Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

57. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence (Wisner) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy)¹

Washington, July 4, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Views of a leading expert on the Soviet Union, concerning exploitation of the Soviet de-Stalinization program

1. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to your request for a somewhat fuller statement, in writing, of the current views of a leading American expert on Soviet affairs (hereinafter referred to as “the expert”).² [This information is submitted for your confidential use, since the expert has repeatedly expressed himself to me as being most anxious to avoid the creation of any impression that he is seeking to intrude or in any way impose his views upon governmental officials having the responsibility for policy formulation, and I have undertaken to respect his requests in this regard.]³

2. It will be recalled that the expert expressed the view, prior to the publication on June 4 by the State Department of a version of the Khrushchev secret speech, that it might be wiser and more effective in the long run if more “indirect means” could be found for releasing the document and exploiting its contents to our advantage. About two weeks after the publication of the document, the expert told me that he had been most agreeably surprised to find such a heavy percentage of favorable and useful reaction in the foreign press (extracts of which I have been furnishing to him on a continuing basis). He said that in his opinion this enterprise had come through the first phase more successfully than he would have predicted, and that on the whole things are rolling along very well. He felt certain that the impact upon the Free World Communist parties had been almost shattering and that they were filled with confusion and dismay. He commented particularly upon the “conspicuous malaise and bitterness of Togliatti”, whom he regards as a most significant bellwether of Free World Communist leadership. He also commented in this same conversation upon the obvious difficulties of the satellite Communist leadership, and repeated his continuing view that the Kremlin leadership itself appears to be on the defensive and to have opened up a Pandora’s Box for themselves. He was, however, quite strongly inclined to the view that now the campaign has been successfully launched, the more we can get others to say for us and the less our own top leaders have to say themselves, the better the results will be.

3. In a conversation which I had with the expert yesterday, for the purpose of requesting him to study and give us the benefit of his reactions and interpretations regarding the so-called “Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU” which was published on or about 1 July,⁴ the expert offered the following additional observations and refinements:

a. The Resolution, especially the use which is made of the Poznan riots to blame all of their problems on “subversive imperialist intervention”, is a typically Stalinist reaction; after all the Kremlin leadership were Stalin’s own pupils, especially in so far as the non-Communist world is concerned. It appears more and more clearly that the differences between the present leadership and Stalin are mainly tactical as regards their handling of the outside world and in the conduct of foreign affairs generally. They seemed to feel that Stalin had missed a lot of good bets; viz., had made enemies unnecessarily and in so doing had united the Free World against him—and also Stalin had failed to cash in on many opportunities which should have been easily exploitable to the advantage of the Soviet Union.

b. The effort to justify the dictatorship in the 1920’s and early 1930’s in terms of capitalist encirclement is a Stalinist explanation and one which was entirely unwarranted by the factual situation. No one was planning to attack the Soviet Union during that period. They no doubt did have need of a tightening-up of the reins of authority when the threat of Nazi Germany became real, slow as Stalin was to open his eyes to the true nature of that menace.

c. The tone and content of the Resolution indicate that the Kremlin is very worried and their dragging in of the references to the Poznan revolt underscores this worry. It is of the greatest importance that they not be allowed to get away with this new lie. The expert said that whereas he welcomed the State Department’s flat denial of our involvement or responsibility, he wanted to underscore in particular the importance of the avoidance on our part of any statements or actions which would be susceptible of the interpretation that we were involved—i.e., “let the lady not protest too loudly”.

d. … [The expert continues to feel that there are many evidences of a continuing power struggle within the top leadership, and that they are still very far away from resolving all of the difficulties which are inherent in the attempt to convert from a one-man dictatorship to a truly collective leadership.]

Frank G. Wisner

P.S. You may want to show this to Jake Beam and Franny Stevens.

F

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–456. Secret; Eyes Only.
2. According to a covering memorandum of July 5 from Murphy to the Secretary of State, the CIA was in continuous contact with George Kennan on matters relating to the Soviet Union. Murphy referred to the analysis of Khrushchev’s secret speech made by Kennan, who had stated his opposition to publication of the speech (see Document 43). Murphy noted that the attached memorandum indicated that “Mr. Kennan was agreeably surprised over the heavy percentage of favorable and useful reaction, and that the first phase was more successful than he would have predicted.”
3. All brackets in this document are in the source text.
4. See footnote 2, supra.