102. Memorandum of a Conference With the President, White House, Washington, April 2, 1957, 2:30 p.m.1
OTHERS PRESENT
- Secretary Dulles
- Ambassador Bruce
- Mr. Robert Murphy
- Mr. Timmons
- Deputy Secretary Robertson
- Assistant Secretary McNeil
- Admiral Radford
- General Goodpaster
Mr. Dulles said there were two essentially separate issues to discuss—German support costs and the reduction of our forces in Germany
Regarding the first, the German contribution to the cost of supporting our forces in Europe, a good case can be made that the Germans could pay more. They have, however, already budgeted a definite amount. If we press them to increase the contribution for U.S. forces, the Germans will certainly cut their payments to the United Kingdom and to France. The result will be ill will toward us on the part of the French and the British, and we will in the end have to help them out to a considerable extent in compensation. The German budget provided rather liberally for the French and the British—as we pressed them to do—but they allocated to us only one-half of what we received last year.
Secretary Robertson then reviewed the matter from the standpoint of the Defense Department for the President, utilizing a memorandum [Page 225] of which a copy is attached.2 He said that Congressional opinion is so strong on this matter that it may affect adversely our aid program proposals. He suggested we should point this fact out to Adenauer, and present the question to him as one of equitable mutual security contributions. At his request Mr. McNeil then reviewed charts showing the increase in German economic strength over the past several years. He said the Germans could afford an increase without difficulty as a mutual defense contribution, and confirmed that Congress is taking a very stiff position on this matter.
Both Mr. McNeil and Mr. Robertson referred to the “slippage” in German rearmament effort.
The President recalled that Adenauer is coming up for election this fall. He said he feels that Adenauer generally wants to go forward with collective defense effort, including the German rearmament, but he is limited in how much he can attempt. Secretary Dulles said that he too thought that Adenauer is trying hard and honestly to make good on the rearmament program. It is not a question of his will. The short-fall is simply a measure of the real political difficulties he is experiencing. It has been very hard for him to go forward with the program, and to obtain any conscription law at all. By pressing him, we may risk what we are seeking to gain. The President asked if we should not say to Adenauer that, if this is all they plan to contribute to the support of U.S. forces, and plan to do themselves, we will have to reexamine our deployments next year. Admiral Radford said that Strauss had described the program to him in December.3 It sounded like a good program. Five divisions by 30 June 1957, two additional by the first of January 1958, and five more “soon.” Later, evidence began to appear of a cutback, culminating in messages from Bonn two months ago indicating that Strauss is not going to do what he said he would. Admiral Radford said he thought the United States had been the victim of some sharp practice in this matter.
The President said the real question was as to how this matter would affect the election. He said he is ready to write a letter setting forth the whole thing. He added that he felt Congress would be more inclined to accept the situation if German defense effort were rising rapidly. Mr. Murphy pointed out that, for the Germans to increase their contribution, they would have to go back to the Bundestag for an appropriation. Funds cannot be transferred from their own defense effort to support costs. The President said we must find some way to establish our position with Adenauer. He recognized that Adenauer might well not publish what was sent. We could [Page 226] report what Mr. Strauss said. We might say that we will wait until next year to press the matter further, but we could add that we feel they should contribute an additional amount, and that we intend to insist upon it. Mr. McNeil said it might be possible to apply the $77 million they are contributing to the period from May until November, and let them know we will seek additional funds then. The President suggested that we might say to Adenauer that we will have to review the matter at the end of the year. Mr. Dulles said he would try to draft a reply to Adenauer in collaboration with Defense. He said it was very important to the British to get the situation settled. He felt we should acquiesce in what the Germans are contributing to the British. The President said we should tell the Germans that they cannot satisfy us by taking funds from the British and French contributions. Mr. Dulles said we should try to get the Germans to accept the British arrangement as definitive.
The group next took up the subject of force skills and deployments. Mr. Robertson said that for forward planning for FY–59 Defense wanted to pull out some men and units from Europe. There was discussion of the renewal of the fighter wing, and certain antiaircraft and other elements from the United Kingdom. The President indicated he associated this with the IRBM, and this point was clarified after discussion. He said that we should make clear that we are trying to help the British out with regard to foreign exchange burdens, but that we feel that they could take over a unit which is going to be stationed within the UK itself.
The President asked why we cannot streamline divisions and cut down backup troops without public announcement. It could be done on a worldwide basis, avoiding the connotation of pulling out of Europe.
Mr. Robertson said it is not planned to touch major units, but to cut down administrative elements, and the President said he is all for cuts of this kind. Admiral Radford said we should let our allies know that we will be cutting numbers. Secretary Dulles recalled that, in the December NATO meeting, he announced that there would be a change in numbers without reducing the strength of units and without removing major units. He saw no need to make any public announcement. Secretary Dulles said he assumed Defense would keep in close touch with SACEUR on this matter, and Secretary Robertson undertook to do so. Secretary Robertson said that the British are giving a lot of publicity to the withdrawal of our anti-aircraft units (which are armed with weapons now becoming obsolete), and there was some thought that they were doing so to divert attention from their own cutbacks. The President asked what weapons will be used against low-flying aircraft, and some of the new missile developments were discussed with him.
[Page 227]The President then took up his views regarding the desirability of having the British get the German tank order for their Centurion tanks. Mr. Robertson said that Defense had received a statement of the President’s view and policies had been adjusted to that in Defense, and in the Army too. Germany, however, is leaning toward the M–48 tank. Secretary Dulles said a message had just been received indicating that Mr. Strauss had announced his decision in favor of the M–48. The President expressed himself very strongly on this matter. He said he had understood that the Germans were going to buy Centurions (this understanding was apparently based on a statement by Minister Blank); German military men had opposed this decision, and it appeared that it was being reversed. The President said he could find many ways to influence the Germans toward the Centurion. There was discussion which indicated that our services had, in a degree, facilitated German consideration of the M–48. Mr. McNeil said that the matter of delivery schedules was still open. The President said it looked to him as though someone had decided to sell M–48s in spite of the President’s ideas. He said if such was not the case, they had not been very clever in their methods.
Secretary Robertson finally said that, in addition to pulling out administrative personnel and some administrative units, it might be necessary to pull out certain combat support units. The President said it would be best simply to pull out men as part of a worldwide tightening-up operation, not as a cutback in European strength.
Brigadier General, USA