Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Soviet Union, Eastern Mediterranean, Volume XXIV

56. Memorandum Prepared in the Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence¹

Washington, July 3, 1956.

SOVIET RESOLUTION ON CULT OF PERSONALITY²

1. The Central Committee resolution appears as an effort to keep under control further critical discussions of Stalin and prevent such discussions from becoming an inquiry into the characteristics of the Soviet system and the past actions of current Soviet leaders. In response to the recent questioning of Togliatti and others, it advances an explanation of how Stalin managed to gain control and why he was not removed. Moscow presumably expects foreign Communists to accept this explanation and terminate their discussions, since the resolution stresses that Stalin is a thing of the past and in effect warns that critical discussions of the Stalin situation parallel efforts of the imperialists to distract the working class from future tasks.

2. Compared to the depth of analysis of Togliatti’s questioning, the resolution is superficial, transparent, and hackneyed. Its defensive tone, lack of frankness, and incompleteness point up how difficult it is for Moscow to provide a serious explanation so long as the Soviet rulers refuse to permit discussion of the Soviet system and their own relations with Stalin.

3. The only foreign Communist reaction as of Wednesday³ appeared in the New York Daily Worker which equivocally concluded that some would be satisfied and some would want to probe deeper.

4. The explanation of how the cult of personality developed provides no new thoughts, simply repeating what has been previously suggested by various foreign Communists. Moscow does go beyond its previous position, however, of ascribing everything to Stalin’s vanity and argues that historical conditions, chiefly capitalist encirclement, also operated as a cause.

5. The explanation of why Stalin was not removed omits some points mentioned in Khrushchev’s secret speech and provides some new points, but these raise more questions than they answer. The resolution denies that no counteraction was taken against Stalin and, without elaboration, asserts that Party and military figures restricted his activity during the war. It also for the first time alleges that a “Leninist nucleus” existed in the Central Committee and, immediately after the death of Stalin, began the struggle against the cult of personality. These two new elements raise the possibility that within the Soviet ruling circle an effort is under way to build a case designed to absolve at least some of the current rulers from co-responsibility for Stalin’s excesses and even to claim that these excesses had been opposed within the limitations of Stalin’s rule.

6. As for guarantees against a repetition of Stalin, the resolution simply asserts that such excesses will not be allowed in the future, but does not state how they would be prevented.

7. The resolution completely ignores the remarks of Togliatti and others regarding new relations among Communist parties, including greater autonomy and mutual criticism.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/7–356. The source text was attached to a brief covering memorandum dated July 3 from Armstrong to Howe, indicating that the memorandum was material for the Secretary’s briefing book.
2. On July 2, Pravda published a June 30 resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU entitled “On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences.” An English translation is printed in Gruliow, Current Soviet Policies—II, pp. 221–227.
3. Apparently June 27.