Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Central and Southeastern Europe, Volume XXVI

101. Memorandum From the Secretary of State to the President¹

Washington, March 27, 1957.

I enclose herewith a communication from Chancellor Adenauer to you, as received by me today from the German Ambassador.² This deals with the matter of German contribution to the support of American troops in Germany. The Germans have offered us $77 million, which is half of what we received last year, and we have asked for what we got last year.

The Ambassador said he was instructed also to transmit orally the Chancellor’s personal assurance to you that he had studied this matter very carefully and was genuinely convinced that it was impossible to do more this year. The funds allocated for the financial support of foreign forces in the Federal Republic with parliamentary agreement will be exhausted by the contemplated contributions to the United Kingdom, France, and the United States. The principal contribution is to the United Kingdom, which will receive considerably more than last year, but somewhat less than what the British estimate they need completely to cover their troop expenditures in Germany. However, the United Kingdom agreement is not being finalized until it is known that the United States will accept the German offer. Any increased payment to us would probably be at the expense of the United Kingdom and would have a serious impact upon the whole matter of stationing United Kingdom troops on the continent. You may recall that Macmillan urged that we should take action which would permit of finalizing the United Kingdom-German agreement.

It is, I believe, the view of the Defense Department that we should insist upon getting more. I think that under a “capacity-to-pay” test the Germans should pay more. However, we in the State Department feel quite clearly that the political price of getting more would be excessive. It would either require the Chancellor to go back and get an additional appropriation, which would be politically very hazardous for him, or require the British to give up to us some of the amounts which are now to be paid them. This would be costly from the standpoint of our United Kingdom relations.

I therefore recommend that we acquiesce in the Chancellor’s proposal. But perhaps before deciding this finally, you may want to have a meeting with Defense and State to hear Defense’s viewpoint which will also reflect, I believe, a Congressional view that we should try to get the Germans to pay more.³

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Confidential; Personal and Private.
2. Document 99.

3. On March 28, President Eisenhower telephoned Secretary Dulles. The transcript of the conversation reads in part as follows: “The President said there was one question that was not covered by State—that is what Germany proposes to do for the French as compared with the past. Said France has taken most of troops out and sent them to Algeria and he did not see any reason why France would be given a favored position.

   “President asked if Secretary had talked directly to Charlie Wilson on this—and when the Secretary was going to take it up. Apparently the Secretary said he would do so, and talk to President later.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries)