Federal Republic ought to be able to assist in extending economic assistance to the Middle East, the Secretary said to the Chancellor. Germany is now free from any colonial taint. On long-term economic development projects in this area, the Secretary said, the Federal Republic and the United States should work more closely together than has been the case in the past.

The Chancellor replied that he agreed to this general proposition, and that the Federal Republic was in principle prepared to proceed with projects. He referred to his recent visit to Tehran at the invitation of the Shah, a man who, he said, was to be taken seriously. The Shah had requested German-Iranian cooperation in the field of economic development, and in his reply the Chancellor had stated that it would be necessary to have capital participation from other countries, particularly the United States. In specific industrial projects, the Chancellor felt that German nationals should not take on the leading jobs—this would cause future difficulties in relations with Iran. The outcome of the discussions had been the formation of a joint committee of experts located in Iran and charged with formulation of specific recommendations. On the basis of such recommendations, the Chancellor would consult once again with the Shah. (The Secretary remarked at this point that the Iranians could use a tough German tax collector. The Chancellor: Should we give up Schaeffer?) The Chancellor noted that the British press had been “very impolite” about his visit to Iran, though he felt he could hardly have done anything there to arouse British antagonism.

The Iranians had demonstrated in their talks with the Chancellor particular interest in a project for a pipeline direct to Turkey (not through Iraq). The Chancellor said he hoped that, if the Germans should decide on some practical projects, the United States would be ready to participate in them also, The Secretary asked whether the Chancellor had in mind American governmental assistance or investment by private enterprise. The Chancellor said that he meant assistance through private investment, and the Secretary added he considered this to be better.

The Chancellor continued that he could not quite agree with the approach suggested by Special Ambassador Richards,⁴ who, he thought, was recommending too fast a start. For example, according to the Chancellor, Richards has suggested to the Iranians that they invest in a steel mill with the capacity of 300,000–400,000 tons—a project which the Chancellor considered totally unrealistic. The Secretary replied that this might have been a misunderstanding. The Chancellor said that he had heard this from the Shah, who had made a perfectly clear statement as he had just retold it. The Chancellor wondered whether the Iranians were exaggerating matters in order to encourage the Germans to take bolder steps. The Secretary said that this kind of thing had been done before, and that he was always glad to have such a cross-check on statements by third countries. The Chancellor then said that when he had gone into the matter more closely with the Shah, it had appeared to him that Richards must have been talking about steel mills in the United States.

Military Policy

The Chancellor said that he had received the news the previous day that Great Britain would no longer call up draftees from the class of 1940. If this had indeed now been stated so precisely by the British, the Chancellor said, then Germany was confronted by a very grave situation. The Chancellor said that he was currently very concerned by the mass of Soviet troops in the Soviet Zone of Germany. Recent British actions, said the Chancellor, had sharpened the necessity for him to clarify his views on atomic weapons for the Bundeswehr. (He commented in this connection that his views on this subject as published in the press were almost always subjected to some distortion, and he specifically named the London Times and Le Figaro as offending newspapers.) In the wake of the story of the scientists’ statement on atomic weapons, and of the emotional reaction of the Evangelical Church, particularly under the leadership of Niemoeller, he wanted to make plain once again the following points:

1) The Federal Republic has no atomic weapons.

2) The Federal Republic has not asked its allies for any atomic weapons. (But he emphasized that he had not stated that the Federal Republic never would acquire atomic weapons.)

3) According to his information, the United States has not yet achieved practical results in the production of tactical atomic weapons. The interim period, therefore, must be used to press for disarmament. Once tactical weapons become a reality, however, Germany should re-examine the situation.

British Military Leadership

The Chancellor said that he was now confronted with the following very serious situation: He understood that UK ground forces were to be deployed in the future from Kassel to the North Sea, while US forces were to be confined to the area south of Kassel. He had also heard from his German military advisers that Britain’s military leaders, and particularly Montgomery, were adopting a strategy which was quite contrary to the US policy of forward defense. He was in general very much concerned with the trends in top British military leadership. His concern had been increased by a book published by two reputable French journalists with close connections in the French Ministry of Defense (Les Secrets de l’Expedition d’Egypte, by Beuve-Merry and Bromberger). The Chancellor said that this book presents British leadership in a fearful light, and he recommended that the Secretary read it. The Chancellor said that all these things, together with British intentions to reduce forces in northern Germany, left him acutely worried about the security of the North German plain. The Russians, he said, have 7,200 tanks in the Soviet Zone, and might be tempted to push into this area if it should be stripped of its defenses.

The Chancellor, therefore, wished to request that a certain number of United States combat units be attached to the German division stationed in Hannover. He felt that only in this way would there be sufficient security for northern Germany, since the presence of American troops would surely be a deterrent to the Soviets.

The Secretary replied that the basis for these British steps was, as he had said on May 1, the historical change occurring in the status of Great Britain as a world power. The Secretary wished to make it clear, however, that he did not consider the UK as a factor to be written off as negligible. He said that, despite the Suez fiasco, the US military consider the British to be competent and dependable. Weaknesses in British military performance in the Suez affair had been due, at least in part, to an effort to preserve the secrecy of the undertaking at the outset. Eden had been a sick man. The Secretary continued that he felt that Macmillan was a good, strong, and dependable person; and that one should not conclude, on the basis of Suez or of French-oriented or other journalistic reports, that the British forces were other than dependable and brave.

The Chancellor replied that the virtues of British troops should not be confused with the qualities of British military leadership. He was greatly concerned, the Chancellor continued, at Montgomery’s proposals for “defense in depth”, which had been expressed as a matter of moving Belgian troops back to Belgium, Dutch troops back to the Netherlands, etc. General Heusinger amplified this statement by describing the recent NATO exercise at which Montgomery had projected possible defense actions in a theoretical attack situation in 1965. Heusinger said that Montgomery had thoroughly supported the thesis expressed in the White Paper. Heusinger added that General Norstad had indeed stressed the theory of the “forward strategy”, but Heusinger had been surprised that Norstad had not countered Montgomery’s presentation in much more detail. The Secretary assured the Chancellor that such opinions expressed by Montgomery were not shared by the US Government, and said it was his impression that they were also not shared in many responsible quarters of the British Government. The Chancellor said that he hoped not, but added that the British have never done anything about Montgomery.

Defense Strategy

The Secretary said he believed that the defense of Germany and Western Europe cannot be left entirely to the deterrent of massive atomic counter-attack. Depending on the situation, there would be powerful moral considerations against a massive retaliation on Moscow which would annihilate millions of people. There was a definite development, however, toward nuclear tactical weapons with far greater power than conventional tactical weapons. The time would arrive fairly soon, though it had not arrived yet, when forces equipped with such weapons, if stationed on a national border, might make virtually impossible invasion by hostile forces. Though this development was by no means yet complete, the Secretary believed that the trend was therefore away from defense by massive retaliation and toward defense by tactical atomic weapons.

Disarmament

The Secretary said that he doubted whether it would be possible to obtain an agreement on controlled disarmament which would abolish atomic weapons, since this new form of power was bound to be utilized in the field of armaments. He did believe, however, that it might be possible to reach agreement on control of the means of delivery of atomic explosives, i.e., on control of weapons of mass destruction in contrast to tactical atomic weapons. The Secretary felt that this was the most likely direction in which the London Disarmament Conference might achieve some kind of positive result on controls.

The Chancellor repeated his concern about the United Kingdom’s placing all reliance on massive retaliation. In the light of the British inclination to pull out of the North German plain even in the absence of an agreement on controlled disarmament, the Chancellor felt that there was a genuine chance of the Soviets’ moving into the plain if there were no US forces stationed there. General Heusinger gave a brief presentation on the strategic importance of the North German plain. Strauss stated his conviction that neither Soviet nor satellite forces would attack this area if it involved the risk of tangling directly with United States forces, and said that the specific German request was that two US combat teams be relocated from south to north Germany.

The Secretary stated that on these military matters he could not express an opinion, but assumed that the Germans would be discussing them with General Norstad.

Soviet Embassy’s Note of May 4

During the course of the conversation, Ambassador Smirnov’s note of May 4 to the Chancellor was delivered. An interpreter was called in and he rendered a rough oral translation which was the basis for the provisional report of this note in Embassy telegram No. 4289 of May 4.⁵ The Chancellor reacted in particular to the allegation in the note that he and Von Brentano had said the Federal Republic should possess atomic weapons if other Western powers acquired them. He retorted: “I never said that.”

As soon as the note had been read, the Chancellor remarked that he was not sure whether the Federal Republic should proceed with commercial negotiations with the Soviet Union. If we should start them, he said, perhaps we shall see to it that they are dragged out. There would have to be some trade with the Soviet bloc, of course, but the Chancellor did not think that it should be allowed to grow too large. The Secretary concurred. The Chancellor said he would have to study Smirnov’s note further, but that he thought the Soviet note of April 27 was outrageous.

The Secretary said that, if the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister would allow him to do Von Brentano’s work for a moment, he could suggest the lines of a reply which he would make to the May 4 note if he were in the latter’s position. The Federal Republic, the Secretary suggested, might state that it has one great responsibility to itself and to humanity: to ensure that its territory is not used as a base for any aggression, this responsibility the Federal Republic will scrupulously discharge. As for the means of its own defense, however, the Federal Republic will not accept the dictates of any country; least of all of a country which forcibly holds some 20 million Germans in bondage. As for the reference to policy on disarmament, the Secretary concluded in his suggestion, this subject was being negotiated in conference at London and the Federal Republic will observe any agreement reached there.

Relations With Poland

The Chancellor asked the Secretary about the course to be set for relations with Poland. The Secretary replied that it was difficult to judge the degree of independence achieved by the Gomulka regime. The Secretary was inclined to believe that there had been some beginnings of Polish independence which deserved some encouragement—though this should not be overdone. Referring to the aid negotiations, the Secretary said that the United States may be disposed to extend a certain amount of economic aid, designed to encourage whatever additional degree of independence might be practicable in Poland and possibly in other satellite countries. This had not been an easy decision to reach, the United States Government was not entirely sure about the decision it was taking, but it did have a certain amount of confidence in the wisdom of its decision.

The Chancellor replied that it might therefore appear appropriate for the Federal Republic cautiously to envisage the establishment of additional economic relations with Poland.

European Unity and the Role of Great Britain

Von Brentano said that he had had a very useful conversation that morning with Pineau on ratification of the Rome Treaty⁶ and allied subjects, and on their common concern about the United Kingdom’s position. The UK, Von Brentano said, had been exerting an unfortunate pressure on France in two respects: (1) The British had been urging the French to reach agreement on the Free Trade Area prior to ratification of the treaty on the Common Market. Von Brentano had agreed with Pineau that this would be impossible—negotiation of the Common Market treaty had taken some 18 months, and it was obvious that negotiations on the Free Trade Area would also last for months. This British intervention, therefore, could have only a very unfortunate psychological effect on the French with respect to prospects for ratification of the Common Market treaty. (2) Von Brentano also considered British advocacy of the so-called “Grand Design” as unfortunate. He felt that this was not a good scheme, and that it could only have the effect of destroying prospects for practicable projects toward European unity. Von Brentano said that Pineau had fully agreed with him on this point. Von Brentano explained that one of the most questionable aspects of the “Grand Design” was that it was proposed as including all the NATO countries in its membership. He said that he did not know whether the United States and Canada would be willing to join the proposed single great assembly, whereupon the Chancellor interjected: “We would not join it.”

The Secretary replied that the United States Government shares some of this concern regarding the British moves. The Secretary had just seen Foreign Minister Lloyd, who had firmly denied that there was any British governmental opposition to the treaties on the Common Market and EURATOM and had asserted that these treaties had the strong support of Macmillan and Thorneycroft. Lloyd, however, had suggested reasons why there should be some connection between the Common Market and the Free Trade Area (Von Brentano interjected: “We agree”). The Secretary said that he agreed that there are some tendencies to endanger the prospects for practical European projects by superimposing rather vague, more generalized plans. The United States Government, he assured the Chancellor, would not participate in such maneuvers, and specifically had no intention of joining the “Grand Design”.

Von Brentano confirmed that he and Pineau had agreed not to accept the British proposal regarding the Free Trade Area. Their position would be that the Common Market treaty should be ratified first and as soon as possible, and that negotiations on the Free Trade Area should then proceed.

The Secretary said that the United States Government strongly supported the Common Market, and did not wish any position on its own part to interfere with the prospects for ratification of this treaty. If the Common Market treaty should not be ratified soon, he said, there would be great discouragement in the United States about European unity. As long as Western Europe remains divided, the Secretary said, it appears to the American public either as subject to being captured by the Russians or as representing some kind of charge on the US which the American public is not prepared to carry indefinitely. A united Europe, by contrast, could be as powerful as the United States or the Soviet Union. Complete sovereignty for the many nations of Europe, said the Secretary, is a luxury which European countries can no longer afford at US expense. If the Common Market treaty should fail, after the failure of the EDC, the Secretary thought that further support for Europe could hardly be expected from American public opinion.

The Chancellor said that the German process of ratification should be completed at the end of June. Von Brentano mentioned that the French Government also hoped to meet this deadline, but he had heard that the British Ambassador in Paris, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, had been making representations toward delaying the French schedule on ratification. The Secretary suggested that the Chancellor discuss this matter with Macmillan during the latter’s forthcoming visit.

Support Costs

The Secretary said he hoped that President Eisenhower’s most recent proposal on support costs⁷ would be found acceptable by the Chancellor.

Von Brentano replied that the Federal Government would, of course, like to reach agreement as soon as possible, but the difficulty was that parliamentary approval was required for each separate agreement on support costs. If the US-German agreement should contain a reservation, the Bundestag would undoubtedly object on the grounds that other countries would demand similar consideration. Hence there could be no certainty about keeping the Federal Government’s total contribution down to the definite sum envisaged by the Bundestag. Under the present budgetary situation, the Bundestag could hardly be expected to grant more than last year’s total contribution. The Federal Government had indeed made a generous offer to the British, Von Brentano said, and this had been partly because the Secretary had encouraged it to do so.

The Secretary replied that he hoped the Germans realized that the United States Government was also faced with parliamentary difficulties in this matter. The Congress had become excited about the support costs issue, and this was admittedly to a certain degree attributable to certain Defense officials who were anxious to free funds for other projects. The point in the President’s proposal, the Secretary said, was that the residual problem for this year could be dealt with after the parliamentary recesses on both sides and after the German elections. The United States Government could emphasize to the Congress the reservation in the proposed agreement; while the Federal Government would be in a position to assure the Bundestag that it was committed to make no further payment without the agreement of the Bundestag.

Von Brentano asked if it would not be possible for both sides to agree on the figure offered by the Germans, since a formula could undoubtedly be found which would not exclude later discussions. The Secretary said that he believed there was agreement on this point, but Hallstein pointed out that there was still one difficulty in the US proposal: namely, that the first payment was characterized as “on account”. This implied that a later payment must be made, Hallstein said, and the implication would undoubtedly be unacceptable to the Bundestag. The Secretary said that it had not been our intention now to obtain an implied obligation to make a further payment, but simply to find a formula on later discussions which would be acceptable to both parliaments.

Stinnes Properties

Von Brentano said that he had heard from Washington of the US decision to proceed with sales of the vested Stinnes properties, and wished to make again an urgent plea that such sales be delayed until after the German elections. The Chancellor added that it should not be forgotten that Stinnes had numerous socialist connections.

The Secretary asked if it would not be possible to solve this problem by organizing a group of German interests who would purchase the properties to be sold. Hallstein replied that such a group had indeed already been organized, but Krekeler explained that it was not clear to what extent such a group would be legally in a position to purchase. Less than 50 per cent of the securities were apparently legally unencumbered for such sale. Krekeler expressed the view that a delay of some months in disposition of the properties, affording time to negotiate, would provide desirable clarifications for both sides. The Secretary said that both the President and he had discussed this matter with the Attorney General. There were many complex regulations affecting this sale under legislation administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, which make delay costly. The Secretary felt confident, however, that a solution to the question would be found through purchase by a German group. He pointed out that, for the first time, exceptions to previous practice were now possible so as to permit purchase of vested German properties by German interests.

Status of Forces Negotiations

The Secretary stated briefly to Von Brentano (as the meeting adjourned to the luncheon table) the US position favoring a continuation of the negotiations.

Effects of Atomic Radiation

Particularly in the light of the forthcoming Bundestag debate on the subject, the Chancellor told the Secretary that it would be most helpful to the Federal Government to obtain from the United States as much factual material as possible which would demonstrate the limits to the effects of nuclear radiation on human beings.

Proposed Visit of Nuclear Scientist

In the presence of the Chancellor, the Secretary suggested to Ambassador Bruce that steps be taken within the coming weeks to get a top-ranking and prominent American nuclear scientist to visit Germany.

1. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret. Drafted by David R. Thomson, Counselor of the Embassy in Bonn. Dulles was in Bonn for the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, May 2–4.
2. For text of the letter from the Soviet Government to the Federal Republic, dated April 27, 1957, see Moskau Bonn, pp. 245–249.
3. Not further identified.
4. For documentation on the Richards Mission to the Middle East, see volume XII.
5. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/5–457) For text of this note, see Moskau Bonn, pp. 254–255.
6. Reference is to the treaty ratified in Rome on March 21, 1957, creating EURATOM and a European Common Market.
7. See Document 103.