Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

43. Memorandum From the Deputy Director (Plans) of Central Intelligence (Wisner) to the Director (Dulles)¹

Washington, May 8, 1956.

SUBJECT

• Views of a Leading Expert² on Soviet Affairs Regarding Causes and Significance of the Downgrading of STALIN

1. It is believed that you and certain other Agency officials will be interested in the hypothesis, set forth below, of one of the most outstanding American experts on Soviet affairs, which I have just received. For the reasons which I have expressed orally to you, I do not deem it advisable to identify this expert in this memorandum. … It is my hope that a certain amount of additional research, keyed to the various points that are advanced in support of this hypothesis, will be productive of material tending to support or disprove at least some portions of the analysis, thereby affording to us a somewhat clearer view of the matter. I would recommend against the dissemination of this document outside the Agency until such time as it has been subjected to further research and analysis.

2. The expert takes exception to the view which has been expressed in certain quarters that the present Soviet leadership is a group of amiable and mutually cordial persons, welded together by their long apprenticeship under STALIN who have found a workable and enduring solution to the inherent difficulties of collective leadership. In particular this expert is skeptical of the view that the recent wave of anti-STALIN revelations in Russia represents only the implementation of a plan conceived long in advance, and quite harmoniously, by the entire group at the top. [The foregoing is perhaps an over-simplification of the line of thought to which exception is taken—but it is set up in this manner by the expert to provide a clear point of departure for his analysis. Actually I am not aware that any of the respectable experts consider that there is complete harmony within the top leadership, since most of those who are inclined to the view that barring unforeseen crises we can expect a substantial period of mutual accommodation as between the leaders have qualified their statements in various ways and in varying degrees.]³

3. The hypothesis which appears to this expert the most plausible and most worthy of attention with respect to these recent happenings in Russia is simply this:

“That the members of the present leading group either killed STALIN, in 1953, or brought about his death as a side-effect of an effort to remove him from power;

“That they did not wish to admit this at the time for fear of causing ‘panic and disarray’;

“That they have been aware from the start that some day and in some way the truth must come out;

“That this has been the basic reason for the entire action, since STALIN’s death, to reduce his stature in the public eye; that these men have been concerned, in other words, to reveal—gradually and discreetly—the true frightfulness of STALIN’s personality in order that when the truth does come out their action may appear as a justifiable step to save the movement from possible destruction at the hands of a semi-mad villain rather than as an act of treachery and jealousy;

“That the secret thus shared by these men is indeed in some respects a bond of unity among them, but at the same time a very touchy and delicate factor in their relations and one that can easily be or become, the source of violent suspicions and disagreements;

“That there has not by any means been full agreement to date as to:

• “(a) The point at which the complete revelation should be made, or—accordingly—
• “(b) The rate of speed at which STALIN’s image should be deflated;

“That the vacillating and erratic quality of their recent behavior with respect to the treatment of STALIN (the increased use of his name at the close of 1955, followed by the complete rejection of it toward the end of January) reflects these disagreements; and

“That there is considerable likelihood that these recent developments involve not just a theoretical argument about how fast the debunking of STALIN ought, in the interests of the movement, to be permitted to proceed but threats or insistence, from some quarter, that the revelation of what occurred in 1953 may—or should—take place in the near future.”

The expert adds that if his hypothesis is generally accurate, then there would be every reason to suppose that the killing of Beria (who would not—in this expert’s opinion—be accepted as a party to the action against STALIN) had something to do with knowledge on Beria’s part of what had occurred and of the fact that he could not be depended on—not sharing the guilt—to observe the same rules and to have the same sense of responsibility in this respect, as the others.

This expert also doubts very much that Molotov was a party to any of this, which would explain his estrangement from the ruling group; but his cautious temperament plus perhaps the fact that he has no actual proof, might be considered sufficient guarantee, in contrast to Beria, that he will make no trouble. Malenkov, too, cannot have been a full-fledged participant in the action against STALIN, a circumstance that would explain much in the development of his position since STALIN’s death, and may be very important for his political future as well.

4. This expert emphasizes that the foregoing is only a hypothesis, but states that he has been encouraged to give it to us by what seems to him to be some general confirmation, in subsequent events of the interpretation of Soviet internal happenings which he gave to us shortly after the death of Stalin.

Note: This analysis and hypothesis is quite similar in certain respects to that which appeared in the 16 April issue of the New Leader, in an article by Vishniak, entitled “Was STALIN Murdered?” The Vishniak article contains references to other authors said to hold similar views (e.g., Nicolaevsky, Borkenau, Crankshaw, Joseph Newman, Gouzenko). It may well develop that the processs of normal research will not produce any very clear-cut results, by way of affirming or disproving the thesis. … The fact that a serious and knowledgeable expert can arrive at such an hypothesis suggests that it may be a very credible one.…

Frank C. Wisner⁴

1. Source: Department of State, EUR Files: Lot 59 D 233, Memos 1956–7. Secret.
2. George F. Kennan.
3. Brackets in the source text.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.