72. Memorandum of a Conversation, Bonn, September 10, 19561
PARTICIPANTS
- Chancellor Konrad Adenauer
- Dr. James B. Conant
- Mr. Donald A. Quarles
On September 10, 1956, at 12 noon, Chancellor Adenauer received the American Secretary of the Air Force, Mr. Donald A. Quarles, for a conversation in which the American Ambassador in Bonn also participated.
First, the American Ambassador conveyed greetings from President Eisenhower to the Chancellor. He had had an opportunity to speak with the President on the preceding Friday and the President was concerned about the situation in Europe.2 In response to the remark of the Chancellor that he would be happy when the American elections were over, the American Ambassador declared that the elections play no great role and there was no doubt but that the President would be reelected. In the opinion of the Chancellor, the election constitutes a handicap for President Eisenhower and the Republican party.
Then the Chancellor gave some highly confidential information on a resolution of the NATO Standing Group taken on September 5 or 6. A spokesman of the Standing Group had declared before the NATO Council that the previous intention to pursue the so-called “forward strategy” in case of a Soviet attack could no longer be maintained after the withdrawal of the French and British troops and [Page 156] that the defense points would be moved back to the Rhein and the Ijssel. This means a complete declaration of bankruptcy by NATO. If this fact should become known, it would have an extremely crushing effect in Europe and particularly in Germany. During the discussion of this plan by the NATO Ambassadors, it was learned that two Ambassadors, the American and the Greek, were without instructions from their Governments. According to information given by Mr. Blankenhorn, the American Ambassador to NATO frequently was without information or instructions from his Government. For example, the nomination of Senator George was announced to the press but not to Mr. Perkins himself so that he was forced to state that he did not know whether or not he was Ambassador to NATO.
The reason for his remarks were to show that only the United States could assume the leadership of the Free World and that if it did not maintain this leadership, then that is the end.
The Chancellor then spoke of news which he had received the previous day (Sept. 9) according to which a subcommittee of the American Senate for Disarmament had heard 75 individuals, the majority of whom expressed the opinion that the armament of the Federal Republic increased tension and would make an international agreement on disarmament difficult. This appears in an interim report of the Committee which was published in Washington on the weekend. All the persons who appeared before the Committee favored a cessation of experiments with atomic and hydrogen bombs on the basis of an international agreement. The witnesses supported the view of the American Government according to which disarmament should only be accomplished step by step, but at the same time they recommended that the United States should pursue a unilateral policy of disarmament in case an international disarmament agreement could not be reached in the near future.
As a third point, the Chancellor named the differences of opinion concerning the Suez which exist between the United States, England and France. If the three aforementioned facts are considered together, it is not too much to say that it is all over with NATO. This is a serious situation and the Soviet Union is thereby rendered the best possible service. The report on the reduction of armed forces is completely destroying Adenauer’s policy.
He sees as the reason for these events the fact that American politicians and also numerous members of the American Government are not able to comprehend what a dictator, a dictatorial regime, and especially a communistic regime mean. In America, the belief appears to prevail that if one treats another person decently the other person must for his part also conduct himself decently. Germans have had experience with dictatorship and know that meeting a person half way is always regarded as a sign of weakness. For this reason, the [Page 157] danger is so great and the entire work which the United States has in the past, thank God, accomplished, threatens to be destroyed.
If the Mollet Government should fall, the only alternatives would be a dictatorship or a popular front. Mollet is an excellent man and Adenauer himself does not know what would become of France if Mollet should fall. Such a development would then extend to Italy where the Nenni- and Saragat-Socialists are already close together. If Mollet should fall, Eden would also fall at the same time.
Under these conditions, it is impossible for him to succeed in introducing a period of military service of 18 months; and if the Federal Republic does not introduce this, all other NATO States would eliminate their 18-month period of service. The only way out which he sees is to introduce a 12-month period of service for certain branches of the armed forces and an 18-month period for others. He could perhaps also say that he must discuss the question again with experts in the Defense Ministry, but the planning now is for a 12-month period of service coupled with two or three month periods of training in succeeding years.
Mr. Quarles then responded to the remarks of the Chancellor and referred to the report of the Senate Committee which he had not seen. He pointed out that there are many people in the American Government with very different views, that this is an election year, and that the opposition party constitutes a majority of the Senate. Regrettable though it is, it is necessary to take into account that the Senate will express views which are not in accord with the Government.
Mr. Quarles assured the Chancellor that President Eisenhower, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense do not share the views presented in this report. He is certain that everyone who occupies a responsible political position would accept the validity of the statements by the Chancellor concerning the seriousness of the situation, the unreliability of a dictatorship, and the necessity to remain firm. The United States is determined to remain firm. This determination is given its expression in its military progress and in the defense budget, which are constantly becoming greater. In this regard, the United States is motivated by the desire to strengthen its own position and, at the same time, to help its Allies strengthen their positions. Mr. Quarles further assured the Chancellor that both political parties support these efforts. With regard to the defense budget, there had been differences of opinion, but the budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1 was greater than that for the previous year and, although the budget for the following year has not yet been fixed, he is of the firm belief that this will be larger than the present one.
[Page 158]The United States now finds itself in the midst of a revolution of its military structure which is based on the development of atomic weapons. In this connection, the Army, Navy and Air Force are affected. As a result of the development of these weapons, through the great increase in strength, speed and cruising range of modern planes as well as the application of the most modern electrical equipment for the use and control of these planes, the fire power and striking power of the individual soldier has been substantially increased. With the further development of fire power, consideration is being given to an appropriate reduction in the strength of the personnel.
The Chancellor again referred to the interim report of the Senate Committee to which the American Ambassador replied this involved personal views of the witnesses, who are not experts.
Mr. Quarles then mentioned two fundamental principles of the American defense position. In the first place, it is a matter of keeping the border of the Free World strong enough so that a Soviet or communistic aggression would have to be massive enough in order to overcome the power of the Free World which has been built up on its border. However, if a Soviet aggression were so massive, then the intention underlying this would be clear, and if it were clearly established that the Soviet Union planned to undertake such a massive aggression, then the United States is determined to respond to this wherever necessary with all of the strength at its disposal. It is therefore a question of maintaining the periphery strong enough in order that the intention of the opponent will be revealed in case of an attack.
The second principle is that one must have sufficient retaliatory power so that any aggression would a priori constitute a risk for the opponent. He believed that if the Free World stands firm on the periphery and if it maintains the possibility of waging a massive retaliatory blow against the Soviet Union once its intention to begin a massive aggression has become known, then this serves as a deterrent which will keep the Russians from even thinking about aggression. Of course, it is known that the Soviets are attempting to expand their sphere of influence through subversive activity, infiltration and economic warfare. He believed, however, that the United States together with the Federal Republic and all of its other Allies is strong enough and that the system of the Free World is good enough to counter this danger. If the Russians can be prevented from resorting to massive aggression, then in his opinion it would also prove possible to protect the system of the Free World against the evil system of communism.
The Chancellor responded to Mr. Quarles’ remarks as follows: To be sure, nuclear weapons and deterrents must be placed in the hands of the Army. It is also correct to say that the fire power of the [Page 159] individual soldier is much greater than before. If it should ever be possible to fire nuclear shells from conventional cannons, then it would be possible to think of a reduction in the armed forces. But this should not be suggested until the situation has progressed so far, that is, before nuclear munitions are developed to such an extent that they could, for example, be fired from conventional cannons and their effectiveness reduced to a smaller radius. The article which appeared in the New York Times concerning the reduction of the American armed forces by 800,000 men would mean that all bases outside the United States would have to be given up.
The Soviet Union is living on the hope of disunity in the West. Therefore, everything must be avoided which nourishes this hope. The Chancellor recalled his conversations with Bulganin and Khrushchev, in which the question of whether the West could stick together played a decisive role. Khrushchev openly admitted that because of armament, social burdens have become so pressing that they wish to reduce their armaments. Now, for example, if the proposal is made that the United States disarm unilaterally, the position of the Russians in power would thereby be strengthened although great dissatisfaction exists in their own land. The Chancellor saw only one possibility, namely, that the Russians must not be given a respite.
In so far as the development of pilotless aircraft, nuclear weapons and guided missiles is concerned, the Soviet Union will also one day reach a point when it will be able to project such missiles onto the United States. A dictator is always more ready to use such a method without a declaration of war than a democratic statesman. The Soviet Union would therefore have an advantage over the United States because it could utilize such weapons suddenly. Hitler, for example, did not recognize the concept of law and international law. He had no conscience, and the only thing which counted for him was power. Therefore, the Chancellor saw in the present development a serious danger for the United States.
Mr. Quarles informed the Chancellor that the United States is already able to use atomic shells of the type which the Chancellor mentioned. This is particularly true for the Army and the Air Force. Such weapons could be utilized by tactical aircraft or with rockets or could be fired from conventional cannons. Weapons of this kind exist in various sizes so that their usage can be adapted to the appropriate target in a particular theater of action. These weapons are now ready for use. It is practically a question of advanced conventional weapons.
In so far as the reduction of forces by 800,000 men is concerned, stated Mr. Quarles, this was a matter of a staff proposal which was prepared for discussion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This plan had neither the approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, [Page 160] Admiral Radford, nor had it been officially presented to the Government. In working out the draft paper, the question under study was an examination of how the strength of the forces could be adjusted to the constantly increasing costs which arise from equipping the individual soldier with the newest weapons. In view of the increased costs and the accompanying increase in striking power, one could not maintain the same number of soldiers under arms. It was therefore a question of establishing a balance between these two factors, whereby Mr. Quarles explicitly pointed out that there is a tendency toward a constant increase in the total expenditures for military purposes.
Mr. Quarles believed that the Russians are genuinely interested in disarmament and reduction of costs since they are spending a greater portion of their national income for armament than the United States, and this must constitute a substantial burden. Everything that the Russians had done thus far in the field of disarmament, nevertheless, is of little value with regard to modern weapon technique and he doubted the sincerity of their intentions. He is convinced that the strength of the Free World depends upon its solidarity and he attached particular importance to a continuation of this solidarity with the Federal Republic.
The Chancellor replied that the fact must be taken into account that some day the Russians will also be in a position to deliver modern weapons on the U.S. They are already in such a position. In the event that the Russians undertake a major aggression, it is believed that they would begin with a massive air attack on the U.S. in order to destroy the centers of American striking power in their own land. It is not expected, for example, that the Soviets would set their land forces into motion in the direction of the Rhine because they would thereby betray their aggressive intentions toward America and would thereby renounce the possibility of a surprise attack on the United States.
The Chancellor believed that in the light of the present-day strategic situation, the statements of the Standing Group do not have too great significance.
The Chancellor observed that this statement had not failed to make an impression and that NATO had thereby been weakened. One could even say that NATO would then be superfluous.
Mr. Quarles interjected that the view expressed in this statement was not in accord with the thinking of the Defense Ministry in Washington since in its opinion it is not reasonable.
The Chancellor continued that if one said that the Soviet Union would not undertake a local aggression because it feared retaliatory blows, then the question arises why German forces should be raised. Furthermore, account must be taken of the fact that such local aggression could be started not only by the Russians but also by satellite [Page 161] states. The United States would also think over the situation several times before it determined to utilize its entire atomic force.
Mr. Quarles again referred to the two basic principles of the American defense position. Strength on the periphery can only be created when the German armed forces are strong enough to oppose attacks by guerrilla forces of the East Zone. It is necessary to make a distinction between guerrilla activity and a massive Soviet aggression. Strong German forces are indispensable if one is to oppose all aggressions which are less than a massive attack of the entire East Bloc.
The Chancellor observed that in such a major conflict the first hour would be decisive and he feared, for the previously mentioned reasons, that the Soviets would have the advantage.
Mr. Quarles disagreed with this. The Americans, in their planning, are prepared to grant the Soviets the advantage of the first blow since they believe they have achieved such a strong position that it would be possible to wage a decisive retaliatory blow, despite a surprise attack, which would make any massive Russian aggression a risk. Therefore, not the first day but the first week is decisive.
The conversation ended at 1:25 p.m.
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10–1256. Secret. Drafted by Weber on September 11. In an October 12 note to Murphy, attached to the source text, Beam wrote:
“Attached is a copy of a German report of the conversation between Chancellor Adenauer and Secretary Quarles at Bonn on September 10, 1956. I understand Mr. Reinstein has previously shown you this report which was sent us by the Embassy. Presumably it was prepared by the Chancellor’s personal translator, Herr Weber.
“The conversation dealt almost entirely with the recent doubts of the Chancellor with reference to American political-military policy.
“The very last statement attributed to Mr. Quarles to the effect that ‘not the first day but the first week is decisive’, is apparently the basis of Adenauer’s misunderstanding of the U.S. position which he expressed in his talk with you.”
↩ - Not further identified.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩