Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

103. Letter From President Eisenhower to Chancellor Adenauer¹

Washington, April 12, 1957.

Dear Mr. Chancellor: I have received your letter of March 25, 1957² with regard to the German contribution to the costs of supporting American forces in the Federal Republic. I appreciate your having gone into the matter personally and am glad that you have written me on the subject.

I can understand that this problem involves difficulties for you. Frankly it also involves serious political difficulties for my Administration. Our defense budget is now being considered by the Congress. As you probably know, we ran into substantial difficulty with the Congress last year regarding the amount of financial support which the Federal Republic gave to our forces. The Congress was very critical of the agreement which we made with you last year, and there has been increased criticism this year of the arrangements which your Government has proposed to us.

The criticism stems basically from the fact that our Congress does not feel that the Federal Republic has been carrying its fair share of the burden of defending the Atlantic Community, either in financial terms or as regards the actual contribution of forces. Our figures indicate that the defense burden borne by the Federal Republic has been substantially less than that of the average for other European NATO countries and far less than the burden being carried by the United States. While I recognize that the buildup of military forces by the Federal Republic is now under way, progress has been considerably slower than we had been led to expect by earlier statements by the Federal Government. Our agreement to the current level of support for our forces was based in large measure on the increased burden to the Federal Republic that was expected to result from a rapid buildup of military forces, which has not materialized. Moreover it is not clear to us that steps are being taken which will in fact lead to the creation of the forces which we understood as recently as the conversation between Defense Minister Strauss and Admiral Radford in December 1956 would be established.³

At the same time, as you are aware, the already heavy burden of our defense budget has been rising and we are encountering increasing difficulty in meeting fully all of the varied military requirements which our own position in the world imposes upon us. The current level of DM support covers only a fraction of the total cost of equipping and maintaining the United States Forces in Germany, and any further reduction in the level of support would directly increase our already rising defense costs. These circumstances create a political problem for us which I can assure you is a very genuine one.

I have been glad to learn from your letter of the importance which you attach to the arrangements which you have worked out with the British. I hope that these arrangements, and those which you have made with the French, can be brought to a final conclusion as soon as possible. Prime Minister Macmillan mentioned to me at Bermuda his concern regarding this matter.⁴ I see no reason why the conclusion of these arrangements should be held up by our negotiations.

When we concluded the arrangements on this subject with your Government last year, our negotiators made it clear that our agreement to the amount of support which you offered for our forces was premised on our expectation that the buildup of German forces would proceed rapidly. It was understood we were free to raise the issue of further support in the future if, in our judgment, the circumstances warranted.

In view of our respective political problems, it occurs to me that we might approach the matter on somewhat the same basis as that employed last year. This might permit us to accept the lump-sum payment which your Government has offered us. It would be regarded as a payment “on account” so that the entire subject could be reviewed again in six months’ time. This suggestion might provide the way out of our immediate problems. Meanwhile, your forthcoming trip to Washington will give us an opportunity to discuss all these problems personally.

With kindest personal regards,

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204, Eisenhower to Adenauer. Secret; Presidential Handling. Transmitted to Bonn on April 12 in telegram 2850, which is the source text, with the instruction that it be delivered to Adenauer.
2. Presumably a reference to Document 99.
3. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files.
4. For documentation on the conversations at Bermuda, March 21–23, between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan, see vol. XXVII, pp. 704 ff.
5. Telegram 2850 bears this typed signature.